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ARTICLES

THE EMERGING FIRST AMENDMENT LAW OF
MANAGERIAL PREROGATIVE
Lawrence Rosenthal*
In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the U.S. Supreme Court, by the narrowest of
margins, held that allegations ofpolice perjury made in memoranda to his
superiors by Richard Ceballos, a supervisoryprosecutor in the Los Angeles
County DistrictAttorney's office, were unprotected by the FirstAmendment
because "his expressions were made pursuantto his duties." The academic
reaction to this holding has been harshly negative; scholars argue that the
holding will prevent the public from learning of governmental misconduct
that is known only to those working within the bowels of the government
itself
This Article rejects the scholarly consensus on Garcetti. It argues that
the critics' claim that Garcetti undervalues the role of whistleblowers in
enhancing the quality of public discussion and debate is misconceived
because Garcetti is not properly understood as a whistleblower case.
Moreover, although the Court's opinion is admittedly undertheorized, its
holding is consistent with fundamental principles of First Amendment law.
Rather than stiflingpublic discussion and debate about public institutions,
Garcetti rests on an understandingof the FirstAmendment's commitment to
free speech as a means of achieving political accountability-an
understandingwith powerful roots in FirstAmendment jurisprudence. The
Court's opinion contains an account-concededly undertheorized-of
managerial control over employee speech as essential if management is to
be held politically accountablefor the performance of public institutions.
This Article endeavors to fill out that account.
* Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law. The reader should know that as
Deputy Corporation Counsel for the City of Chicago, I litigated many of the issues discussed
in this Article on behalf of a public employer. In particular, I successfully pressed on the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit much the same position as was ultimately
adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Garcetti v. Ceballos in Gonzalez v. City of Chicago,
239 F.3d 939 (7th Cir. 2001). My thanks are owed to Cynthia Estlund, Steve Krone, Kurt
Lash, Matt Parlow, and Paul Secunda for sage advice on prior drafts. I must also thank
Jeremy Katz, Christine Ludwiczak, Amy Song, and the staff of the Chapman University
School of Law's Rinker Law Library for highly capable research assistance. I am grateful as
well for helpful comments made by my colleagues at a faculty workshop at Chapman
University School of Law and the participants at the Colloquium on New Scholarship in
Employment and Labor Law at the University of Colorado.
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The Article begins with an exploration of Garcetti. PartI demonstrates
that Garcetti essentially abandons the Court's prior approach to the First
Amendment rights of public employees by embracing a new inquiry that
focuses on an identification of the scope of legitimate managerial
prerogatives. Managerial prerogative, in turn, ensures that political
officials have effective control over the functioning of public offices-and
therefore arefairly held politically accountablefor the operations of those
offices. Part I concludes with a consideration of the future of public
employee speech litigation in light of the emerging law of managerial
prerogative.
Part II considers the implications of this new law of managerial
prerogative in another employment-related context-laws forbidding
discriminatoryharassment. There has been a powerful current of scholarly
argument that the First Amendment places substantial limitations on the
power of government to forbid sexually or racially harassingspeech. At
least four members of the Supreme Court have expressed significant
support for this view. Part II demonstrates that under the concept of
managerial prerogative embraced by Garcetti, governmental power to
forbid harassingspeech in the workplace is largely unconstrained by the
FirstAmendment.
In Part III, the Article places Garcetti within the context of a broader
trend in recent First Amendment jurisprudence. Part III sketches the
emerging doctrinal framework of this new First Amendment law of
managerialprerogative and then, to illustrate the character of emerging
doctrine, applies this framework to institutions of higher education and the
concept of academic freedom-an issue noted but set aside in Garcetti.
Part III argues that the emerging First Amendment law of managerial
prerogative permits public universities to regulate academic speech in a
manner that is consistent with scholarly norms as a means of achieving
legitimate institutionalobjectives.
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INTRODUCTION

In Garcetti v. Ceballos,1 the U.S. Supreme Court, by the narrowest of
margins, held that allegations of police perjury made in memoranda to his
superiors by Richard Ceballos, a supervisory prosecutor in the Los Angeles
County District Attorney's office, were unprotected by the First
Amendment because "his expressions were made pursuant to his
duties .... ,,2 The academic reaction to this holding has been harshly
negative; scholars argue that the holding will prevent the public from
learning of governmental misconduct that is known only to those working
within the bowels of the government itself. 3 Here, for example, is Erwin
Chemerinsky's take:
1. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court,
joined by Chief Justice John Roberts, Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice Clarence Thomas, and
Justice Samuel Alito. Dissenting opinions were filed by Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice
David Souter, joined by Justice Stevens and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Justice
Stephen Breyer. See id. at 412.
2. Id. at421.
3. For the negative reaction in the academy, see Michael P. Allen, George W. Bush and
the Nature of Executive Authority, 72 BROOK. L. REv. 871, 933-34 (2007); Sonya Bice,
Tough Talk from the Supreme Court on Free Speech: The Illusory Per Se Rule in Garcetti as
FurtherEvidence of Connick 's Unworkable Employee/Citizen Speech Partition,8 J.L. Soc'Y
45, 83-86 (2007); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Kennedy Court: October Term 2005, 9 GREEN
BAG 2d 335, 340-41 (2006); Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both
Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 605, 670, 683 (2008); Cynthia Estlund,
Harmonizing Work and Citizenship: A Due Process Solution to a First Amendment
Problem, 2006 SuP. CT. REV. 115, 144-53 [hereinafter Estlund, Work and Citizenship];
Cynthia Estlund, Free Speech Rights that Work at Work: From the FirstAmendment to Due
Process, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1463, 1470-74 (2007) [hereinafter Estlund, Free Speech Rights
that Work at Work]; Joel Gora, FirstAmendment Decisions in the October 2005 Term, 22
TouRo L. REV. 917, 925-27 (2006); Scott A. Moss, Students and Workers and PrisonersOh, My! A Cautionary Note About Excessive Institutional Tailoring of FirstAmendment
Doctrine, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1635, 1649-52 (2007); Sheldon H. Nahmod, Public Employee
Speech, CategoricalBalancing, and § 1983: A Critiqueof Garcetti v. Ceballos, 42 U. RICH.
L. REv. 561, 569-81 (2008); Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, Public Employee Speech Rights
Fall Prey to an Emerging DoctrinalFormalism, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTs J. 1173, 1192202 (2007); John Sanchez, The Law of Retaliation After Burlington Northern and Garcetti,
30 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 539, 559-64 (2007); Paul M. Secunda, The Solomon Amendment,
Expressive Associations, and Public Employment, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1767, 1809-13 (2007);
Terry Smith, Speaking Against Norms: Public Discourse and the Economy of Racialization
in the Workplace, 57 AM. U. L. REv. 523, 572-75 (2008); Kathryn D. Cooper, Case Note,

Garcetti v. Ceballos: The Dual Threshold Requirement Challenging Public Employee Free
Speech, 8 Loy. J. PUB. INT. L. 73, 90-93 (2006); Elizabeth M. Ellis, Garcetti v. Ceballos:
Public Employees Left to Decide "Your Conscience or Your Job," 41 IND. L. REv. 187
(2008); Lara Geer Farley, Comment, A Matter of Public Concern: "Official Duties" of
Employment Gag Public Employee Free Speech Rights /Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct.
1951 (2006)], 46 WASHBURN L.J. 603, 620-32 (2007); Shubha Harris, Case Note, Silencing

the Noise of Democracy--The Supreme CourtDenies First Amendment Protectionfor Public
Employees'Job-RelatedStatements in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1143,
1167-85 (2007); Note, The Supreme Court, 2005 Term, 120 HARV. L. REv. 125, 277-82
(2006); Beth Anne Roesler, Student Article, Garcetti v. Ceballos: Judicially Muzzling the
Voices of Public Sector Employees, 53 S.D. L. REv. 397 (2008); Jaime Sasser, Comment,

Silenced Citizens: The Post-Garcetti Landscapefor Public Sector Employees Working in
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The Court's opinion rests on a false and unprecedented distinction
between individuals speaking as "citizens" and as "government
employees." Never before has the Supreme Court held that only speech
"as citizens" is safeguarded by the First Amendment. For example, in
prior decisions holding that speech by corporations is constitutionally
protected, the Court emphasized the public's interest in hearing the
speech. The fact that corporations are not citizens did not matter because
it is the right of listeners, according to the Supreme Court, that is
paramount.
Justice Kennedy's opinion thus signals a significant shift away from
free speech rights for government employees and, even worse, a
restriction on the ability of the public to learn of government misconduct.
Many fewer whistleblowers
are likely to come forward without
4
constitutional protection.

Ouch.
It is hard to dismiss the critics. The breadth of Garcetti's holding is
remarkable. Under Garcetti, any duty-related speech of a public employee
is denied constitutional protection, no matter how valuable its contribution
to public discussion and debate, and no matter how unpersuaded a court
may be of the employer's justification for suppressing that speech. This
outcome seems at odds with the Court's usual insistence that First
Amendment doctrine reflect the "profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." 5 The
National Security, 41 U. RICH. L. REv. 759, 788-92 (2007); Matthew R. Schroll, Note,
Garcetti v. Ceballos: Miscontruing Precedent to Curtail Government Employees' First
Amendment Rights, 67 MD. L. REv. 485 (2008); Steven J. Stafstrom, Jr., Note, Government
Employee, Are You a "Citizen "?: Garcetti v. Ceballos and the "Citizenship" Prong to the
Pickering/Connick Protected Speech Test, 52 ST. Louis U. L.J. 589, 622-25 (2008); Sarah F.
Suma, Note, Uncertainty and Loss in the Free Speech Rights of Public Employees Under
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 369 (2008); Christie S. Totten, Note, Quieting
Disruption: The Mistake of CurtailingPublic Employees' Free Speech Under Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 233 (2008); Julie A. Wenell, Note, Garcetti v.
Ceballos: Stifling the FirstAmendment in the Public Workplace, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTs.
J. 623, 635-46 (2007). For a defense of the decision of the court of appeals in Garcetti v.
Ceballos that appeared before that decision was reversed by the Supreme Court, see Mami
N. Zack, Note, Public Employee Free Speech: The Policy Reasons for Rejecting a Per Se
Rule PrecludingSpeech Rights, 46 B.C. L. REv. 893, 910-11 (2005).
4. Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 340 (footnote omitted).
5. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). This statement, of course,
has taken on iconic status in First Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper,
532 U.S. 514, 534-35 (2001); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 346-47
(1995); FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 382 (1984); NAACP v.
Claibome Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913, 927-28 (1982); Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972). For this very reason, the only scholarly defense of Garcetti
offered to date is easily refuted. Patrick Garry argues, "If society is concerned about
oppressive governmental employment practices, just as if society is concerned about public
employees exposing governmental waste or corruption, then it can address the problems
through the legislative process." Patrick M. Garry, The Constitutional Relevance of the
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Court's opinion, moreover, makes little effort to reconcile its holding with
general principles of First Amendment jurisprudence.
This Article rejects the scholarly consensus on Garcetti. The critics'
claim that Garcetti undervalues the role of whistleblowers in enhancing the
quality of public discussion and debate is misconceived because Garcetti is
not properly understood as a whistleblower case. Ceballos did not take his
case against the District Attorney's office to the public; therefore his speech
could not have advanced the public's understanding and evaluation of the
District Attorney's performance. Moreover, although the Court's opinion is
admittedly undertheorized, its holding is consistent with fundamental
principles of First Amendment law. Rather than stifling public discussion
and debate about public institutions, Garcetti rests on an understanding of
the First Amendment's commitment to free speech as a means of achieving
political accountability-an understanding with powerful roots in First
Amendment jurisprudence. The Court's opinion contains a sketchconcededly partial and somewhat obscure-of managerial control over
employee speech as essential if management is to be held politically
accountable for the performance of public institutions. This Article
endeavors to fill out the sketch. It argues that Garcetti recognized a
prerogative of public employers to regulate duty-related speech of public
employees in order to ensure that these officials are accountable for the
manner in which the offices that they hold discharge their public duties.
After all, if the First Amendment were understood to require that all speechrelated disputes between public employees and their superiors be referred to
binding arbitration overseen by the judiciary, then politically accountable
officials would be denied effective control over public institutions, a result
that would seriously compromise the First Amendment's commitment to
ensure that the functioning of public institutions be subject to effective
political accountability. Precisely because the electorate is ordinarily
entitled to judge the performance of public institutions, effective
accountability demands that responsibility for that performance not become
fragmented between politically accountable management and judicial
overseers.
While this Article argues that Garcetti is anchored in fundamental
principles of First Amendment jurisprudence, it refrains from claiming that
Garcetti was a straightforward application of existing law. After all,
Ceballos garnered the support of the court of appeals, as well as four
members of the Supreme Court.6 That was no fluke; pre-Garcettidoctrine
Employer-Sovereign Relationship: Examining the Due Process Rights of Government
Employees in Light of the Public Employee Speech Doctrine, 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 797, 816
(2007). Of course, if public officials are able to prevent those most likely to know of
government misconduct from disclosing what they know to the voters, the electoral process
can hardly be expected to produce an accurate assessment of the need to protect public
employee speech.
6. For the decision of the court of appeals, see Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168,
1174 (9th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). Garcettiwas one of three cases during the
October 2005 Term that were reargued after Justice Alito joined the Court, all of which were
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had lent considerable support to his position. Prior to Garcetti, when a
public employee's speech addressed a matter of public concern, it was
eligible for constitutional protection under a test that would "arrive at a
balance between the interests of the [employee] ...in commenting upon
matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees."' 7 After Garcetti, however, a public employee's duty-related
speech is categorically denied First Amendment protection.8 Garcetti
accordingly marks an important shift in First Amendment doctrine-albeit
one that had been foreshadowed by a number of earlier doctrinal strands.
Garcetti represents the first overt, if tentative and perhaps even cryptic,
explication of a First Amendment law of managerial prerogative-a
concept that will have important implications in a variety of contexts in
which public institutions must manage speech within those institutions in
order to achieve what are otherwise constitutionally legitimate objectives.
This Article begins with an exploration of Garcetti. Part I demonstrates
that Garcetti essentially abandons the Court's prior approach to the First
Amendment rights of public employees by embracing a new inquiry that
focuses on an identification of the scope of legitimate managerial
prerogatives. Managerial prerogative, in turn, ensures that political officials
have effective control over the functioning of public offices-and therefore
are fairly held politically accountable for the operations of those offices.
This concern for maintaining political accountability is anchored in
fundamental First Amendment principles. There is no constitutional value,
however, in preserving political accountability for functions of public
offices that the Constitution places beyond the control of the political
process.
It follows that managerial prerogative extends only to
constitutionally permissible managerial objectives. Part I concludes with a
consideration of the future of public employee speech litigation in light of
the emerging law of managerial prerogative.
Part II considers the implications of this new law of managerial
prerogative in another employment-related context-laws forbidding
discriminatory harassment. There has been a powerful current of scholarly
argument that the First Amendment places substantial limitations on the
ability of government to forbid sexually or racially harassing speech. At
least four members of the Supreme Court have expressed significant
ultimately decided by 5-4 votes with Justice Alito in the majority. See Erwin Chemerinsky,
The Rookie of the Year of the Roberts Court & a Look Ahead: Civil Rights, 34 PEPP. L. REv.
535, 538 (2007).
7. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465-66 (1995)
(quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (alteration in original));
accord, e.g., City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (per curiam); Rankin v.
McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983).

8. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 ("We hold that when public employees make
statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for
First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications
from employer discipline.").
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support for this view. Part 1I demonstrates that under the concept of
managerial prerogative embraced by Garcetti, governmental power to
forbid harassing speech in the workplace is largely unconstrained by the
First Amendment.
In Part III, the Article places Garcetti within the context of a broader
trend in recent First Amendment jurisprudence. Part III sketches the
emerging doctrinal framework of this new First Amendment law of
managerial prerogative and then, to illustrate the character of emerging
doctrine, applies this framework to institutions of higher education and the
concept of academic freedom-an issue noted but set aside in Garcetti.
Part III argues that the emerging First Amendment law of managerial
prerogative permits public universities to regulate academic speech in a
manner that is consistent with scholarly norms as a means of achieving
legitimate institutional objectives.
I. MANAGERIAL PREROGATIVE IN GARCETTI V.CEBALLOS

Garcetti is the most explicit recognition to date of the concept of
managerial prerogative in First Amendment jurisprudence. This part begins
with an examination of the opinion, and then explores the concept of
managerial prerogative embraced by the opinion and its implications for
future litigation.
A. The Decision
1. Facts
Ceballos was a Deputy District Attorney with supervisory
responsibilities-a "calendar deputy"--in the Los Angeles County District
9
Attorney's Pomona office.

In February 2000, a defense attorney telephoned Ceballos to alert him to
a motion the attorney had filed attacking a search warrant on the ground
that the affidavit of a deputy sheriff that had been used to obtain the warrant
contained misrepresentations of fact.10 Under the Fourth Amendment, if a
warrant application contains intentional or reckless misrepresentations of
fact that are material to the existence of probable cause, the warrant is
invalid and evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant should be
suppressed.I' After visiting the location described in the affidavit, Ceballos
concluded that it inaccurately characterized as "a long driveway what
Ceballos thought should have been referred to as a separate roadway" and
that the affiant's claim that tire tracks had led from a stripped-down truck to
the premises covered by the warrant could not be true because "the
9. Id. at 413.
10. Id. at413-14.
11. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914-16 & n.12 (1984); Franks v. Delaware,
438 U.S. 154, 164-72 (1978).
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roadway's composition in some places made it difficult or impossible to
leave visible tire tracks." 12 Ceballos wrote two memoranda to his
supervisor recommending dismissal of the case. 13 After a "heated" meeting
with sheriffs personnel, Ceballos's supervisor decided to proceed with the
case. 14 At the ensuing suppression hearing, "Ceballos was called by the
defense and recounted his observations about the affidavit, but the trial
court rejected the challenge to the warrant." 15 Ceballos subsequently lost
his supervisory position and was denied a promotion. 16 He then brought
suit alleging that he had been subjected17to impermissible retaliation for the
exercise of his First Amendment rights.
2. The Court's Holding
There was a good deal of substance to Ceballos's claim. As we have
seen, under then-prevailing doctrine, a public employee could claim First
Amendment protection for speech at the workplace under a balancing test
that assessed the employee's interests in commenting upon matters of
public concern in light of the public employer's interests in promoting the
efficiency of the public services that it performs. 18 To be sure, First
Amendment protection was unavailable when a public employee's speech
"cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or
other concern to the community," 19 but as the Ninth Circuit rather sensibly
concluded when it reversed a grant of summary judgment against Ceballos,
allegations of police perjury implicate matters of substantial public
concern. 20 Moreover, the public concern test does not exempt speech
communicated privately to superiors at the workplace from First
Amendment protection. The Court was quite clear on this point in Givhan
v. Western Line ConsolidatedSchool District,21 a case involving a private
conversation between a public school teacher and her principal in which the
teacher criticized the school's policies as racially discriminatory: "Neither
the [First] Amendment itself nor our decisions indicate that this freedom is
12. Garcetti,547 U.S. at 414. Ceballos thought that the characterization of the roadway
in the affidavit was significant because it abutted a number of other residences and therefore
Ceballos thought that the warrant application misleadingly suggested that the tire tracks
could only have come from the premises that the warrant application sought authorization to
search. Deposition of Richard Ceballos 32-33, Garcetti, 547 U.S. 410 (No. CV 00-11106),
2005 WL 1620385.
13. Garcetti,547 U.S. at 414.
14. Id.
15. Id. at414-15
16. Id. at415.
17. Id.
18. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
19. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983); accord, e.g., City of San Diego v. Roe,
543 U.S. 77, 82-83 (2004) (per curiam); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384-85
(1987).

20. See Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 547 U.S. 410
(2006).

21. 439U.S. 410 (1979).
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lost to the public employee who arranges to communicate privately with his
employer rather than to spread his views before the public. '22 And, until
Garcetti, it had been settled that when "speech does involve a matter of
public concern, the government
bears the burden of justifying its adverse
23
employment action."
Reversing the Ninth Circuit, Justice Kennedy's opinion of the Court said
next to nothing about the public concern test. Strikingly, the opinion offers
no answer to the principal dissent's claim that allegations of police perjury
implicate matters of public concern even when made pursuant to a law
enforcement official's duties, 24 nor does it answer the related claim that the
need to balance the employee's interest in speaking against the employer's
interest in workplace efficiency "hardly disappears when an employee
speaks on matters his job requires him to address." 25 Instead, the Court
wrote that "[t]he controlling factor in Ceballos' case is that his expressions
were made pursuant to his duties as a calendar deputy." 26 The Court
explained that Ceballos was engaged in the type of speech over which an
employer is entitled to exercise unfettered control:
Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee's
professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee
might have enjoyed as a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of
employer control over what the employer itself has commissioned or
created. Cf. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.

819, 833 (1995) ("[W]hen the government appropriates public funds to
promote 27
a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it
wishes").
Although the Court never explained how an employer's entitlement to
control speech that it has commissioned can be reconciled with the First
Amendment's commitment to unfettered public discussion and debate, the
Court repeatedly returned to this concept. For example: "When he went to
work and performed the tasks he was paid to perform, Ceballos acted as a
government employee. The fact that his duties sometimes required him to
speak or write does not mean his supervisors were prohibited from
22. Id. at 415-16. The Court subsequently reaffirmed this holding in Connick v. Myers,
461 U.S. 138, 148 n.8 (1983), and went on to hold that an item on a questionnaire circulated
to the staff of a local prosecutor's office asking whether they felt pressured to work on
political campaigns satisfied the public concern test, even though the questionnaire was
circulated only to other Assistant District Attorneys within the office. See id. at 141, 149. To
similar effect is Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987), in which the Court held that the
comment of a clerical employee of a local constable's office to a coworker during a private
conversation at work, upon hearing of an attempt on President Reagan's life, that "if they go
for him again, I hope they get him," id. at 381 (footnote omitted), was protected by the First
Amendment, see id. at 384-92.
23. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 466 (1995); accord
Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388.
24. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 430-32 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 430.
26. Id. at421.
27. Id. at 421-22 (alteration in original).
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evaluating his performance." 28 Again: "Supervisors must ensure that their
employees' official communications are accurate, demonstrate sound
judgment, and promote the employer's mission .... If Ceballos' superiors
thought his memo was inflammatory
or misguided, they had the authority to
'29
take proper corrective action."
Accordingly, managerial prerogative was critical to the outcome in
Garcetti. The Court did not abandon the public concern test in terms, but
the question whether the employee's speech was an effort to raise a matter
of public concern was no longer performing any analytical work. Instead,
the Court's view was that when speech is undertaken to serve
management's purposes, management necessarily enjoys the prerogative to
evaluate that speech in order to determine whether it really serves
management's purposes and, if not, to take whatever remedial action it
30
deems warranted.
Responding to the majority's approach, Justice Souter's dissent
acknowledged that the government is entitled to control the message that its
agents convey on its behalf, but added, "There is no claim or indication that
Ceballos was hired to perform such a speaking assignment. He was paid to
enforce the law by constitutional action:
to exercise the county
government's prosecutorial power by acting honestly, competently, and
constitutionally." 31 The Court never responded to Justice Souter's attack;
this is one of the ways in which the Court's opinion will strike many
readers as undertheorized. In fact, Justice Souter's characterization of
Ceballos's job was quite inaccurate, and in that inaccuracy lays the essence
of the innovation in First Amendment law that Garcettihas worked.

28. Id. at 422.
29. Id. at 422-23.
30. In dissent in Garcetti, Justice Souter argued that a public employee can speak both
as a citizen on a matter of public concern and as an employee, relying primarily on Givhan v.
Western Line ConsolidatedSchool District,439 U.S. 410 (1979), and City of Madison, Joint
School DistrictNo. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 429 U.S. 167, 17677 (1976), in which the Court had held that the First Amendment protected a teacher's right
to speak at a public meeting of a board of education on pending labor negotiations. See 547
U.S. at 429-30 (Souter, J., dissenting). Others have echoed this criticism. See, e.g.,
Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 340-41; Estlund, Work and Citizenship, supra note 3, at 14249; Rhodes, supra note 3, at 1189. While I have some difficulty with the notion that an
attorney subject to a fiduciary obligation to his client is speaking as a citizen on a matter of
public concern, even if one accepts the criticism, it highlights that Garcetti is not an
application of the public concern test, but rather is based on a conception of managerial
prerogative. This same point explains how the holdings in Garcetti and Givhan can be
reconciled. In the latter case, the employee's expression of her views on school policy was
not part of her duties, and hence no managerial prerogative over the manner in which
employees perform their duties was implicated. See supra text accompanying note 21.
31. Garcetti,547 U.S. at 437 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
Paul Secunda has echoed this point. See Secunda, supra note 3, at 1811-13.
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B. The ManagerialPrerogativeto Assess Subordinates' Speech
1. The Character of Duty-Related Speech
It should be evident that a prosecutor is hired to speak on behalf of the
government, at least in many aspects of prosecutorial duties. The most
obvious example is when the prosecutor speaks as an advocate in the
courtroom. Even the dissenters in Garcetti made no argument that when
the prosecutor litigates for the government, he has some cognizable First
Amendment interest in speaking his own mind that must be balanced
against the office's interest in ensuring that its staff comport with office
policies and positions. To the contrary, as suggested by the Court's citation
to the Rosenberger case set out above, it is settled that when the
government hires personnel to speak for it, the government is entitled to
32
regulate the content and even the viewpoint reflected in such speech.
Thus, for example, a prosecutor who acts on his personal view and opposes
incarcerating drug offenders during sentencing hearings when applicable
office policy requires a request for incarceration could find no refuge in the
First Amendment. Advocacy in the courtroom, however, is not the only
context in which a prosecutor is expected to engage in speech that an
employer must necessarily control and evaluate-certainly I recall being
expected to say and write a good deal outside of my courtroom advocacy
responsibilities during my years as a prosecutor. Consider, for example, the
very context at issue in Garcetti-aprosecutor's recommendation about the
merits of a pending case.
In my days as a prosecutor, I recall that line attorneys frequently voiced
doubts about the strength of cases. Sometimes a prosecutor's doubts were
well-founded, sometimes they stemmed from an inordinate fear of losing,
and sometimes they were borne of a desire to avoid work. It was the job of
management to fairly assess a line attorney's doubts about the merits of a
case, rather than taking them at face value. Indeed, in order to avoid such
difficult judgments about the merits of a case, a manager might even choose
to take the position that it is the job of his staff to advocate, not adjudicate,
and direct the staff to present every factual dispute to the appropriate trier of
fact for resolution. Although I never served in an office that took this
approach, it may well describe the position of senior management in
Garcetti. The decision to adopt such a policy, in turn, involves an exercise
of a constitutionally legitimate managerial prerogative-while the
Constitution guarantees an accused a fair trial and a right of access to all
exculpatory evidence, it does not guarantee an accused a right to a

32. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 540-43 (2001); Bd. of
Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229, 235 (2000);
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
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prosecutor who is 33willing to drop charges because of a possibility of defeat
at hearing or trial.
Thus, if senior management in the Los Angeles County District
Attorney's office did not want to hear from prosecutors who are unwilling
to trust trial judges to make the right ruling on a motion to suppress, its
position might be unwise, improvident, or may even violate some state-law
rule of professional ethics, but it violated no principle of constitutional law.
The Constitution protects the innocent by guaranteeing them a fair trial, not
a sympathetic ear in the prosecutor's office; indeed, the Court has
unequivocally held that the Constitution requires no "judicial oversight or
review of the decision to prosecute. '34 The Constitution accordingly
reflects the view that after a fair hearing, an independent judicial
determination is all that is necessary to protect a defendant's rights-an
accused has no additional entitlement to an advocate inside of the
prosecutor's office who will protect the accused's rights on the off chance
that a judge will not.
As it happens, Ceballos's view of the validity of the search warrant in the
underlying criminal case that gave rise to the Garcetti litigation was
wrong-the trial court ultimately ruled that the warrant was valid. It is
surely more than a little difficult to understand why the First Amendment
should protect a prosecutor's assessment of the merits of a case from
supervisory review-especially when that assessment proves erroneous.
Still, the preceding discussion should make plain that the character of
managerial prerogative does not turn on the soundness of Ceballos's
judgment. It was the prerogative of Ceballos's supervisors, not Ceballos, to
run the District Attorney's office, and among the constitutionally
permissible options open to management was the prerogative to insist that
all disputes of fact be resolved by a judge. It was the District Attorney who
had been elected to run the office, and he was therefore entitled to exercise
his own judgment about whether his subordinates were performing their
duties-including their speech-related duties-to his satisfaction. It was
Ceballos's job, in turn, to perform his duties-including duty-related
speech-to the satisfaction of the District Attorney. In other words, public
employees who are hired to speak (and write) are not hired to say just
33. Cf United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 51-55 (1992) (prosecutors are under no
constitutional obligation to present exculpatory evidence to a grand jury considering charges
against a suspect). The right to a fair trial, and the subsidiary right to disclosure of
exculpatory evidence to ensure a fair trial, are discussed in Part I.B.4. below.
34. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975); accord, e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 510
U.S. 266, 282-83 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); Costello v. United

States, 350 U.S. 359, 362-64 (1956). The only pertinent qualification is that the U.S.
Constitution guarantees an arrestee a right to a judicial determination of probable cause to
support pretrial detention. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 52 (1991).

This determination, however, need not be the product of an adversarial hearing. See
Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 116-25. Accordingly, the requirement of a postarrest judicial
determination reinforces the point that the Constitution guarantees an accused only a right to
a judicial determination of probable cause, and not any particular consideration from
prosecutors.
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anything, but are hired to speak (and write) in the fashion desired by their
superiors. 35 To the extent that the District Attorney abuses this prerogative
to run the office in the manner he finds optimal, in a republican system of
government, it is the electorate that is entitled to correct that abuse, not
Ceballos, and not the courts.
Although the need to evaluate the character of subordinates' job-related
speech may be especially evident for prosecutors, it is far from unique to
that context. For example, a candidate might gain public office on a pledge
to make the office's staff more courteous and helpful to the public at large.
Justice O'Connor once opined, "[S]urely a public employer may,
consistently with the First Amendment, prohibit its employees from being
'rude to customers,' a standard almost certainly too vague when applied to
the public at large."'36 She added, "when an employee counsels her coworkers to do their job in a way with which the public employer disagrees,
her managers may tell her to stop, rather than relying on counterspeech. ''37
After all, if the First Amendment abolished hierarchy in public offices, then
officeholders could never be held politically accountable for the acts of
their subordinates; political accountability for the performance of public
institutions would itself be seriously compromised.
Once hierarchy is recognized as consistent with constitutional principles,
however, it should become plain that an elected official's prerogative to
control the office he holds includes a prerogative to control employee
speech for which the employer is to bear political accountability. And, as
Justice O'Connor's example demonstrates, the prerogative to control
employee speech is ubiquitous in public employment; it is hardly confined
to those employees who, like Ceballos, are required to exercise professional
judgment. Thus, in Garcetti, the Court properly recognized that when an
employee's duties require the employee to speak, the employer does not
violate the First Amendment by evaluating whether the speech comports
with the employer's own views about how the employee should be
performing speech-related duties. After all, if the elected officeholder is to
be politically accountable for the manner in which the office discharges its
duties, the officeholder must have the prerogative to control the manner in
which those duties are discharged, including speech-related duties.
Precisely because the District Attorney is politically accountable for the

35. This point exposes the flaw in Terry Smith's claim that Ceballos could not have
"expected to be subject to discipline for exposing potential mendacity by a deputy sheriff."
Smith, supra note 3, at 575. To the contrary, prosecutors are acutely aware that if they make
erroneous allegations of misconduct against others in the law enforcement community-or
recommend abandoning what turns out to be a meritorious case-they will be held
accountable. No prosecutor's office could function effectively without imposing some
system of accountability in such circumstances.
36. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994) (plurality opinion).

37. Id. at 672. Elizabeth Dale has made an analogous point, analogizing the approach
taken in Garcetti to the concept of retained managerial rights in labor law. See Elizabeth
Dale, Employee Speech and ManagerialRights: A Counterintuitive Reading of Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 175, 212-17 (2008).
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manner in which his office conducts prosecutions, for example, he is
properly expected to control the manner in which his subordinates develop
those recommendations. This point explains Garcetti's reference to the
government's power to control speech that it has created; 38 it is the
availability of political accountability that justifies this prerogative. As the
Court has explained, "When the government speaks, for instance to
promote its own policies or to advance a particular idea, it is, in the end,
accountable to the electorate and the political process for its advocacy. If
elected officials later could espouse some
the citizenry objects, newly 39
position."
contrary
or
different
Given the reality of hierarchy in the workplace, Robert Post has argued
that the First Amendment has little proper application to public
employment, "where an image of dialogue among autonomous selfgoverning citizens would be patently out of place." 40 One can fairly debate,
however, whether the promotion of a self-governing citizenry is the only
relevant value in this context. Stanley Ingber, for example, has argued that
sound management theory teaches that employees, by airing their views and
even their grievances, can make an important contribution to the effective
administration of the workplace. 4 1 Regardless of how one might resolve
this debate, however, there is no serious argument to be made that the First
Amendment requires public employers to abolish hierarchy. Whether they
should listen to their subordinates' views or not, public managers must
ultimately decide what positions their offices will take-and if Professor
Ingber is correct that sound administration requires management to value
the views of subordinates, management can hardly be indifferent to the need
to evaluate the speech of subordinates in order to determine whether it is
contributing to the achievement of workplace objectives. Even for a
manager who accepts Professor Ingber's view of the world, there is ample
reason to be concerned about subordinates who provide what the manager
comes to regard as suboptimal advice about workplace issues.4 2 A manager
who will be held politically accountable for suboptimal performance by
subordinates cannot afford to look the other way.
Accordingly, even on Professor Ingber's account, management should
take action against those whose duties include speech when it regards that
38. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
39. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000).
40. Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 267, 289 (1991); accord, e.g., Miranda Oshige McGowan, Certain Illusions
About Speech: Why the Free-Speech Critique of Hostile Work Environment HarassmentIs
Wrong, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 391, 406-22 (2002); Robert Post, Sexual Harassmentand the
FirstAmendment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 382, 388-94 (Catherine A.

MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004).
41. See Stanley Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual Rights: The
FirstAmendment in Institutional Contexts, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1, 60-73 (1990). For a similar
argument, see Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in the Workplace, 71 IND.
L.J. 101, 106-10 (1995).

42. For a particularly helpful discussion of efficiency norms in the workplace, see
McGowan, supra note 40, at 411-24.
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duty-related speech as unacceptable.
Supervisors cannot monitor
everything that subordinates do; once they lose confidence in a subordinate,
because of that subordinate's speech or for any other reason, remedial
action is warranted, as the Court recognized in Garcetti.43 The rationale for
permitting remedial action, in turn, is more than consequentialist; it too is
driven by First Amendment principle. A primary rationale for First
Amendment protection is that it enables the people to hold government
officials accountable for the conduct of their offices, and to decide whether
to place new officials in charge of those offices at the next election. 44 And,
as we have seen, if public policymakers could not remove subordinates
whom they regard as unwilling or unable to execute their duties as those
policymakers wish-including duties that involve speech-then they cannot
be fairly held politically accountable for the performance of their offices,
and they cannot obtain full and effective control over the performance of
public offices even after enjoying electoral success. Preserving the process
of political control and accountability over public offices is surely at the
core of our Constitution, and it is precisely this value that is served by
recognizing managerial prerogative in the public sector.45 Conversely, if
supervisors ignore the advice of their subordinates and, as Professor Ingber
argues, the performance of the workplace therefore suffers, supervisors will
eventually be held politically accountable for that decline in performance.
After all, cover-ups of official misconduct have become a staple of political
scandal in recent years. Public officials that fail to consider internal
allegations of malfeasance run considerable political risks.
2. The Categorical Nature of Managerial Prerogative over Workplace
Speech
To the preceding discussion, one might respond that the need to evaluate
and control the speech of subordinates does not require that public
employers receive a categorical exemption from First Amendment attack.
One could retain a balancing test in which the employee's interests in
43. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422-23 (2006).
44. For classic judicial statements of this position, see, for example, N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-71 (1964), and Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369
(1931). For classic scholarly statements along these same lines, see, for example, JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 105-16 (1980); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 1-27 (Lawbook Exchange 2000) (1948);
and Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in FirstAmendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 521, 526-65.

45. Cynthia Estlund, although a critic of Garcetti,makes the point quite nicely:
In a sense, democracy itself depends on public officials being empowered to direct
and evaluate how employees perform their jobs. It is all well and good for voters
to elect officials and express policy preferences, but those democratic processes do
not amount to much unless those elected and appointed officials can implement
those policies. And most policies can only be implemented through the words and

actions of public employees. In the simplest and starkest terms, that is why the
workplace cannot and should not be run like a public square.
Estlund, Free Speech Rights that Work at Work, supra note 3, at 1472.
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speaking would be weighed against the employer's interest in controlling
duty-related speech in the workplace, as Justice Souter argued in his
Garcetti dissent. 4 6 A rule that preserves judicial review over a public
employer's assessment of the quality of an employee's speech, however,
requires the employer to act not only on the basis of its own assessment of
the manner in which the employee has discharged his speech-related duties,
but also on the basis of its prediction of how a judge or jury might assess
that same speech and weigh it against the employee's liberty interests. The
uncertainty inherent in such litigation would inevitably have a chilling
effect on employees and supervisors alike. Moreover, it is unclear at best
that the process of political accountability will be less effective than judicial
oversight in monitoring the performance of public institutions. If Professor
Ingber is correct about the value of encouraging internal criticism in the
workplace, then the mechanisms of political accountability will reward
public employers who encourage internal dissent.
A more fundamental problem with balancing, however, is that there is
nothing to balance. An employee called upon to speak as part of his
duties-by evaluating the prosecutive merits of cases or otherwise-is not
exercising a "liberty" interest. Instead, the employee's duty-related speech,
as we have seen, is supposed to be performed in a manner consistent with
management's wishes. At least when it is pursuing constitutionally
legitimate policies, a public employer is entitled to insist that the employee
perform official duties-including speech-related duties-in a fashion
consistent with the wishes of the responsible politically accountable
47
officials.
46. Garcetti,547 U.S. at 434-36 (Souter, J., dissenting). One could go further and adopt
a "just cause" requirement that would give courts the authority to insist that an adequate
managerial justification supported discipline against an employee on the basis of dutyrelated speech. For a proposal along these lines, see Estlund, supra note 41, at 124-39;
Estlund, Free Speech Rights That Work at Work, supra note 3, at 1477-87; Estlund, Work
and Citizenship, supra note 3, at 155-68.
47. Scott Moss has argued that judicial deference in the workplace speech cases is
rooted in the view that public employees waive significant First Amendment rights by
accepting public employment and that courts fear that public employee free speech cases
present unacceptable risks of judicial error, and then criticizes these justifications for
deference as wanting. See Moss, supra note 3, at 1649-52, 1654-68. The argument
advanced above, however, rests on neither waiver nor risk of error, but instead on a
conception of managerial entitlement subject to political accountability. Garcetti itself
rejects any notion of waiver, see 547 U.S. at 417, and the Court's concern about the risk of
error, to the extent it can be found in this line of cases, seems part of its conception of
managerial prerogative. For example, on the question of whether partisan political loyalty is
a permissible criterion for a particular position, the Court has placed the burden on the
employer to justify the use of this criterion and afforded no discernable deference to the
employer's views. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518-20 (1980). There is no obvious
reason why the Court would view the risk of error to be lower on this question than on the
question of whether a public employee's speech has adversely affected the workplace.
Instead, the Court has afforded deference when speech is undertaken as part of an
employee's assigned duties and is therefore within the scope of managerial prerogative, yet
refused to defer when some other managerial justification for the restriction at issue is as yet
unproven.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

Consider Cynthia Estlund's critique of Garcetti'scategorical approach to
workplace speech. She argues that Garcetti improperly ignored the First
Amendment interests of public employees in their duty-related writing and
speech: "Many employees may find that part of their job is to speak up,
disclose information, [and] express critical judgments. They inevitably
bring their civic and moral selves to that job."'48 Elected officials, however,
also bring their "civic and moral selves" to their jobs, and they have no
obligation to fight a guerilla war with their own staffs about the manner in
which the staff discharges its duties. Precisely because it is elected officials
and not their staffs who are politically accountable, public employers are
entitled to insist that their employees leave their "civic and moral selves" at
home, and conduct their duties-including their speech-related duties-as
management prefers. After all, the electoral process determines whose
sensibilities will inform the discharge of official duties, and not some sort
of chancellor's veto supposedly held by individual public employees. A
prosecutor whose "civic and moral self' is hostile to the incumbent
officeholder's view on incarceration, for example, at best will waste a lot of
at worst, will
supervisory time pressing objections to office policies, 4and,
9
exercise discretion in ways that undermine office policy.
What is more, even if Professor Estlund is correct that public employees'
"civic and moral selves" properly inform the discharge of their duties, her
view would provide no real protection for dissenters within the ranks of the
public workforce without radically altering the authority of politically
accountable officials over their own offices. Long before Garcetti, the
patronage cases, while limiting the ability of management to insist on
partisan political loyalty, cautioned that political affiliation is properly a
criterion for public employment when "the hiring authority can demonstrate
that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective
performance of the public office involved. '50 Thus, to the extent that an

48. Estlund, Work and Citizenship, supra note 3, at 153.
49. Ironically, although the scholarly reaction to Garcetti has been hostile, see supra
notes 3-4 and accompanying text, recent scholarship has also been harshly critical of

prosecutorial discretion and advocated reforms that will reduce horizontal inequities among
defendants created through the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. For a sampling of the
extensive literature on point, see WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING &
ORIN S. KERR, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 13.2(d) (3d ed. 2007); Leslie C. Griffin, The Prudent
Prosecutor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259, 297-306 (2001); Gerard E. Lynch, Our
Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2136-51 (1998);
Mark Osler, This Changes Everything: A Call for a Directive, Goal-OrientedPrinciple to
Guide the Exercise of Discretion by Federal Prosecutors,39 VAL. U. L. REV. 625, 640-59
(2005); Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors in Discretionary
Decisions, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1511, 1530-34 (2000). Indeed, the attack on prosecutorial
discretion is nothing new; for decades scholars have argued against lodging expansive
discretion with individual prosecutors. See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY
JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 188-214 (1969); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of
ProsecutorialPower, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1545-73 (1981).
50. Branti, 445 U.S. at 518; accord Bd. of County Comm'rs, Wabaunsee County, Kan.
v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 675 (1996); O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518
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employee's personal views properly shape the performance of her duties,
then employers are entitled to refuse to hire, or even dismiss, those whose
views undermine office efficiency-by wasting supervisors' time pressing
objections that management will inevitably reject.
In other words, if public employees' "civic and moral selves" properly
bear on the performance of their duties, management is entitled to hire only
those whose civic and moral conceptions mirror its own, at least if it wishes
to avoid the friction and inefficiency of constantly having to monitor, and
frequently having to overrule, employees whose personal views lead them
to discharge their responsibilities inconsistently with the wishes of
management.
And, to the extent that one wishes to circumscribe
managerial authority to discharge employees on the basis of views that have
a bearing on the performance of their duties, then elected officials-and the
voters to whom they answer-would lose a significant measure of control
over the functioning of public offices. 5 1 That result is surely at odds with
the vision of political accountability that, as we have seen, ordinarily
informs First Amendment jurisprudence.
To be sure, a concept of First Amendment managerial prerogative seems
to offer no remedy for managerial overreaching. There are, for example,
plenty of objections to a managerial philosophy that insists that prosecutors
press every case to hearing or trial regardless of subordinates' doubts about
the strength of the evidence or the integrity of the investigators. But this
risk of managerial overreaching compromises no First Amendment value
precisely because it poses no threat to the process of political accountability
that, as we have seen, is at the heart of the First Amendment. Prosecutors
who press cases to trial on questionable evidence will see conviction rates
go down, and lower conviction rates have consequences in the next
election. Under a system of republican government, it is the voters who
properly assess the performance of incumbent management, not the courts.
The categorical rule of Garcetti does not entitle management to overreach.
Instead, it leaves judgments about the soundness of managerial

U.S. 712, 714, 718-19 (1996); Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 64, 71 n.5

(1990).
51. Consider, for example, Professor Estlund's proposal:
Employees whose jobs require the exercise and expression of judgment and
discretion on matters of public concern should be deemed to enjoy a reasonable
expectation that they will not be penalized for expressing that judgment and
discretion in a responsible manner. That reasonable expectation should be implied
into the employment contract as a matter of First Amendment policy, and should
be protected against deprivation without due process of law: an administrative
hearing on whether the employee was indeed subject to reprisals for speech on
matters of public concern that was part of the conscientious performance of the
iob.
Estlund, Work and Citizenship, supra note 3, at 156. On this view, what constitutes
"responsible" or "conscientious" performance of speech-related duties would no longer be
determined by politically accountable officials, but presumably by some sort of independent
administrative adjudicative official, subject to what may be searching review by a judge or
jury.
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philosophy--on the management of employee speech as with all other
matters within the scope of managerial prerogative-to the political
process.
Thus, Garcetti rejects a vision of the public workplace in which
employees are entitled to pit their own values against those of politically
accountable management, with the judiciary ensuring mandatory arbitration
of disputes. Viewed in that light, the holding in Garcetti looks less
remarkable; acceptance of Ceballos's position, in contrast, would have
radically insulated public employees from effective political control. It is
therefore small wonder, in my view, that the Court rejected what it
characterized as "a new, permanent, and intrusive role, mandating judicial
oversight of communications between and among government employees
and their superiors in the course of official business." 52 And, given the
availability of political accountability, surely the burden rests on those who
advocate judicial oversight of managerial prerogative to establish that the
judiciary is likely to do a better job of managing public employees than
their own politically accountable managers.
3. The Rule Against Content Regulation and Public Employee Speech
One can object to Garcetti's conception of a managerial prerogative as
antithetical to the longstanding hostility to content and viewpoint regulation
reflected in settled First Amendment doctrine. 53 Indeed, government
regulation of the content or viewpoint of speech has long been thought to
mandate strict judicial scrutiny because of the risk that content regulation
will cast government in the role of a censor of disfavored ideas or
viewpoints. 54 Even prior to Garcetti, however, First Amendment doctrine
was coming to recognize that some institutions must be granted a
prerogative to evaluate and control the content of what would otherwise be
constitutionally protected speech if they are to achieve otherwise
constitutionally legitimate objectives.
In Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes,55 for
example, the Court held that the general First Amendment prohibition
against evaluating the content or viewpoint of speech should not be applied
to a public broadcaster's programming decisions because the imposition of
such a requirement would undermine the essential character of broadcasting
by impairing editorial judgment and transferring some measure of editorial

52. Garcetti,547 U.S. at 423.
53. See, e.g., Zack, supra note 3, at 912-15.
54. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-43 (1995);

Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1994); R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115-16 (1991); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-94
(1991).

55. 523 U.S. 666 (1998).

2008]

MANAGERIAL PREROGATIVE

control to the judiciary. 56 Similarly, in NEA v. Finley,57 the Court reasoned
that decisions by a public agency about whether to fund particular art
projects necessarily involve assessment of the merit of each applicant's art
and accordingly held that the First Amendment did not prohibit an
assessment of the merit of competing proposals. 5 8 Thus, the Court began
turning away from strict scrutiny for content and viewpoint regulation in the
managerial context long before Garcetti.
Precedent aside, the rationale for the rule against content discrimination
has limited applicability to the workplace. As the Court has observed,
"[t]he rationale of the general prohibition.., is that content discrimination
'raises the specter that the Government may effectively drive certain ideas
This concern has limited
or viewpoints from the marketplace.' 59
application to public employment. Because managerial prerogative is
limited to the workplace, it is unlikely to drive disfavored viewpoints from
the general marketplace of ideas-a point that the Court made quite
explicitly in the Term following Garcetti. In Davenport v. Washington
56. Id. at 673-75. For example, the Court wrote,
As a general rule, the nature of editorial discretion counsels against subjecting
broadcasters to claims of viewpoint discrimination. Programming decisions would
be particularly vulnerable to claims of this type because even principled exclusions
rooted in sound journalistic judgment can often be characterized as viewpoint
based. To comply with their obligation to air programming that serves the public
interest, broadcasters must often choose among speakers expressing different
viewpoints. "That editors-newspaper or broadcast--can and do abuse this power
is beyond doubt," but "[c]alculated risks of abuse are taken in order to preserve
higher values." Much like a university selecting a commencement speaker, a
public institution selecting speakers for a lecture series, or a public school
prescribing its curriculum, a broadcaster by its nature will facilitate the expression
of some viewpoints instead of others. Were the judiciary to require, and so to
define and approve, pre-established criteria for access, it would risk implicating
the courts injudgments that should be left to the exercise of journalistic discretion.
Id. at 673-74 (quoting Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
124, 125 (1973)) (citations omitted and alteration in original).
57. 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
58. Id. at 583-86. In particular, the Court wrote,
Any content-based considerations that may be taken into account in the grantmaking process are a consequence of the nature of arts funding. The NEA has
limited resources, and it must deny the majority of the grant applications that it
receives, including many that propose artistically excellent projects. The agency
may decide to fund particular projects for a wide variety of reasons, such as the
technical proficiency of the artist, the creativity of the work, the anticipated public
interest in or appreciation of the work, the work's contemporary relevance, its
educational value, its suitability for or appeal to special audiences (such as
children or the disabled), its service to a rural or isolated community, or even
simply that the work could increase public knowledge of an art form. As the
dissent below noted, it would be impossible to have a highly selective grant
program without denying money to a large amount of constitutionally protected
expression. The "very assumption" of the NEA is that grants will be awarded
according to the "artistic worth of competing applicants," and absolute neutrality is
simply "inconceivable."
Id. at 585 (quoting Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 795-96 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976)) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
505 U.S. at 387 (quoting Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 116).
59. R.A. V.,
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Education Ass 'n, 60 as it considered a First Amendment attack on a state
statute that required public employee unions to obtain nonmembers'
authorization before using their mandatory union fees for election-related
purposes, 6 1 the Court observed that "the risk that content-based distinctions
will impermissibly interfere with the marketplace of ideas is sometimes
attenuated when the government is acting in a capacity other than as
regulator." 62 The Court then upheld the statute, reasoning that "no
suppression of ideas is afoot, since the union remains as free as any other
entity to participate in the electoral process with all available funds other
63
than the state-coerced agency fees lacking affirmative permission."
Similarly, an employer's requirement that duty-related speech serve
managerial objectives is unlikely to drive disfavored views from the
marketplace of ideas-it merely keeps them out of the workplace, at least
until the next election, when those ideas may well carry the day.
Although the Court has justified the rule against content discrimination in
terms of avoiding skew in the marketplace of ideas, some argue that the rule
is justified instead as an effort to identify the kind of regulation of speech
that is most likely to lack a sufficient justification. 64 On this account, as
60. 127 S. Ct. 2372 (2007).
61. Although the Court had previously held that objecting nonmembers have a First
Amendment right to prevent any use of mandatory fees for purposes that are not germane to
collective bargaining, those cases had not required that a union obtain affirmative consent
from nonmembers before using mandatory fees for non-collective-bargaining purposes. See
id. at 2376-77.
62. Id. at 2381. The metaphor of an unfettered marketplace of ideas as the mechanism
by which the First Amendment protects the search for truth, originally formulated by Justice
Holmes in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.dissenting), has
become commonplace in First Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Virginia v. Hicks, 539
U.S. 113, 119 (2003); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997); Rosenberger v. Rectors &
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n,
514 U.S. 334, 341-42 (1995); United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S.
454, 464-65 (1995); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418 (1989); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988); Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789, 804 (1984); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530,
537-38 (1980).
63. Davenport, 127 S.Ct. at 2382.
64. For a sampling of the debate over whether First Amendment doctrine is properly
directed at identifying regulations that are likely intended to burden disfavored ideas, or
instead is aimed at identifying inadequately justified regulation of speech, compare, for
example, Larry Alexander, Trouble on Track Two: Incidental Regulations of Speech and
Free Speech Theory, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 921, 931-54 (1993) (identifying censorial motive as
the linchpin for First Amendment analysis); Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose:
The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413,
443-505 (1996) (same); and Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L.
REV. 767, 775-98 (2001) (same); with John Fee, Speech Discrimination,85 B.U. L. REV.
1103, 1152-65 (2005) (rejecting motive as dispositive); Richard A. Posner, Pragmatism
Versus Purposivism in First Amendment Analysis, 54 STAN. L. REV. 737, 742-52 (2002)
(same); and Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal
Courses of Conduct, "Situation-Altering Utterances," and the Uncharted Zones, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1286-311 (2005) (same). The philosophical underpinning for both
positions is helpfully summarized by Frederick Schauer, who argues that First Amendment
protections are ultimately premised on skepticism about the competence of government to
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well, the process of political accountability is likely to work against overly
restrictive regimes of workplace speech regulation without need of the
heavy-handed First Amendment doctrine. Precisely because, as advocates

of employee speech rights argue, employee work-related speech improves
65

workplace efficiency by improving information flow to management, it
follows that overly restrictive regulatory regimes will undermine the
efficiency of a public office, and will eventually create political
vulnerabilities for officeholders. 66 Thus, the case for a First Amendment
law of managerial prerogative, at least as First Amendment doctrine is
currently structured, is strong, despite the general doctrinal hostility to
regulation of speech on the basis of content or viewpoint.
4. Ceballos as a Whistleblower
The reader will note that I have yet to address the primary objection
leveled at Garcetti-the claim that its holding will impoverish the
marketplace of ideas by preventing those most likely to know of
governmental misconduct from bringing what they know to an open
marketplace of ideas. 67 Because whistleblowers advance the process of
political accountability at the core of the First Amendment, the
68
constitutional argument for whistleblower protection is substantial.
Yet, if whistleblowing is defined as bringing to light previously
undisclosed government misconduct, Garcetti is not a whistleblowing
case. 69 To be sure, Ceballos tried to do something that resembled
whistleblowing-he concluded that his internal memoranda should be
disclosed to the defense, and he had to be ordered to limit his disclosure
only to portions of the memorandum describing his telephone conversation
distinguish between speech that has net social utility and speech with net social disutility.
See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 73-86 (1982).

65. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
66. As the Court has put it when explicating the justification for judicial deference to the
political process, "'The Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy,
even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that
judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a
political branch has acted."' FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993)
(quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (footnote omitted)).
67. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 570-81
(1970); Rosalie Berger Levinson, Silencing Government Employee Whistleblowers in the
Name of "Efficiency," 23 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 17, 63-65 (1996); Toni M. Massaro,
Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the Public Sector Workplace, 61 S.CAL. L. REv.
1, 63-67 (1987); Kermit Roosevelt, Note, The Costs of Agencies: Waters v. Churchill and
the FirstAmendment in the AdministrativeState, 106 YALE L.J. 1233, 1261-65 (1997).
69. The definition of "whistleblowing" utilized above tracks the Whistleblower
Protection Act, which provides limited statutory protection to federal employees with respect
to "any disclosure of information by an employee, former employee, or applicant for
employment which the employee, former employee, or applicant reasonably believes
evidences-(A) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation; or (B) gross mismanagement, a
gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public
health or safety." 5 U.S.C. § 1213(a)(1) (2006).
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with a deputy sheriff who was likely to testify. 70 One might characterize
this as disclosing governmental misconduct; indeed, the Due Process
Clause forbids "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to
an accused upon request ... where the evidence is material either to guilt or
to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution." 7 1 This obligation is understood to impose a duty upon the
prosecutor to learn of and disclose to the defense all exculpatory
information known to law enforcement personnel involved in the
investigation. 72 In Garcetti, however, there was never any question in the
underlying criminal case of suppressing exculpatory evidence; Ceballos
learned of the circumstantial evidence suggesting police perjury from the
defense counsel and his inspection of the area described in the warrant
application, not as the result of any information in the exclusive possession
of the District Attorney or Sheriffs office. 73 Ceballos's opinion about the
affiant's veracity similarly was not exculpatory information; he had no
special ability to evaluate the evidence. It may well be that Ceballos was
unwilling to trust the trial judge to reach what he regarded as the correct
result without the benefit of Ceballos' own views, but whatever one wants
to call this course of conduct, it surely did not involve the disclosure of
otherwise suppressed evidence of governmental misconduct into the realm
of public discussion and debate.
Beyond all this, Garcetti addressed only Ceballos's communications to
others within the District Attorney's office. Internal workplace speech,
however, does not improve the public's understanding of the functions of
government or otherwise enhance the effectiveness of the process of
political accountability. Managerial receptiveness to internal complaints
can improve the performance of public institutions, but as we have seen, the
performance of public institutions is properly monitored by the political
process, not the courts.

70. See Deposition of Richard Ceballos, supra note 12, at 54-58.
71. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
72. See, e.g., Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 869-70 (2006) (per curiam);
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280-81 (1999); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437
(1995); see also AM. BAR ASs'N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION
FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3-3.11(a) (3d ed. 1993) ("A prosecutor should not
intentionally fail to make timely disclosure to the defense, at the earliest feasible
opportunity, of the existence of all evidence or information which tends to negate the guilt of
the accused or mitigate the offense charged or which would tend to reduce the punishment of
the accused."); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2004) ("The prosecutor in a
criminal case shall ... make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information
known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the
"). The analogous California rule that governed Ceballos provided that "[a]
offense ....
member [of the bar] shall not suppress any evidence that the member or the member's client
has a legal obligation to reveal or to produce." CAL. R. PROF'L CONDUCT § 5-220 (2008).
Justice Breyer, although skeptical of a general claim to First Amendment protection for dutyrelated speech, thought that this constitutional obligation of disclosure was decisive in
Garcetti. See 547 U.S. at 446-49 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
73. See supra text accompanying notes 10-12.

20081

MANAGERIAL PREROGATIVE

Thus, Garcetti was simply not a whistleblowing case. The holding in
Garcetti, properly understood, does not alter the rule that affords First
Amendment protection under a balancing test to a public employee who
"seek[s] to bring to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public
trust."' 74

For public employees who take their concerns to the public,

Garcetti should pose no bar to First Amendment protection; managerial
prerogatives with respect to such employees do not include an entitlement
to evaluate their ability to assess allegations of misconduct (although the
balancing test may still deny such employees protection).
There are, however, some governmental employees whose duties include
ferreting out governmental misconduct, and they are categorically denied
First Amendment protection under Garcetti, at least for intraoffice speech
that is made pursuant to their investigative duties. 75 But again, these
employees do not speak on their own behalf-they unearth misconduct in
order to serve the purposes of their employers. It is therefore the
prerogative of these employers to decide if the internal investigators that
they have unleashed are serving their purposes. As we have seen, the
concept of managerial prerogative attaches to duty-related speech
undertaken to advance the purposes of a public employer. This concept
should therefore also guide future litigation over whether speech should be
considered duty-related within the meaning of Garcetti; speech that an
employer would have legitimate reason to take into account when
evaluating the quality of an employee's job performance is speech that falls
within the scope of managerial prerogative. 76 Garcetti accordingly marks a
74. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983). To date, the lower courts have read
Garcetti to preserve protection for public employee allegations of misconduct when the
employee's duties do not ordinarily include the investigation of misconduct. See, e.g, Casey
v. W. Las Vegas Indep. Sch. Dist., 473 F.3d 1323, 1332-33 (10th Cir. 2007); Freitag v.
Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 542-43, 545 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1918 (2007);
Pittman v. Cuyahoga Valley Career Ctr., 451 F. Supp. 2d 905, 929 (N.D. Ohio 2006).
75. For an example, see Gonzalez v. City of Chicago, 239 F.3d 939, 941 (7th Cir. 2001).
76. In an effort to demonstrate that Garcetti's rule is unsatisfactorily indeterminate,
Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes claims that he cannot tell whether Garcetti denies protection to
a federal agent not assigned to investigate other agents and who nevertheless alleges criminal
misconduct by an employee. See Rhodes, supra note 3, at 1194-97. Other critics have also
argued that determining whether speech was made in the course of duties will pose many
difficulties. See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 3, at 202-08; Stafstrom, supra note 3, at 613-20;
Suma, supra note 3, at 379-86. At least based on the holdings in the lower courts to date,
however, the outcome in cases involving internal allegations of misconduct by law
enforcement officials seems clear under Garcetti-law enforcement officials are expected,
as part of their duties, to properly assess the merits of any evidence of criminal misconduct,
whether by a colleague or otherwise. A public employer surely has the prerogative to
terminate a law enforcement employee when it concludes that the employee has improperly
evaluated evidence of misconduct. See, e.g., Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590, 597-98 (7th
Cir. 2007) (police officer's allegation of misconduct by superior to District Attorney was
unprotected under Garcetti because it was made as part of his duties, but subsequent
deposition testimony in a related civil suit was not pursuant to duties); Green v. Bd. of
County Comm'rs, 472 F.3d 794, 797-801 (10th Cir. 2007) (lab technician's complaints
about drug testing program were unprotected); Spiegla v. Hull, 481 F.3d 961, 965-67 (7th
Cir. 2007) (correctional officer responsible for institutional security lacked protection for
complaint that superior deviated from institutional policy under Garcetti); Freitag v. Ayers,
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turn away from a focus on public concern and toward a regime that
endeavors to identify the scope of legitimate managerial prerogative.
No one should weep for the demise of the public concern or balancing
tests, even from the standpoint of a whistleblower. These are deeply factdependent tests, requiring consideration of "the content, form, and context
of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record."'77 Intensively factdependent tests, in turn, breed uncertainty in litigation. Indeed, the Court
has twice divided 5-4 over the application of the public concern and
balancing tests for public employee free speech claims, 78 and has
acknowledged that "the boundaries of the public concern test are not well
defined."'79 It should therefore come as no surprise that commentators have
nearly universally attacked the Court's pre-Garcetti approach to public
employee speech as providing uncertain protection that will, for just that
reason, inevitably have an unacceptably chilling effect on the speech of
public employees. 80 The public concern test's demise or, at a minimum,
468 F.3d 528, 545-46 (9th Cir. 2006) (prison guard's internal complaints about inmate
harassment unprotected but external complaints to inspector general and legislator qualified
for protection); Battle v. Bd. of Regents, 468 F.3d 755, 759-62 (1 1th Cir. 2006) (financial
aid official's internal allegations of irregularities in financial aid program were unprotected).
For helpful discussions of the manner in which Garcetti has been applied, see Ronald
Kramer, Garcetti v. Ceballos: The Battle over What It Means Has Just Begun, 39 URB. LAW.
983 (2007); Christine Elzer, Note, The "Official Duties" Puzzle: Lower Courts' Struggle
with First Amendment Protection for Public Employees After Garcetti v. Ceballos, 69 U.
PITT. L. REv. 367, 375-86 (2007). In any event, whatever indeterminacy is left under
Garcetti surely is less than a rule that would use a free-form balancing test for any statement
involving a matter of "public concern."
77. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48 (footnote omitted); accordCity of San Diego v. Roe,
543 U.S. 77, 83 (2004) (per curiam); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384-85 (1987).
78. See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 394-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Connick, 461 U.S. at 158-65
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
79. Roe, 543 U.S. at 83. In Garcetti, the Court similarly described both the public
concern and balancing tests: "To be sure, conducting these inquiries sometimes has proved
difficult. This is the necessary product of 'the enormous variety of fact situations in which
critical statements by teachers and other public employees may be thought by their
superiors.., to furnish grounds for dismissal."' Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418 (quoting Pickering
v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968) (ellipsis in original)).
80. See, e.g., ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY,
AND MANAGEMENT 164-78 (1995); Stephen Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The
Struggle to Define Speech on Matters of Public Concern, 64 IND. L.J. 43, 50-75 (1988);
Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perilsof an Emerging First
Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 28-51 (1990); Ingber, supra note 41, at
53-58; Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing Public Employee Speech, 99 Nw. U. L. REv.
1007, 1018-27 (2005); Pengtian Ma, Public Employee Speech and Public Concern: A
Critique of the U.S. Supreme Court's Threshold Approach to Public Employee Speech
Cases, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 121, 126-38 (1996); Massaro, supra note 68, at 25-37;
Lawrence Rosenthal, Permissible Content Discrimination Under the FirstAmendment: The
Strange Case of the PublicEmployee, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 529, 539-66 (1998); Rodric
B. Schoen, Pickering Plus Thirty Years: Public Employees and Free Speech, 30 TEX. TECH.
L. REv. 5, 29-31 (1999); Jeffrey A. Shooman, The Speech of Public Employees Outside the
Workplace: Towards a New Framework, 36 SETON HALL. L. REv. 1341, 1360-67 (2006);
Eugene Volokh, Crime Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1095, 1166-71 (2005);
Michael L. Wells, Section 1983, the First Amendment, and Public Employee Speech:
Shaping the Right to Fit the Remedy (and Vice Versa), 35 GA. L. REv. 939, 957-69 (2001);
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decreased importance in the wake of Garcetti should therefore not be
mourned.
In this light, much of the criticism of Garcetti looks overheated. It is
more than a little odd for Garcetti's critics to campaign so vigorously for
the right of public employees to engage in internal dissent that management
is free to ignore, when the far more potent avenue for dissent-public
pronouncements that can have real political consequences for inept or
overreaching public managers-remains eligible for First Amendment
protection. To be sure, there is some anomaly in a rule that protects
Ceballos only when he goes outside of the chain of command and makes his
81
complaints public, as Justice Stevens observed in his Garcetti dissent.
Indeed, for public statements not made pursuant to their duties-such as
Ceballos's testimony-public employees can still claim the protection of
the balancing test. Yet this anomaly, if anomaly it is, has its roots in First
When a public employee brings heretofore
Amendment principle.
concealed misconduct into public view, he enables the process of political
accountability to function. Such employees deserve First Amendment
protection for just that reason. Public employees whose views remain
hidden from public view, in contrast, contribute little to public discussion
and debate. A government agency that encourages internal dissension and
debate may provide more effective service to the public, and minimize the
political risks that a whistleblower will disclose official misconduct with
the attendant political consequences of such revelations, but as we have
seen, ordinary processes of political accountability can be expected to
operate against public employers that adopt suboptimal policies, whether
relating to internal communications or any other aspect of their mission.
Thus, when it comes to the intraoffice speech of public employees
undertaken pursuant to their duties, the interest in ensuring that public
officials remain politically accountable-the interest ordinarily thought to
justify constitutional protection for whistleblowers-provides no support
for limiting managerial prerogative with respect to duty-related speech.
A decade or so ago, when I was still litigating the public concern test
rather than teaching it, I predicted its demise and replacement with an
approach that would endeavor to delineate the scope of legitimate
managerial prerogatives over employee speech. 82 At the risk of immodesty,
Karin B. Hoppman, Note, Concern with Public Concern: Toward a Better Definition of the
Pickering/Connick Threshold Test, 50 VAND. L. REV. 993, 1012-19 (1997); Cynthia K.Y.
Lee, Comment, Freedom of Speech in the Public Workplace: A Comment on the Public
Concern Requirement, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1109, 1121-28 (1988); Roosevelt, supra note 68, at
1261-65.

81. See Garcetti,547 U.S. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a similar critique, see, for
example, Scott A. Moss, FightingDiscrimination While FightingLitigation: A Tale of Two
Supreme Courts, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 981, 994-95 (2007).

Strangely, the most frequent
82. See Rosenthal, supra note 80, at 567-73.
recommendation of the other critics of the public concern test was that the Court should
engage in balancing in all cases without need of a threshold determination that a public
employee's speech raises a matter of public concern. See, e.g., Allred, supra note 80, at 7681; Estlund, supra note 80, at 52-54; Ma, supra note 80, at 138-47; Massaro, supra note 68,
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I am happy to claim that Garcetti goes a considerable way toward
vindicating my view. Even if the public concern test has not been expressly
repudiated, after Garcetti, the question whether a public employee is
83
speaking "'as a citizen... commenting upon matters of public concern,"'
will be decided not so much by "the content, form, and context of a given
statement, '84 as by the scope of managerial prerogative.
C. The Future ofFirstAmendment Workplace Litigation
After Garcetti, it is settled that managerial prerogative includes an
entitlement to control the speech of public employees whose duties require
them to speak. The prerogative to control the speech that is required of
public employees as part of their duties, however, does not exhaust the
universe of employer prerogative. Garcetti defines managerial prerogative
in terms of "the exercise of employer control over what the employer itself
has commissioned or created. '85 Speech that public employees undertake
pursuant to their duties, however, is not the only example of public
employee speech involving workplace arrangements that a public employer
has "commissioned or created."
1. Insubordinate Speech
One obvious area of employer prerogative involves the promulgation and
enforcement of office policy and directives. As we have seen, the First
Amendment does not abolish hierarchy; a public employer accordingly
need not rely on persuasion to implement office policy. The theory of
political accountability at the heart of the First Amendment means that
public employers must be able to implement their own policies through
their control of the public workforce. 86 Thus, the prerogative to make and
implement office policy necessarily includes the prerogative to take
remedial measures against those who resist the policy, by speech or
otherwise. And, as we have also seen, public employees have no protected
liberty interest in pursuing their own notions about how the affairs of public
offices should be conducted. 87 Thus, insubordinate speech implicates no
First Amendment interest that can be balanced against the employer's
interests.
In Connick v. Myers, 88 the Court made this very point as it held that a
questionnaire concerning a recent reorganization of a prosecutor's office
at 67-77. A test involving nothing but ad hoc balancing, however, would fail to obviate the
chilling effect of a relatively indeterminate legal protection for public employees, as we have
seen.
83. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983) (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391
U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
84. Id. at 147-48.
85. Garcetti,547 U.S. at 422.
86. See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
88. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
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that a dissatisfied attorney, Sheila Myers, had circulated to her colleagues
raised no issue of public concern because its "focus [was] not to evaluate
the performance of the office but rather to gather ammunition for another
round of controversy with her superiors." 89 Still, the approach taken in
Connick does not quite capture the full scope of post-Garcetti managerial
prerogative; had the questionnaire been modestly rephrased to suggest that
the office was defaulting in its responsibilities to the public, the opinion
suggests that it might have raised an issue of public concern. 90 Garcetti's
focus on the scope of managerial prerogatives, however, should make the
precise words that Myers used immaterial. We have seen that public
employees who are hired to pursue official objectives through, among other
things, their speech, have no cognizable liberty interest in speech directed at
undermining those objectives--everything that Myers said about how her
office should be fighting crime involved speech concerning her professional
responsibilities, and we know from Garcetti that "[r]estricting speech that
owes its existence to a public employee's professional responsibilities does
not infringe any liberties [that] the employee might have enjoyed as a
private citizen." 9 1 Whether insubordinate speech takes the form of a
dispute over the effect of a new office policy on workplace morale or a
claim that policy compromises public safety, it is inconsistent with
management's prerogative to run the public office to which it has been
entrusted without the need to persuade subordinates of the merits of each
and every order. After Garcetti, First Amendment protection, at least when
it comes to speech within the course of a public employee's duties, will no
longer turn on whether the precise words used by a public employee seem
to implicate an issue of public concern-at least when her point is that
managerial directives should be opposed.
Admittedly, the managerial prerogative to set and enforce office policies
has implications for whistleblowing. Public employers frequently impose
obligations of confidentiality on their employees. The Court has quite
brusquely rejected arguments that a public employee has a First

89. Id. at 148.
90. This follows from the Court's emphasis on the particular form of the questionnaire:
We view the questions pertaining to the confidence and trust that Myers' coworkers possess in various supervisors, the level of office morale, and the need for
a grievance committee as mere extensions of Myers' dispute over her transfer to
another section of the criminal court .... [W]e do not believe these questions are
of public import in evaluating the performance of the District Attorney as an
elected official. Myers did not seek to inform the public that the District
Attorney's Office was not discharging its governmental responsibilities in the
investigation and prosecution of criminal cases. Nor did Myers seek to bring to
light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust on the part of
Connick and others. Indeed, the questionnaire, if released to the public, would
convey no information at all other than the fact that a single employee is upset
with the status quo.
Id. For additional discussion of this point, see Rosenthal, supra note 80, at 555-56.
91. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421-22 (alterations in original).
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Amendment right to disclose confidential information, 92 and has even held
that an employee who is required to seek clearance before disclosing any
employment-related information can be sanctioned for failing to seek
clearance even if he discloses no classified or otherwise sensitive
information, at least when the employee holds a position involving access
to particularly sensitive information. 9 3 Although the opinions in the
confidentiality cases have been criticized for their failure to explain how
their holdings can be reconciled with the usual rule requiring that the
government justify restrictions on speech under a balancing test when
public employees speak on matters of public concern, 94 the concept of
categorical managerial prerogative provides the missing rationalemanagerial prerogative includes the power to set and enforce confidentiality
policy. For example, enforcement of preclearance requirements reflects the
managerial prerogative to avoid the risk of error that would exist if an
employee were to make unilateral and unreviewed decisions about what
information should be treated as confidential. 95 Thus, preclearance
requirements serve the same interest in managerial control over the manner
in which the office pursues constitutionally legitimate objectives that
underlie the prerogative to evaluate and control employee speech
recognized in Garcetti.
The implications of the view of managerial prerogative are not as
alarming as they may seem at first blush. For one thing, First Amendment
doctrine limits the scope of managerial prerogatives with respect to
confidential information. We have seen that a true whistleblower can seek
protection under the pre-Garcettibalancing test, at least if the employee has
first sought preclearance when required. 96 An inadequately justified

92. See United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 605-06 (1995); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S.
280, 308-10 (1981); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980) (per curiam).
93. See Snepp, 444 U.S. at 511-13.
94. See, e.g., Mary M. Cheh, Judicial Supervision of Executive Secrecy: Rethinking
Freedom of Expression for Government Employees and the Public Right of Access to
Government Information, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 690, 700-04 (1984); Jonathan C. Medow,
The FirstAmendment and the Secrecy State: Snepp v. United States, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
775, 814-19 (1982); Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History
and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1713, 1770-71 & n.226 (1987); Albert
J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1103,
1144-48 (1987); Note, Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1738, 1771-73 (1984); Diane F. Ortenlicher, Comment, Snepp v. United States: The CIA
Secrecy Agreement and the FirstAmendment, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 662, 685-94 (1981); Susan

F. Sandler, Comment, National Security Versus Free Speech: A Comparative Analysis of
Publication Review Standards in the United States and Great Britain, 15 BROOK. J. INT'L L.

711, 724-26 (1989).
95. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary
Privileges, and the Productionof Information, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 309, 341-42; Richard A.
Epstein, UnconstitutionalConditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L.

REv. 4, 68-69 (1988).
96. See, e.g., Anderson v. McCotter, 100 F.3d 723, 728-29 (10th Cir. 1996); O'Brien v.
Town of Caledonia, 748 F.2d 403, 407-08 (7th Cir. 1984); McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d
1137, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Salge v. Edna Indep. Sch. Dist., 320 F. Supp. 2d 530, 539 (S.D.
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preclearance policy, moreover, can itself be challenged under the balancing
test. 97 While the Court is likely to apply the balancing test in a fashion that
is particularly deferential to the government in cases involving national
security or other particularly compelling governmental interests supporting
confidentiality, 98 the balancing test offers at least some protection for the
99
true whistleblower.
What is more, whistleblowers whose speech is central to the process of
political accountability-such as those who disclose serious government
misconduct-are likely to engage the public's sympathies and for that
reason acquire a measure of political protection from retaliation. 10 0
Conversely, even if there were relatively clear doctrine protecting
whistleblowers from retaliation, it is certainly fair to question the proportion
of public employees willing to gamble their careers on the outcome of a
lawsuit, even if the odds of success are great. It is probably the case that no
matter what First Amendment doctrine is in place, only those public
Tex. 2003), aff'd, 411 F.3d 178 (5th Cir. 2005); Shelton Police Union, Inc. v. Voccola, 125
F. Supp. 2d 604, 631-32 (D. Conn. 2001).
97. See, e.g., Harman v. City of New York, 140 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding
that the "City has not demonstrated any actual harm justifying... [the] broad restriction[s]
on the ability of employees to comment on the workings of the city agencies").
98. See, e.g., Dep't of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528-29 (1988) (national security);
CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 174-77 (1985) (same); Andersen v. McCotter, 205 F.3d 1214,
1217-19 (10th Cir. 2000) (confidential patient information); Lytle v. City of Haysville, 138
F.3d 857, 866-68 (10th Cir. 1998) (confidential details of police investigation); Signore v.
City of Montgomery, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1296-97 (M.D. Ala. 2005) (same), affd mem.,
136 F. App'x 336 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); Garay v. County of Bexar, 810 S.W.2d 760,
765-66 (Tex. App. 1991) (confidential patient information); Lupo v. Bd. of Fire & Police
Comm'rs, 402 N.E.2d 624, 626-27 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (same).
99. See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, Classified Information Leaks and Free Speech, 2008 U.
ILL. L. REv. 881, 928-29; Geoffrey R. Stone, Government Secrecy vs. Freedom of the Press,
1 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 185, 188-97 (2007). Stephen Vladeck takes a different view,
arguing that Garcetti's categorical refusal to protect "speech that owes its existence to a
public employee's professional responsibilities," 547 U.S. at 421, means that a
whistleblower who learned of government misconduct only as a consequence of his duties
lacks constitutional protection. See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Espionage Act and National
Security Whistleblowing After Garcetti, 57 AM. U. L. REv. 1531, 1540-42 (2008). While the
passage highlighted by Professor Vladeck is ambiguous, elsewhere the Court acknowledged
that among the reasons that public employees deserve some constitutional protection for
speech related to their employment is that they are exposed to information of particular
utility to assessing the performance of public institutions: "'Teachers are, as a class, the
members of the community most likely to have informed and definite opinions as to how
funds allotted to the operation of the schools should be spent. Accordingly, it is essential
that they be able to speak out freely on such questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal.'
The same is true of many other categories of public employees." Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421
(quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968)). Thus, Garcetti did not turn
on the fact that Ceballos learned about the alleged misconduct in the course of his duties.
Instead, "[tlhe controlling factor in Ceballos' case [wa]s that his expressions were made
pursuant to his duties as a calendar deputy." Id. Accordingly, statements made outside of an
employee's duties in an effort to expose government misconduct are not controlled by the
holding in Garcetti.
100. The prevalence of statutory protection for whistleblowers, see Garcetti,547 U.S. at
425; id. at 440-41 (Souter, J., dissenting), is some evidence of the political currency that
whistleblowing possesses.
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employees with extraordinary ideological commitments are likely to act as
whistleblowers.' 0 '

The problems posed by limited First Amendment

protection for whistleblowers, in short, are easily exaggerated.
2. Speech Outside the Workplace
One might think that the domain of managerial prerogative ends when a
public employee leaves the workplace. Yet, one could also argue that
management's prerogatives-within applicable contractual and statutory
limitations-includes the right to control off-duty speech and expressive
conduct that might reflect so poorly on an employee's fitness for duty as to
implicate the managerial prerogative to purge the workforce of those whom
it regards as unfit. 10 2 This point explains the otherwise deeply unsatisfying
opinion in City of San Diego v. Roe. 10 3 In that case, a police officer was
discharged after a supervisor discovered that he was selling sexually
explicit videos on the Internet, including videos depicting the officer
removing a police uniform and masturbating. 10 4 The Court held that the
officer lacked protection under the threshold public concern test since
"Roe's activities did nothing to inform the public about any aspect of the

[police department]'s functioning or operation," adding that "[t]he speech in

10 5
question was detrimental to the mission and functions of the employer."'
Even putting aside the possibility, overlooked by the Court, that Roe's
video was a clumsy attempt to make a point about sexual hypocrisy in the
law enforcement community, 10 6 the Court's reasoning conflates the public
concern and balancing tests by making the question whether speech is
detrimental to the employer's interests bear on the threshold public concern

101. The available empirical evidence relating to the current statutory whistleblower
protection, although limited, suggests that such legislation has had little success in inducing
employees to disclose employer misconduct. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 41, at 119-24;
Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: InvigoratingIncentives for Sarbanes-Oxley
Corporateand Securities FraudWhistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV.91, 111-26 (2007).
102. Indeed, even critics of the public concern test who have proposed an approach that
would deny protection to speech at the workplace while granting presumptive protection for
employee speech elsewhere acknowledge that employers must still be permitted to regulate
off-the-job speech that can harm working relationships. See Kozel, supra note 80, at 104451; Shooman, supra note 80, at 1367-70; Roosevelt, supra note 68, at 1265-67.
103. 543 U.S. 77 (2004) (per curiam).
104, Id. at 78-79.
105. Id. at 84.
106. One hesitates to defend Roe's video as having much in the way of redeeming value,
but there was no finding that it was obscene or otherwise constitutionally unprotected based
on its content alone, and one of the awkward aspects of the public concern test is that it puts
the Court in the business of assessing the effectiveness of speech at making a point of
political social import, an endeavor normally thought to be forbidden by the First
Amendment itself. Until City of San Diego v. Roe, the Court had emphasized that "[t]he
inappropriate or controversial character of a statement is irrelevant to the question whether it
deals with a matter of public concern." Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 387 (1987). I
have elsewhere developed this point at greater length. See Rosenthal, supra note 80, at 54044.
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test. 10 7 Viewed through the lens of managerial prerogative as a threshold

limitation on First Amendment protection for public employees, however,
Roe makes a good deal more sense. Public employees who occupy a
position of public trust can undermine that trust through off-duty conduct
that raises sufficiently serious doubts about their integrity or judgment. A
police officer whose off-duty activities reflect virulent racism, for example,
could plausibly be thought to have undermined his ability to work
effectively with the community as a whole.' 08 In such circumstances,
managerial prerogative includes the right to control even off-duty speech
that could undermine the employee's on-duty effectiveness. 10 9 If on-duty
speech directed toward official objectives falls within the scope of
managerial prerogative, then off-duty speech that compromises those same
objectives should no less be subject to managerial control.
3. Coerced Ideological Loyalty
Given the broad scope of managerial prerogative advanced above, one
might think that this conception could grant public employers virtually
unlimited authority to suppress any employee speech that suggests
disloyalty to a public employer. After all, in the private sector, managerial
prerogative includes essentially unfettered power to regulate employee
speech within applicable statutory and contractual parameters. 110 First
Amendment doctrine, however, limits the prerogative of the public
employer. Consider the patronage cases. They hold that the government
may not endeavor to coerce partisan political loyalty by discriminating on
107. For additional discussion of this confusion in Roe, see Estlund, Work and
Citizenship, supra note 3, at 133-35; Shooman, supranote 80, at 1362-63.
108. Prior to Roe, these cases were resolved through an inquiry into whether the racist
speech was disseminated in a manner that attempted to engage public concern and, if so, by
application of the balancing test. See, e.g., Pappas v. Giuliani, 290 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2002)
(upholding discipline against officer who circulated racist leaflet anonymously); Locurto v.
Safir, 264 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding discipline against officer and firefighters who
appeared in blackface on parade float parodying African Americans); Tindle v. Caudell, 56
F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 1995) (upholding discipline against officer who appeared in blackface at a
private party); McMullen v. Carson, 754 F.2d 936 (11 th Cir. 1985) (upholding termination
of sheriff's clerical employee who publicly revealed that he was a recruiter for the Ku Klux
Klan); City of Indianapolis v. Heath, 686 N.E.2d 940 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding
discipline of officer who made an anti-Semitic remark at a public meeting while off duty);
Hawkins v. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 602 A.2d 712 (Md. 1992) (upholding
termination of prison guard for off-duty anti-Semitic remark); Pereira v. Comm'r of Soc.
Servs., 733 N.E.2d 112 (Mass. 2000) (upholding termination for joke told at political event);
Vinci v. Neb. Dep't of Corr. Servs., 571 N.W.2d 53 (Neb. 1997) (upholding demotion of
prison guard for off-duty racial slur).
109. For a similar view of Roe as turning on the extent to which the employer can
reasonably fear that the employee's off-duty conduct can compromise public confidence,
albeit without consideration of the impact of Garcetti or the role of managerial prerogative,
The
see Paul M. Secunda, The (Neglected) Importance of Being Lawrence:
Constitutionalizationof Public Employee Rights to Decisional Non-Interference in Private
Affairs, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 129-30 (2006).
110. For a helpful account of the scope of managerial prerogative in the private sector,
see Ingber, supra note 41, at 65-73.
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the basis of partisan affiliation in public employment except for positions
for which partisan political loyalty is an appropriate qualification for
employment."i ' This line of cases understands the patronage system to
undermine rather than preserve political accountability by converting the
public workforce into an involuntary source of political support for
incumbents-hence the process of preserving political accountability that
ordinarily justifies managerial prerogative lends patronage practices no
sanction.
Coerced partisan loyalty is not the only form of ideological
discrimination forbidden by the First Amendment; the patronage cases
themselves rely on an earlier line of cases condemning compulsory loyalty
oaths in public employment. 112 Similarly, in the public employee speech
case recognized as seminal in Garcetti, Pickering v. Board of Education,113
the Court held that a school board could not discipline a teacher employee
for criticizing its effort to secure a tax increase, 114 a holding that is perhaps
less an innovation than a particularized application of the deeply rooted
First Amendment rule against any governmental effort to compel
ideological conformity. 115 Garcetti, of course, took no issue with this line
of cases; and under that line of cases, ideological1 6disloyalty, without more,
implicates no legitimate managerial prerogative.'
Thus, managerial assertions of a right to control employee speech must
be directed toward managerial and not ideological objectives. As we have
seen, the patronage cases permit consideration of an employee's ideological
loyalty when "the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is
an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public
office involved." 117 The First Amendment accordingly makes ideology a
permissible consideration on public employment only when there is a

111. See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674-75 (1996); O'Hare
Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 717-21 (1996); Rutan v. Republican

Party of Ill.,
497 U.S. 62, 73-79 (1990); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 516-20 (1980).
112. See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs, 518 U.S. at 674-75 (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952)); O'Hare Truck

Serv., Inc., 518 U.S. at 720-21 (relying on Keyishian); Rutan, 497 U.S. at 77 (discussing
Keyishian, Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966), and Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488
(1961)).
113. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
114. See id. at 571-75; see also Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410

(1979) (teacher could not constitutionally be fired for dismissing school's policies as
discriminatory); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)

(teacher could not constitutionally be dismissed for disclosing memorandum imposing dress
code); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (teacher could not constitutionally be fired

for criticizing policies of the junior college system that employed him).
115. See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 233-35 (1977); Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1977), W. Va. State. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 640-42 (1943).
116. Indeed, Garcetti expressly endorsed the holding in Pickeringv. Board of Education.
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417-18 (2006).
117. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980).
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managerial justification for its consideration. 118 In those circumstances,
managerial prerogative is recognized as an incident of management's
political accountability for its performance.
While Garcetti recognizes managerial authority, and the patronage cases
limit it, there is a deeper commonality between these lines of authority. As
we have seen, Garcetti enhances political accountability by preventing a
diffusion of responsibility for the manner in which public officers discharge
their duties. The patronage cases enhance political accountability as well,
by ensuring that elected officials cannot use patronage resources as a means
of garnering electoral support unearned by their records. Thus, it is the
objective of political accountability that helps to define the scope and limits
of managerial prerogative.
4. Other Constitutional Limitations on Managerial Prerogative
The constitutional prohibition on coerced ideological loyalty is not the
only constitutional limitation on the managerial prerogative to regulate
speech. As I note above, the Due Process Clause requires prosecutors to
disclose exculpatory evidence. 119 The concept of managerial prerogative,
while offering the strongest support for the holding in Garcetti, accordingly
also argues against a reading of Garcetti that would deny prosecutors
120
protection even when they speak pursuant to a constitutional obligation.
118. Thus, had Ceballos adduced evidence that other employees who displayed greater
ideological loyalty to incumbent management and who had engaged in similar conduct had
faced no retaliation, he would have been able to assert a cognizable First Amendment claim.
Cf Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 681-82 (1994) (plurality opinion) (evidence that
management terminated employee only because of previous nondisruptive statements critical
of management created genuine issue of fact); id. at 689-92 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (public employees may assert pretext as a basis to challenge discipline under the
First Amendment). This qualification, however, elides the question of whether ideological
loyalty is appropriately required of professional staff in a prosecutor's office. Most courts to
consider the question have held that ideological loyalty can be required of prosecutors. See,
e.g., Fazio v. City of San Francisco, 125 F.3d 1328, 1334 (9th Cir. 1997); Gordon v. County
of Rockland, 110 F.3d 886, 890-92 (2d Cir. 1997); Monks v. Marlinga, 923 F.2d 423, 426
(6th Cir. 1991) (per curiam); Williams v. City of River Rouge, 909 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1990);
Clark v. Brown, 861 F.2d 66, 68 (4th Cir. 1988); Livas v. Petka, 711 F.2d 798 (7th Cir.
1983); Mummau v. Ranck, 687 F.2d 9 (3d Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Ness v. Marshall, 660
F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1981). The possibility that the District Attorney might have been entitled
to ideological loyalty from Ceballos suggests yet another problem with his First Amendment
claim. As Justice O'Connor once observed, citing the discussion concerning the ability of a
public employer to demand partisan loyalty of employees in positions for which partisan
loyalty is appropriate in Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980), "though a private person is
perfectly free to uninhibitedly and robustly criticize a state governor's legislative program,
we have never suggested that the Constitution bars the governor from firing a high-ranking
deputy for doing the same thing." Waters, 511 U.S. at 672 (plurality opinion).
119. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
120. On this point, Garcetti is ambiguous. After citing a number of legal and ethical
constraints on public employers, including the constitutional obligation to disclose
exculpatory evidence recognized in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), Garcetti
continues:
These imperatives, as well as obligations arising from any other applicable
constitutional provisions and mandates of the criminal and civil laws, protect
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After all, the heart of Garcetti, as I argue above, is its view that managerial
prerogative includes "the exercise of employer control over what the
employer itself has commissioned or created."' 12 1 The Due Process Clause,
however, limits employer control by compelling the production of
exculpatory information of which the defense is otherwise unaware, and
imposes an obligation of disclosure on prosecutors quite separate from any
office policy or practice that an employer may have "commissioned or
created." Thus, a conception of employer prerogative does not deny
protection for an employee who is disciplined for honoring a constitutional
obligation because an employer's desire to suppress such information is not
within the scope of a public employer's constitutionally legitimate
prerogatives. 122 Indeed, the centrality of the disclosure of exculpatory
evidence to the proper functioning of the criminal justice system provides
additional reason to doubt that any constitutional conception of managerial
prerogative includes the power to suppress exculpatory evidence. A useful
analogy is provided by the Court's decision to invalidate a prohibition on
federally funded legal services organizations bringing litigation that
challenges welfare laws on the ground that this distorted the proper role that
lawyers play in protecting their clients' rights. 123 Suppressing exculpatory
evidence in criminal proceedings does not inhibit the attorney-client
relationship, but it does distort the ability of the criminal justice system to
supply due process, and for this reason, it likely transgresses the
constitutional boundaries of managerial prerogative. Nor does the theory of
political accountability at the heart of the concept of managerial prerogative
provide support for a prosecutor's effort to prevent his subordinates from
disclosing exculpatory evidence. In light of the constitutional duty of
disclosure, the Constitution denies a prosecutor the ability to suppress
exculpatory evidence as a means of increasing conviction rates and
therefore attracting political support. It follows that this form of managerial
control over the prosecutorial function is constitutionally impermissible.
This is not to suggest, however, that the concept of managerial
prerogative has nothing to say about the manner in which the obligation to
employees and provide checks on supervisors who would order unlawful or
otherwise inappropriate actions.
We reject, however, the notion that the First Amendment shields from
discipline the expressions employees make pursuant to their professional duties.
Our precedents do not support the existence of a constitutional cause of action
behind every statement a public employee makes in the course of doing his or her
job.

Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425-26. The first sentence set out above hints at some protection for
employees, while the following paragraph inclines against protection. In any event, since the
question whether the First Amendment permits discipline of a prosecutor for honoring his
Brady obligation was not presented in Garcetti, it should not be regarded as containing an
authoritative holding on that point.
121. Id. at 422.

122. For an argument in support of a similar constitutional limitation on managerial
prerogative arising from the constitutional right of sexual privacy recognized in Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), see Secunda, supra note 109, at 119-27.
123. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 543-47 (2001).
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disclose exculpatory evidence is discharged. Supervisors and subordinates
will sometimes disagree about whether particular information must be
disclosed. In Waters v. Churchill,124 the Court held that when a public
employer imposes discipline on an employee for her speech, it may act on
the basis of its own factual determinations about what the employee had
said as long as it conducts a reasonable investigation. 12 5 This approachitself resting on a conception of managerial prerogative that came to fruition
in Garcetti-suggests that a supervisor's decision that particular
information need not be disclosed, if reasonable, should receive deference.
And, as we have seen, the First Amendment does not protect
insubordination. A policy requiring supervisory review prior to the
disclosure of exculpatory evidence is not itself unconstitutional, and the
violation of such a policy would accordingly infringe a legitimate
26
managerial prerogative.1

Thus, the concept of managerial prerogative has important explanatory
power in assessing the Supreme Court's public-employee free speech
jurisprudence. That concept will provide critical guidance for post-Garcetti
First Amendment litigation involving the rights of public employees. It
remains to consider the implications of this conception of managerial
prerogative for other areas of First Amendment law.
II. MANAGERIAL PREROGATIVE AND WORKPLACE HARASSMENT

Garcetti considers speech that is part of an employee's duties. This,
however, is not the only type of speech in the workplace. Antiharassment
law addresses workplace speech as well. The concept of managerial
prerogative, moreover, has a good deal to say about the relationship
between the First Amendment and antiharassment law.
A. The FirstAmendment Attack on AntiharassmentLaw
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful "to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,

124. 511 U.S. 661 (1994).
125. Id. at 675-78 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 687-92 (Scalia, J., concurring in the

judgment) (employer's factual determination is conclusive unless pretextual). Although the
plurality's analysis did not command a majority of the Court, its rationale is properly
regarded as the holding of the Court because it states the narrowest ground articulated in
support of the judgment. Id. at 685-86 (Souter, J.,
concurring). See generally, e.g., Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (discussing this rule).
126. Indeed, a policy requiring preclearance prior to disclosure of exculpatory evidence is

much like the CIA preclearance policy that has already survived First Amendment attack.
See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 511-13 (1980).
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color, religion, sex, or national origin."' 127 The Supreme Court has held that
"sexual harassment so 'severe or pervasive' as to "'alter the conditions of
[the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment"'
violates Title VII."'1 28 The same is true for harassment on the basis of other
protected statuses, such as race. 129 Moreover, employers are always liable
for harassment with tangible effects on the terms and conditions of
employment, such as discriminatory harassment in "hiring, firing,
promotion, compensation, and work assignment,"' 130 and even absent such
tangible results, employers are liable for supervisory harassment unless they
demonstrate that they exercised reasonable care to prevent such harassment
through the implementation of antiharassment policies or similar measures
and that the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of available
preventative or corrective opportunities. 131 Employers are only liable for
132
peer harassment upon proof of the employer's own negligence.
When it comes to verbal harassment, the Court has stressed that not every
offensive utterance is sufficient to alter the terms and conditions of
employment in violation of Title VII. 133 Still, verbal harassment-even
though it consists of "speech" ordinarily protected by the First
Amendment-will sometimes be actionable. In Harris v. Forklift Systems,
Inc., 134 for example:
The Magistrate found that, throughout Harris' time at Forklift,
[Forklift's president Charles] Hardy often insulted her because of her
gender and often made her the target of unwanted sexual innuendos.
Hardy told Harris on several occasions, in the presence of other
employees, "You're a woman, what do you know" and "We need a man
as the rental manager"; at least once, he told her she was "a dumb ass
woman." Again in front of others, he suggested that the two of them "go
to the Holiday Inn to negotiate [Harris'] raise." Hardy occasionally asked
Harris and other female employees to get coins from his front pants
pocket. He threw objects on the ground in front of Harris and other
women, and asked them to pick the objects up. He made sexual
innuendos about Harris and other women's clothing.

127. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(a)(1) (2000).
128. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998) (quoting Meritor Sav.
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)) (alteration in original); accord, e.g., Pa. State
Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 146-47 (2004); Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536
U.S. 101, 116 (2002); Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 (2001) (per
curiam); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
129. See Nat'lR.R. PassengerCorp., 536 U.S. at 116 n.10.
130. Faragher,524 U.S. at 790; accord Suders, 542 U.S. at 143-45; Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753-54, 760-63 (1998).
131. See, e.g., Suders, 542 U.S. at 145-46; Faragher,524 U.S. at 801-08; Burlington
Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 763-65.
132. See, e.g., Faragher,524 U.S. at 799-800.
133. See, e.g., Nat'l R.R. PassengerCorp., 536 U.S. at 115-16; Clark County Sch. Dist.,
532 U.S. at 270-71; Faragher,524 U.S. at 786-88; Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81; Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993); Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
134. 510 U.S. 17, 19 (1993).
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In mid-August 1987, Harris complained to Hardy about his conduct.
Hardy said he was surprised that Harris was offended, claimed he was
only joking, and apologized. He also promised he would stop, and based
on this assurance Harris stayed on the job. But in early September, Hardy
began anew: While Harris was arranging a deal with one of Forklift's
customers, he asked her, again in front of other employees, "What did you
do, promise the guy.., some [sex] Saturday
night?" On October 1,
35
Harris collected her paycheck and quit. 1
On these facts, the Court held the harassment actionable even though it had
not caused Harris any physical or serious psychological injury. 136 In other
words, purely verbal harassment is sometimes actionable under Title VII
without proof of some tangible injury. There is a serious question whether
the regime of antiharassment law is consistent with the First Amendment.
1. The Argument Based on Content
First Amendment doctrine has never treated speech as unprotected
because others find it offensive or harassing. Indeed, laws proscribing
137
offensive or annoying speech have been consistently invalidated.
Although the First Amendment is not thought to protect "fighting words,"
"true threats," or speech to "captive audiences," "fighting words" are
limited to those likely to produce an immediate breach of the peace, 138 "true
threats" are only those statements that express a serious intent to commit an
act of unlawful violence, 139 and the "captive audience" concept generally
has no application to persons outside of their home. 140 Thus, under current
First Amendment doctrine, most forms of harassing workplace speech are

135. Id. at 19 (citations omitted and second and third pairs of brackets in original).
136. Id. at 22-23.
137. See, e.g., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 132-33 (1974) (ordinance
prohibiting use of "opprobrious language" toward a police officer); Gooding v. Wilson, 405
U.S. 518, 524-28 (1972) (statute prohibiting use of "opprobrious or abusive language,
tending to cause a breach of the peace"); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615-16
(1971) (ordinance prohibiting groups conducting themselves in a manner "annoying" to
others).
138. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989); Lewis v. City of New
Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 133-34 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 525 (1972); Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
139. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-60 (2003); Rankin v. McPherson,
483 U.S. 378, 386-87 (1987); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969) (per
curiam).
140. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209-11 (1975); Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 412 (1974); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). One
member of the Court once found this concept relevant as it upheld a prohibition on political
advertising on public buses, see Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 305-08
(1974) (Douglas, J., concurring), but a four-Justice plurality found it relevant only to
rejecting a claim that the bus should be treated as a public forum, see id. at 301-04 (plurality
opinion), and the four dissenters rejected any reliance on the concept, see id. at 308-22
(Brennan, J., dissenting). The single vote in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights is therefore
not much of a peg to hang the captive-audience hat on when it comes to workplace
harassment.
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expression that are
unlikely to fall into any of the categories of unprotected
14 1
defined by reference to the content of speech.
Moreover, even if harassing speech were considered unprotected,
antiharassment laws can still be accused of impermissible discrimination
against disfavored ideas, even within categories of unprotected speech. In
R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul,14 2 the Court held that an ordinance prohibiting
"plac[ing] on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation,
characterization or graffiti... which one knows or has reasonable grounds
to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion or gender,"1 4 3 and which had been construed by the
Minnesota Supreme Court to reach only constitutionally unprotected
fighting words, 144 nevertheless violated the First Amendment because it
"impose[d] special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on
disfavored subjects."' 145 Since the invalidated ordinance's formulation
seemingly tracks Title VII, there is reason to believe that Title VII, at least
as applied to verbal harassment, constitutes impermissible
viewpoint
146
discrimination, as indeed a number of scholars have argued.
To be sure, R.A. V offers antiharassment law some solace. After noting
that the First Amendment tolerates "laws directed not against speech but
against conduct," the Court added, "[t]hus, for example, sexually
derogatory 'fighting words,' among other words, may produce a violation
of Title VII's general prohibition against sexual discrimination in
employment practices."' 147 The Court concluded, "Where the government
does not target conduct on the basis of its expressive content, acts are not
141. For additional explication of the difficulties in squaring antiharassment law with
First Amendment doctrine, see, for example, Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship:
Hostile-Environment Harassment and the FirstAmendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481, 510-31
(1991); Richard H. Fallon, Sexual Harassment,Content Neutrality, and the FirstAmendment
Dog that Didn't Bark, 1994 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 12-20; Jules B. Gerard, The FirstAmendment
in a Hostile Environment: A Primer on Free Speech and Sexual Harassment, 68 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1003, 1010-35 (1993); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace
Harassment,39 UCLAL. REV. 1791, 1819-43 (1992).
142. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
143. Id. at 380 (internal quotation marks omitted).
144. Id. at 380-81.
145. Id. at 391.
146. See, e.g., DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, You CAN'T SAY THAT! THE GROWING THREAT TO
CIVIL LIBERTIES FROM ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS 23-34 (2003); Browne, supra note 141, at

491-501; Gerard, supra note 141, at 1010-25; Wayne Lindsey Robbins, Jr., When Two
Liberal Values Collide in an Era of "PoliticalCorrectness": FirstAmendment Protection
as a Check on Speech-Based Title VII Hostile Environment Claims, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 789,
801-08 (1995); Volokh, supra note 141, at 1826-32; Eugene Volokh, How HarassmentLaw
Restricts Free Speech, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 563, 571-73 (1995). As one scholar put it,
The important point is that R.A. V. forces governments to decide what they wish to
control. If fighting words are a problem, ban them. And if, after having done so,
the prohibition is selectively enforced to muzzle only the speaker of fighting words
who hates white men, or Jews, or Korean-Americans, the doctrine of R.A. V. will
operate to invalidate the prohibition ....
Calvin R. Massey, Hate Speech, Cultural Diversity, and the FoundationalParadigms of
Free Expression, 40 UCLA L. REV. 103, 183 (1992).
147. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 389 (citations omitted).
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shielded from regulation merely because they express a discriminatory idea
or philosophy."' 14 8 Still, this observation is of limited aid to a defense of
antiharassment law; it is merely dictum, and it seems directed only to
"fighting words" which, we have seen, probably do not encompass most
49
types of actionable verbal harassment. 1
Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that a course of harassment that
violates Title VII lacks constitutional protection, even if it consists of verbal
harassment that might be constitutionally protected in other contexts. As
we have seen, Title VII is not a general antiharassment statute; it proscribes
only harassment that is thought to alter the terms or conditions of
employment.150 Accordingly, actionable harassment necessarily amounts
to an alteration in the character of the employment relationship; in other
words, the plaintiff in a harassment case must prove that the employer
effectively required an employee to submit to harassment on the basis of
race (or other protected characteristic) that it would not have permitted had
the victim been a nonminority employee. This type of contractual
discrimination is a poor candidate for constitutional protection. In a long
line of cases, the Court has held that discrimination in the terms and
conditions of contracts or other forms of commercial activities is to be
treated as unprotected conduct, not speech.' 5 1 It is equally settled that the
First Amendment offers no protection merely because a violation of an
otherwise valid law thought to be directed at conduct involves, in whole or
in part, words or other forms of speech.152 As the Court has explained,
"[I]t has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press
to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in
part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either
spoken, written, or printed." Congress, for example, can prohibit
employers from discriminating in hiring on the basis of race. The fact that
this will require an employer to take down a sign reading "White

148. Id. at 390.
149. See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text. For a more detailed argument that
the R.A. V dictum is of limited significance, see Volokh, supranote 141, at 1829-32.

150. See supranotes 127-36 and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487 (1993); Hishon v. King &
Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 75 (1984); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1976);
Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 468-70 (1973); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388-89 (1973); Ry. Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326

U.S. 88, 93-94 (1945). Conversely, the First Amendment is thought to protect the right to
discriminate with respect to groups that associate for ideological and noncommercial
reasons. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); see also David E. Bernstein,
Antidiscrimination Laws and the First Amendment, 66 Mo. L. REV. 83 (2001); Dale
A Tripartite
Carpenter, Expressive Ass'n and Anti-Discrimination Law after Dale:
Approach, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1515, 1563-88 (2001).
152. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47,
62 (2006); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110 (1990); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436
U.S. 447,456 (1978).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

Applicants Only" hardly means that the law should be analyzed as one
53
regulating the employer's speech rather than conduct.1

Thus, the fact that discrimination in employment sometimes takes the form
of speech erects no First Amendment barrier to regulation of such speech;
rather, regulations aimed at nonspeech evils are thought to impose only
incidental restrictions on speech. 154 Indeed, the lower courts that have
considered the question have thus far universally held that evidence
sufficient to satisfy Title VII standards also makes out conduct that is
unprotected by the First Amendment. 155 This is also the ground on which
most of its scholarly advocates defend antiharassment law against First
56
Amendment attack. 1

153. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 62 (citations omitted) (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage &
Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949)).
154. See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 294-95 (2000) (plurality
opinion); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566-67 (1991) (plurality opinion);
Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 702-04 (1986); United States v. Albertini, 472
U.S. 675, 688-89 (1985); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 610-11 (1985); United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). Moreover, precisely because the First
Amendment permits the legislature to prohibit racial discrimination in employment, a
prohibition on discriminatory speech that is part of a discriminatory act is considered equally
permissible:
When the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason
the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable, no significant danger of idea or
viewpoint discrimination exists. Such a reason, having been adjudged neutral
enough to support exclusion of the entire class of speech from First Amendment
protection, is also neutral enough to form the basis of distinction within the class.
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992); accord Davenport v. Wash. Educ.
Ass'n, 127 S. Ct. 2372, 2381 (2007); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 361-62 (2003).
155. See, e.g., O'Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 735-36 (1st Cir. 2001);
Baty v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1246-47 (10th Cir. 1999); Jarman v. City of
Northlake, 950 F. Supp. 1375, 1379 (N.D. I11.1997); Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F.
Supp. 847, 884 n.89 (D. Minn. 1993); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp.
1486, 1535-37 (M.D. Fla. 1991); United States v. Swan, 48 M.J. 551, 555-56 (N-M. Ct.
Crim. App. 1998); Aguilar v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 853-59 (Cal. 1999)
(plurality opinion); id. at 868-75 (Werdegar, J., concurring); People v. Allen, 680 N.E.2d
795, 800 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); Trayling v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm'rs, 652 N.E.2d 386,
395 (I11.App. Ct. 1995); Commonwealth v. Hendrickson, 724 A.2d 315, 318 (Pa. 1999);
Sanchez v. State, 995 S.W.2d 677, 687-89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
156. See, e.g., Mary Becker, How Free Is Speech at Work?, 29 U.C. DAVis L. REv. 815,
853-68 (1996); Charles R. Calleros, Title VII and Free Speech: The FirstAmendment Is Not
Hostile to a Content-NeutralHostile-Environment Theory, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 227, 252-62;
Deborah Epstein, Can a "Dumb Ass Woman" Achieve Equality in the Workplace? Running
the Gauntlet of Hostile Environment HarassingSpeech, 84 GEO. L.J. 399, 435-46 (1996);
Fallon, supra note 141, at 42-51; Andrea Meryl Kirshenbaum, Hostile Environment Sexual
Harassment Law and the FirstAmendment: Can the Two Peacefully Coexist?, 12 TEX. J.
WOMEN & L. 67, 86-95 (2002); John H. Marks, Title VII's Flight Beyond FirstAmendment
Radar: A Yin-to-Yang Atttenuation of "Speech " Incident to Discriminatory "Abuse'" in the
Workplace, 9 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 29-40 (1999); Ellen R. Peirce, Reconciling Sexual
HarassmentSanctions and Free Speech Rights in the Workplace, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L.
127, 215-23 (1996); Suzanne Sangree, Title VII ProhibitionsAgainst Hostile Environment
Sexual Harassmentand the First Amendment: No Collision in Sight, 47 RuTGERs L. REv.
461, 532-58 (1995); John F. Wirenius, Actions as Words, Words as Actions: Sexual
HarassmentLaw, the FirstAmendment and Verbal Acts, 28 WHITTIER L. REv. 905, 967-77
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Although one can surely question the integrity of the distinction between
speech and conduct, at least in this context, 157 there remains a fairly
apparent difference between advocating discriminatory employment
practices and actually engaging in those practices. Employment practices
that effectively alter the terms and conditions of employment surely seem to
go into the eminently regulable realm of contractual relationships. 58 To be
sure, drawing a distinction between speech and conduct may not be the
most helpful way to make the point since it is possible to identify in
virtually every effort at communication some component that one might
regard as conduct. Eugene Volokh, for example, has argued that any
regulation that is triggered by the expressive component of conduct should
159
be treated as a presumptively invalid content-based speech restriction.
This observation, however, is of limited utility. Professor Volokh's view
provides no means for separating permissible from impermissible
regulation directed at the content of speech; yet it is clear that a great deal
of content regulation is constitutionally unobjectionable. Citing fighting
words and defamation as examples, the Court has observed,
[I]t is not rare that a content-based classification of speech has been
accepted because it may be appropriately generalized that within the
confines of the given classification, the evil to be restricted so
overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests,160if any, at stake, that
no process of case-by-case adjudication is required.
Thus, labeling a regulation as directed at the content of speech is not
talismanic; a judgment remains necessary about the virtues and vices of the
(2007); Jessica M. Karner, Comment, PoliticalSpeech, Sexual Harassment,and a Captive
Workforce, 83 CAL. L. REV. 637, 688-91 (1995).
157. See, e.g., Peter Caldwell, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment and First
Amendment Content Neutrality: Putting the Supreme Court on the Right Path, 23 HOFSTRA
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 373, 396-406 (2006); Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the
Workplace and the Problem of DiscriminatoryHarassment,75 TEX. L. REV. 687, 705-07
(1997); Fallon, supra note 141, at 14-16; Peirce, supra note 156, at 209-11; Karner, supra
note 156, at 663-67.
158. This observation is related to the view, most forcefully pressed by Kent Greenawalt,
that some types of words are not merely communicative, but effectively alter social or
economic relationships, and under those circumstances can be regulated to the extent that
they go beyond mere speech and become "situation-altering utterances." See KENT
GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS: INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LIBERTIES OF SPEECH 67, 48-50 (1999). For a similar argument about harassing speech from another eminent
scholar, see Frederick Schauer, The Speech-ing of Sexual Harassment,in DIRECTIONS IN
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 347, 357-60 (Catherine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds.,
2004). Even Eugene Volokh, a leading critic of the distinction between speech and conduct
and the associated concept of a "situation-altering utterance," see Volokh, supra note 64, at
1311-16, 1334, refrains from arguing that speech that amounts to an alteration in contractual
or other legal relationships qualifies for constitutional protection. See id. at 1334-35.
159. See Volokh, supra note 64, at 1286-311. On this basis, Professor Volokh also
criticizes the speech/conduct distinction and the associated concept of a "situation-altering
utterance." See id. at 1311-36.
160. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1982); accord, e.g., Virginia v. Black,
538 U.S. 343, 358-59 (2003); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 66-68 (1976)
(plurality opinion).

FORDHAMLAWREVIEW

[Vol. 77

regulation at issue. And, in the particular context of employment, as the
R.A. V. dictum and the long line of cases upholding antidiscrimination laws
against First Amendment attack suggest, it has long been settled that the
government's compelling interest in promoting equal employment
opportunities for women and minorities justifies a categorical prohibition
on discriminatorily altering the terms and conditions of employment,
whether that is accomplished through speech or otherwise.
But even if the argument that a Title VII violation should be treated as
unprotected conduct persuades, it does not quite get antiharassment law out
of the First Amendment woods, as we will now see.
2. The Argument Based on Overbreadth
The concept of "severe or pervasive" harassment expresses something
less than mathematical precision, and that creates an additional First
Amendment hurdle for antiharassment law. Insufficiently precise laws are
thought to run afoul of the First Amendment because vagueness creates a
risk that those potentially subject to the vague prohibition will be inhibited
from engaging in constitutionally protected speech. 16 1 It is far from clear
that antiharassment law can be squared with this doctrine.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that it is often difficult to tell
when individual acts of harassment, nonactionable in themselves, become
sufficiently severe or pervasive to violate Title VII because "[s]uch claims
are based on the cumulative effect of individual acts. 1 62 This imprecision
gives employers an incentive to adopt prophylactic policies barring conduct
that does not itself violate Title VII in order to minimize their exposure to
liability. This incentive is enhanced by the Court's recognition of an
affirmative defense based on antiharassment policies. 163 But, because it is
difficult to tell when harassment becomes actionable, employers cannot
tenably adopt a policy of "no Title VII violations"-that would give
employees insufficient guidance in an area that can trouble even experts,
and run the risk that an accumulation of incidents that do not individually
violate the employer's policy will in the aggregate give rise to a

161. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871-72 (1997); Bd. of Airport Comm'rs v.
Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574-76 (1987); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,
496 (1975); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 133-34 (1974); Gooding v.

Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520-21 (1972). This doctrine is analytically distinct from a claim that
a statute is overbroad because it proscribes a substantial quantum of constitutionally
protected conduct. See, e.g., Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118-20 (2003); Ferber,458
U.S. at 769-73; Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-15 (1973). If one takes it as

given that Title VII proscribes only unprotected conduct, then it is not overbroad in this
sense.
162. See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002). In contrast,
"[d]iscrete acts such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire
are easy to identify." Id. at 114.
163. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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violation. 164
Accordingly, prophylactic antiharassment policies are
commonplace, and for just this reason, critics argue that even if Title VII
violations are themselves unprotected, the statute creates an impermissible
chilling effect by inducing employers-public and private-to prohibit
nonactionable and therefore constitutionally protected verbal harassment. 16 5
A number of lower courts have invalidated prophylactic antiharassment
policies on this ground. 166 The scholarly advocates of antiharassment law,
for their part, have been strikingly unable to answer the critics on this
point. 167

164. As one eminent scholar put it, "a hostile environment can arise from single acts of
discrimination on the part of many different individuals. To deal with a form of abuse that is
repetitive to its victims, and hence constitutes the continuing injury of harassment to them, it
is necessary to prohibit the individual actions that, when added up, amount to institutional
discrimination." Thomas C. Grey, How to Write a Speech Code Without Really Trying:
Reflections on the StanfordExperience, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 891, 907 (1996).
165. See, e.g., Browne, supra note 141, at 501-10; Kingsley R. Browne, Zero Tolerance
for the FirstAmendment: Title VII's Regulation of Employee Speech, 27 OHIO N.U. L. REv.
563, 581-97 (2001) [hereinafter Browne, Zero Tolerance]; Gerard, supra note 141, at 102528; Robbins, supra note 146, at 808-11; Volokh, supra note 141, at 1811-14; Eugene
Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Cyberspace,HarassmentLaw, and the Clinton Administration,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2000, at 299, 304-11; Eugene Volokh, What
Speech Does "Hostile Work Environment" Harassment Law Restrict?, 85 GEO. L.J. 627,
635-46 (1997). Largely for this reason, critics argue that the First Amendment precludes
harassment liability only for the most egregious forms of individually targeted harassment.
See, e.g., TIMOTHY C. SHIELL, CAMPUS HATE SPEECH ON TRIAL 121-62 (1998); Kingsley R.
Browne, The Silenced Workplace: Employer Censorship Under Title VII, in DIRECTIONS IN
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW, supra note 158, at 399, 409-12; Estlund, supra note 157, at
741-59; Volokh, supra note 141, at 1863-68. For a judicial opinion taking this view, see
Johnson v. County of L.A. Fire Dep't, 865 F. Supp. 1430, 1438-42 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
166. See, e.g., Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 258-67 (3d
Cir. 2002) (granting preliminary injunction); Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d
200, 207-10 (3d Cir. 2001); Cohen v. San Bernadino Valley Coll., 92 F.3d 968, 971-72 (9th
Cir. 1996); Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1182-84 (6th Cir. 1995); UWM
Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1180-81 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Doe v. Univ. of
Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 864-68 (E.D. Mich. 1989). Still other cases have found that ad hoc
regulation of allegedly harassing speech creates similar problems. See, e.g., Iota Chi Chapter
of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason Univ., 993 F.2d 386, 393 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding
that a university's punishment of participants in a sexist skit violated the First Amendment).
167. Typical is Suzanne Sangree's effort to address the problem by arguing that Title VII
is no trap for the unwary because only employers who are culpable for harassment can be
held liable. See Sangree, supra note 156, at 528-32. This is no answer to the claim that Title
VII will inevitably cause employers to overregulate speech because of its imprecision.
Deborah Epstein denies that employers are likely to adopt prophylactic antiharassment
policies, see Deborah Epstein, Free Speech at Work: Verbal Harassment as Gender-Based
Discriminatory (Mis)Treatment, 85 GEO. L.J. 649, 658-65 (1997), but her response to the
rather impressive empirical evidence adduced by the Title VII critics consists of a single
telephone interview of an employer-consultant who appears to have a financial interest in the
continued vitality of Title VII antiharassment doctrine, see id. at 664 & nn.85 & 87. In any
event, the interview reflects a view at odds with the practical reality that the financial

incentives of employers, especially in the private sector where there is no potential liability
for violating the First Amendment, lie entirely in minimizing potentially actionable speech.
Having formerly represented a public employer, and having attended more than a few sexual
harassment training seminars from both sides of the rostrum, it is clear to me that the
message sent by these seminars is that managers and employees alike should err on the side
of caution.
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The Supreme Court, for its part, is becoming engaged. In Davis v.
Monroe County Board of Education,168 a majority of the Court, without
reaching any First Amendment issue, recognized a cause of action for
damages under Title IX of the Civil Rights Act when a school district
culpably fails to prevent the sexual harassment of a student, 169 but Justice
Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Thomas, warned that a public school's ability to enforce antiharassment
rules "is ...circumscribed by the First Amendment," and noted that "[a]
number of federal courts have already confronted difficult problems raised
by university speech codes designed to deal with peer sexual and racial
harassment."' 170 It is just a short step to the view of the critics that Title
VII's analogous antiharassment rule impermissibly chills protected speech.
Indeed, in the very next Term, dissenting from a denial of certiorari, Justice
Thomas argued that antiharassment law impermissibly restrains protected
speech in an employment discrimination case. 17 1 Thus, it appears that
the
72
First Amendment day of reckoning for antiharassment law is coming. 1
168. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
169. See id. at 639-53. The advocates of antiharassment regulation in the schools argue
that speech demeaning to racial or other minorities, or women, subordinates these
traditionally disadvantaged groups and therefore discriminatorily limits their educational

opportunities. See, e.g.,

RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, UNDERSTANDING WORDS

THAT WOUND 111-21 (2004); Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional
Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 343, 372-86 (1991); Rhonda G. Hartman,
Revitalizing Group Defamation as a Remedy for Hate Speech on Campus, 71 OR. L. REV.
855, 884-96 (1992); Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 449-76; Mar J. Matsuda, Public Response to
Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320, 2371-73 (1989);
Rodney A. Smolla, Rethinking First Amendment Assumptions About Racist and Sexist
Speech, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 171, 198-211 (1990).

170. Davis, 526 U.S. at 667 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Later in the
opinion, Justice Kennedy added, "At the college level, the majority's holding is sure to add
fuel to the debate over campus speech codes that, in the name of preventing a hostile
educational environment, may infringe students' First Amendment rights." Id. at 682.
171. See Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc. v. Aguilar, 529 U.S. 1138, 1140-42 (2000) (Thomas,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
172. Some advocates of antiharassment law had taken comfort in the fact that although
Forklift mounted a First Amendment defense in Harris v. Forklift Systems Inc., see Brief for
Respondent at 31-33, Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (No. 92-1168), the
Court ruled for Teresa Harris without even mentioning the First Amendment defense. See
Fallon, supra note 141, at 9-10; Schauer, supra note 158, at 356-57. This view fails to take
the posture of the case into account. Harris was the petitioner, and her petition for certiorari
presented only the question whether she was required to establish a serious psychological
injury to make out a Title VII violation. See Brief for Petitioner at i, Harris v. Forklift Sys.,
Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (No. 92-1165). Under the Court's rules, it will not consider questions not
fairly subsumed in the questions presented in petition for certiorari. See SuP. CT. R. 14.1(a).
Although the Court may consider an argument advanced by a respondent in support of the
judgment below that was not reached by the lower court or presented in the petition for
certiorari, it frequently declines to reach questions not yet decided in the lower courts. See,
e.g., Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez, 127 S.Ct. 815, 822-23 (2007); Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S.
Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 258-69 (2004); West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212,
223 (1999); NCAA v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 469-70 (1999). Indeed, the Court "generally
do[es] not address arguments that were not the basis for the decision below." Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 379 n.5 (1996). Since the Court in Harris merely
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B. ManagerialPrerogativeand Workplace Harassment

We have seen that under Garcetti, what an employee says within the
course of his duties is subject to employer control; there is simply no First
Amendment right to perform one's duties in a fashion that displeases one's
employer, even when one's duties include speaking. 173 As the Court
explained, "Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public
employee's professional responsibilities ... simply reflects the exercise of
employer control over what the employer itself has commissioned or
created." 174 This approach has significant implications for antiharassment
law, which by its nature regulates relationships that an employer has created
for its own purposes.
As we have seen, Garcetti ultimately rests on a notion that management
has a right to control how public employees perform their jobs; and surely
that includes how they treat each other. Just as a public employer can
"prohibit its employees from being 'rude to customers,' 17 5 it can insist that
they not be rude to each other. Even if some harassing workplace speech
might not occur in the course of an employee's duties and therefore does
not fall within the literal scope of the holding in Garcetti,we have also seen
that managerial prerogative is not so narrowly circumscribed-it extends to
all conduct by the employee that is inconsistent with the employer's
legitimate managerial objectives with respect to the functioning of the
public institution at issue. 176 If the marketing of crude pornography away
from the workplace at issue in Roe is unprotected because it compromises
employer prerogatives, crude remarks at the workplace could hardly be
177
entitled to greater protection.
1. The Argument Based on Content
As for the question whether an employer's prohibition on harassing
speech at the workplace runs afoul of the rule against content or viewpoint
discrimination, the R.A. V. dictum may be a sufficient answer to this

remanded the case to the lower courts for further proceedings, its disposition did not deprive
Forklift of its First Amendment defense, and at least from the Court's point of view, there
was no reason for it to consider that defense in the first instance. Justice Kennedy and
Justice Thomas's subsequent opinions expressing support for a potential First Amendment
defense to harassment claims make clear that those who joined the Court's opinion in Harris
did not believe they were foreclosing potential First Amendment defenses to harassment
liability.

173. See supra Part I.B.2.
174. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410,421-22 (2006).
175. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 672-73 (1994) (plurality opinion).
176. See supra Part I.C.
177. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text. For similar reasons, antiharassment
policies within public schools and universities should survive First Amendment attack, at
least with respect to harassment occurring within class and other official settings. Just as a
public employer can require its employees not to be rude to customers, or each other, surely
a public university can enforce ordinary civility norms appropriate to the classroom.
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charge. 178 An employer could also evade the problem by adopting a
generally applicable civility code that does not identify discriminatory
harassment for special treatment. Moreover, under such a policy, the
employer could even choose to treat violations motivated by discriminatory
animus as aggravated; the First Amendment is not thought to preclude
sanctions based on discriminatory motive. 179 But even putting these
possibilities aside, the concept of managerial prerogative is itself a
sufficient answer to the charge of content or viewpoint discrimination.
As we have seen, in Davenport, the Court acknowledged that when the
government is not enforcing generally applicable laws, the risk that contentbased regulations will drive disfavored views from the market is decreased,
and accordingly the rationale for heightened First Amendment scrutiny of
such regulations is lacking. 180 Similarly, in Tennessee Secondary School
Athletic Ass 'n v. Brentwood Academy, 18 1 the Court also sustained a form of
viewpoint discrimination against First Amendment attack. Upholding a
high school athletic association's antirecruiting rule against First
Amendment attack, the Court wrote, "Just as the government's interest in
running an effective workplace can in some circumstances outweigh
employee speech rights," a public association "can similarly impose only
those conditions on such speech that are necessary to managing an efficient
and effective state-sponsored high school athletic league." 182 The Court
upheld the rule based on the "common-sense conclusion that hard-sell
tactics directed at middle school students could lead to exploitation, distort
competition between high school teams, and foster an environment in which
athletics are prized more highly than academics."' 183 Notably, both cases
permit not only content but even viewpoint discrimination in the managerial
context-the regulations at issue put the views of unions and high schools
who wish to compete for athletes at a special disadvantage.
The question of antiharassment law's constitutionality was not at issue in
either of these cases; but they importantly illustrate the implications of
managerial prerogative for antiharassment law. Davenport makes fairly
clear that a charge of viewpoint discrimination is likely to have little force
when applied to antiharassment workplace rules. When an employer insists
that its employees keep discriminatory speech out of the office, whether to
178. See supra notes 147-60 and accompanying text.
179. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484-88 (1993). For discussions of the use

of motive as a means to save antiharassment policies from First Amendment attack, see
David Schimmel, Are "Hate Speech" Codes Unconstitutional? An Analysis of R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 76 EDUC. REP. 653, 663-64 (1992); Catherine B. Johnson, Note, Stopping
Hate Without Stifling Speech: Re-Examining the Merits of Hate Speech Codes on University
Campuses, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1821, 1841-43 (2000).
180. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
181. 127 S. Ct. 2489 (2007).
182. Id. at 2495.
183. Id. at 2495-96. In its next sentence, the Court quoted Garcetti as it explained that

the "rule discourages precisely the sort of conduct that might lead to those harms, any one of
which would detract from a high school sports league's ability to operate 'efficiently and
effectively."' Id. at 2496 (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006)).
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improve morale and workplace harmony or merely to minimize the risk of
liability, there is little chance of the suppression of disfavored ideasemployees remain free to vent their private views in the most appropriate
venues for personal concern. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n,
in turn, suggests that a workplace rule that requires employees to adhere to
commonly understood norms of civility ordinarily thought appropriate in
the workplace, even if likely to fall disproportionately on identifiable
viewpoints, is likely to be sustained without need of an elaborate empirical
showing that it improves efficiency. These cases, in short, provide potent
answers to the charge that antiharassment law tolerates impermissible
content and viewpoint discrimination.
2. The Argument Based on Overbreadth
The overbreadth attack on antiharassment law remains to be considered.
But again, the concept of managerial prerogative goes a long way toward
answering this attack on antiharassment law.
Recall that Title VII, like other antidiscrimination laws, is considered a
content-neutral regulation of conduct. 184 The Supreme Court tells us that to
survive First Amendment attack, such laws "need not be the least restrictive
or least intrusive means .... Rather, the requirement of narrow tailoring is
satisfied 'so long as the ...regulation promotes a substantial government
'' 8 5
interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation. "
This standard accordingly permits prophylactic regulation when
reasonable. 186 While a wildly overbroad antiharassment policy could be
invalidated for that reason, or on grounds of impermissible vagueness,
policies that constitute a reasonable effort to prevent an accumulated series
of incidents that could amount to an actionable hostile environment are far
more defensible. Such policies are more defensible yet when coupled with
a scienter or culpability requirement that forbids only verbal harassment
that the speaker knows or should know will be perceived as abusive and
without a business justification should readily pass muster. A scienter
requirement is generally understood to cure problems of impermissible

184. See supra notes 147-60 and accompanying text.
185. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798-99 (1989) (quoting United States
v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)); accord, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 725-26
(2000); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 216-18 (1997); Bd. of Trs. of State
Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477-78 (1989). This test is derived from United States
v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), in which the Court held that "when 'speech' and
'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations
on First Amendment freedoms." Id. at 376. The Court subsequently explained that the
O'Brien test for incidental restrictions on speech is essentially the same as the test governing
the regulation of the time, place, or manner of speech. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 & n.8 (1984).
186. See, e.g., Albertini, 472 U.S. at 688-89; Clark, 468 U.S. at 296-97; Heffron v. Int'l
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 652-53 (1981).
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vagueness. 187 At a minimum, a policy with reasonable prophylactic scope
and a scienter requirement therefore should survive First Amendment
188
attack.
In any event, the concept of managerial prerogative tolerates what might
otherwise be considered unacceptable imprecision in regulation when
regulation is consistent with ordinary workplace norms. As we have seen
with Justice O'Connor's example of a workplace policy forbidding
"employees from being 'rude to customers,"'' 18 9 vagueness standards are
more forgiving in the workplace. Employees surely can be expected to
understand workplace norms as an incident of their employment. In Roe,
for example, there was no specific rule against officer involvement in the
manufacture or distribution of sexually explicit videos; Roe's discipline was
based, among other things, on rules against "conduct unbecoming of an
officer" and "immoral conduct." 190 Yet Roe did not even put forward a
vagueness attack on these rules, which would in any event have been
doomed by the Court's prior holding that sustained against a First
Amendment vagueness attack a civil service rule that permitted termination
"for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." 19 1
This more forgiving view of imprecision when it comes to workplace
regulation of speech follows from the character of managerial prerogative.
As we have seen, the First Amendment rule against vagueness is thought to
minimize the possibility of self-censorship caused by a fear of violating
imprecise regulations. 192 This rationale has limited applicability to the
workplace for at least two reasons. First, as we have also seen, regulation
in the workplace raises little threat that disfavored views will be driven
from the marketplace of ideas. Second, the fear of self-censorship itself has
little application to the workplace. The workplace, after all, is supposed to
187. See, e.g., Posters 'N' Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1994);
Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498-503 (1982).
188. Cf Cohen v. San Bemadino Valley Coll., 92 F.3d 968, 971-72 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding policy lacking culpability requirement impermissibly vague as applied to teacher's
use of long-accepted pedagogical methods); UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents, 774 F. Supp.
1163, 1180-81 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (reasoning that an intent to demean listener would cure
vagueness); Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 864-68 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (holding
policy overbroad and vague because it had been applied to serious academic discussion and
reached "threats" to "academic efforts" and "a stigmatizing or victimizing comment"
without any culpability requirement); United States v. Swan, 48 M.J. 551, 555-56 (N-M. Ct.
Crim. App. 1998) (defendant's culpable mental state defeated overbreadth and vagueness
challenge); Sanchez v. State, 995 S.W.2d 677, 687-89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (requirement
of culpable mental state saved antiharassment statute from vagueness and overbreadth
attack). There is a striking paucity of judicial decisions considering whether prophylactic
policies can satisfy First Amendment tailoring standards. Although one opinion by thenJudge Alito rejects such an argument, the policy at issue was aimed at preventing many
kinds of harassment that were not unlawful. See Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d
200, 210 (3d Cir. 2000).
189. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 672, 673 (1994) (plurality opinion).
190. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 79 (2003) (per curiam).
191. See Amett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 158-64 (1974) (plurality opinion) (internal
quotation marks omitted); id. at 164 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
192. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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be full of what one could regard as chilling effects-we have seen that at
work; employees are expected to serve their employers' interests, rather
than their own, even when speaking. It is therefore not unreasonable to
expect employees to understand and conform to ordinary workplace norms
of civility and professionalism.
3. Title VII and Private Employers.
The preceding discussion, as well as Garcetti itself, concerns a public
employer's prerogatives. One could argue that Title VII, by placing
governmental pressure on private employers to impose speech regulations,
cannot be supported by managerial prerogative since it enlists potentially
193
unwilling employers in a governmental effort to inhibit harassing speech.
Of course, to the extent that a private employer forbids its staff to violate
Title VII, there is no constitutional objection; we have seen that Title VII
violations are unlikely candidates for First Amendment protection. 194 But
even to the extent that Title VII is thought to effectively compel employers
to adopt prophylactic antiharassment policies, that would not render it
invalid.
The objection based on the rules against content and viewpoint
discrimination is easily answered. As we have seen, as recently as
Davenport, the Court has emphasized that this rule is inapplicable to
contexts in which regulation is unlikely to skew the general marketplace of
ideas, such as regulations governing only the workplace. 195 Just as
excluding harassing speech from the public workplace raises little threat of
skewing the marketplace of ideas, the regulation of harassing speech at the
private workplace is equally unlikely to have much effect on the general
tenor of public discussion and debate. After all, even if private firms do
overregulate, that will not drive what might be considered racist or sexist
views from general public discussion and debate altogether; it will just keep
such speech out of the workplace. When the threat of driving disfavored
views from the marketplace of ideas is so low, there is little reason to
invalidate an otherwise constitutional regulation of what is considered
unprotected conduct merely because of the risk that it will produce undue
self-censorship. Indeed, although Davenport upheld a regulation governing
only public employees and their unions, the Court cautioned that for private
sector employers, "[w]e do not suggest that the answer must be different,"
labor-management
and added that it had in the past upheld regulations of
96
relations "in a manner that is arguably content based."'
193. Writing before Garcetti,Kingsley Browne advanced just this argument. See Browne,
Zero Tolerance, supra note 165, at 573, 576-78.
194. See supra notes 147-60 and accompanying text.
195. See supra Part II.B.1.
196. Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 127 S. Ct. 2372, 2382 n.4 (2007). For example,
the Court upheld the authority of the National Labor Relations Board to prohibit a private
employer to make a threat of reprisal or a promise of a benefit during a unionization drive.
See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 616-20 (1969).
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As for the problem of overbreadth, as we have also seen, Title VII is
thought to regulate conduct rather than speech, and the First Amendment
tolerates prophylactic regulation if reasonable in scope. This doctrine is
fully applicable to government regulations that impose restrictions on
private groups that must, in turn, impose them on their own members. For
example, the government may compel the organizers of a protest to ensure
that all protesters comply with a no-camping rule in public parks as a
prophylactic means of protecting park resources, 197 and it can similarly
prevent the members of religious groups from distributing literature on the
grounds of a state fair as a prophylactic means of limiting pedestrian
congestion. 198 Since private groups engaged in otherwise constitutionally
protected activity can be compelled to require their members to adhere to
prophylactic regulations of this character, it is difficult to understand how
private firms cannot be compelled to impose similarly prophylactic
99
antiharassment regulation on their members.1
Thus, the reality that Title VII will produce some prophylactic
antiharassment regulation is itself no reason to invalidate antiharassment
law on First Amendment grounds, although the potential for unreasonably
overbroad regulation must still be considered. On that score, however,
while private firms have an incentive to adopt prophylactic antiharassment
policies to minimize the possibility that a series of otherwise nonactionable
events do not eventually produce actionable harassment, they also have an
incentive to avoid unnecessarily overbroad regulation of employee speech.
Firms that squander resources by investigating and enforcing wildly
overbroad prophylactic policies will for that reason place themselves at a
competitive disadvantage. If by chance private firms do overregulate, that
error cannot be laid at the government's door. Such overregulation, instead,
would be an example of the exercise of managerial prerogative by the
private firm itself-likely an imprudent exercise of managerial prerogative,
given the competitive harm of overregulation, but an exercise of managerial
prerogative nevertheless.
To be sure, there is always some risk that a legal rule that creates liability
for speech will produce impermissible overregulation, but that threat does
not mean that all such rules run afoul of the First Amendment. For
example, the threat of self-censorship has persuaded the Court to prohibit
liability for defamation absent fault, and presumed or punitive damages
197. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294-99 (1984).
198. See Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 650-55
(1981).
199. Although the compelled speech doctrine forbids the government from compelling
private firms to effectively adopt as their own speech with which they disagree, that doctrine
does not apply when a firm is required to comply with prophylactic regulations that are fairly
understood as requiring those subject to regulation to comply with a regulatory mandate
rather than requiring the regulated entity to convey what listeners might reasonably
understand as its own message. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights,
Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 61-65 (2006); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 653-57

(1994).
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absent intentional falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth, 200 but when
the speech at issue raises no issue of public concern, the Court has declined
to grant it special First Amendment protection because the threat to robust
public discussion and debate is necessarily limited. 20 1 The same point is
applicable to potentially harassing speech at work. The incentive that Title
VII creates for private employers to keep harassing speech out of the
workplace creates, at most, a highly limited threat to the general
marketplace of ideas.
Thus, the incentive that Title VII creates for private employers to adopt
prophylactic regulation is not likely to lead to impermissibly overbroad
regulation of speech. And, given the market incentive for private firms to
avoid inefficient overregulation, Title VII seems a particularly unattractive
context for the Court to hold that the risk of self-censorship requires the
202
invalidation of antiharassment laws.
III. THE EMERGING DOCTRINAL PARAMETERS OF MANAGERIAL
PREROGATIVE AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM

By now, it should be plain that First Amendment doctrine is undergoing
an important evolution when it comes to the management of speech within
public institutions. While no case before Garcetti contained such a bold
and categorical statement on the character of managerial prerogative, over
the past quarter century, the power to control the content and even the
Viewpoint reflected in speech has been steadily recognized in a variety of
contexts as an appropriate incident of managerial authority in governmental
institutions. We now know, for example, that the government may prohibit
a dissident labor union from access to its internal mail system while
granting access to the incumbent union, 2 03 bar nonprofit organizations
thought to be involved in controversial social or political activities from a
charitable drive aimed at public employees, 204 exclude fringe candidates
from a debate televised on a public television station, 205 utilize "decency
and respect for ...

diverse beliefs" as criteria when acting on applications

for public funding of the arts, 206 and use a technological filter to screen out
obscene and pornographic material from the materials provided through the

200. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
201. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 774-75 (1986); Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 757-61 (1985) (plurality
opinion); id. at 764 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 773 (White, J.,
concurring in the judgment).

202. This same approach should also sustain student antiharassment laws such as Title IX
against First Amendment attack. As we have seen, these regulations are also proper if
limited to generally understood civility norms appropriate to the classroom context. See
supra note 177.
203. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
204. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
205. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
206. See NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 569 (1998) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1)
(2000)).
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Internet at public libraries. 20 7 These cases illustrate the scope of the
emerging First Amendment law of managerial prerogative.
The discussion that opens Part III sketches out the doctrinal parameters
of the concept of managerial prerogative in First Amendment jurisprudence.
The concluding portion of Part III applies that framework to an issue
expressly reserved for future decision in Garcetti-the interaction between
managerial prerogative and the concept of academic freedom.
A. A DoctrinalFrameworkfor the Law of FirstAmendment Managerial
Prerogative
In recent years, a few scholars have advocated for reform of First
Amendment doctrine within public institutions, while bemoaning the failure
of existing doctrine to take account of institutional imperatives. Frederick
Schauer, for example, has argued that First Amendment doctrine should be
calibrated to the needs of particular public institutions, 208 and Professor
Post has argued that the First Amendment doctrine ought to distinguish
between the government acting in its regulatory and managerial
capacities. 209 Even advocates of doctrinal reform have complained,
however, about the difficulty of divining a new doctrine that would grant
government institutions the power to regulate the content and even the
2 10
viewpoint of speech without distorting the general marketplace of ideas.
After Garcetti, however, the contours of the new doctrine have begun to
come into sharper focus. As we have seen, Garcetti offers managerial
control over speech that the government has itself commissioned for its own
purposes as the conceptual justification for recognizing governmental
authority over the content of speech within a public institution. This is not
quite the approach taken by Professors Schauer and Post, although it
contains important elements of their proposals along with an emphasis on
affording public institutions the power to control institutional speech to the
extent that such control facilitates the political accountability of those
institutions.
1. The Threshold Inquiry
As we have seen, Garcetti and the other workplace speech cases are
premised on a recognition that some public institutions cannot achieve
otherwise constitutionally legitimate objectives-and therefore cannot be
fairly held politically accountable for the manner in which they pursue such
objectives-unless they are afforded the ability to control the speech of
207. See United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
208. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Principles,Institutions, and the FirstAmendment, 112
HARV. L. REv. 84 (1998); Frederick Schauer, Toward an InstitutionalFirstAmendment, 89
MINN. L. REv. 1256 (2005).
209. See, e.g., POST, supra note 80, at 234-65.
210. See, e.g., Lee C. Bollinger, Public Institutions of Culture and the FirstAmendment:
The New Frontier,63 U. CIN. L. REv. 1103, 1115-17 (1995).
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those within those institutions. 2 11 A focus on an institutional need to
evaluate the content of speech, however, is not limited to the workplace
speech cases. This point has become significant to a variety of First
Amendment litigation involving the management of speech within public
institutions.
Consider, for example, the forum cases, which treat governmental
authority to regulate access to government property. The Court has held
that when the government creates a forum for nongovernmental
communication for a limited programmatic purpose, it may regulate the
content of speech as long as the distinctions it draws are reasonable in light
of the underlying purposes of the forum and not an effort to suppress
disfavored viewpoints. 2 12 For instance, the Court has held that a public
television station could permissibly exclude fringe candidates from a
televised debate on the ground that limiting the debate to major candidates
was a reasonable editorial judgment in a medium that necessarily requires
editorial judgment to be exercised. 2 13 Thus, the imperatives associated with
institutional objectives are thought to justify what would otherwise be
considered impermissible discrimination against unpopular views or
speakers. Similarly, when the government hires persons to speak on its
behalf, it is well settled that the government may engage in content and

211. This inquiry partakes of the distinction between managerial and public domains that
Robert Post has offered:
Public discourse must be distinguished from domains that I have elsewhere

called "managerial." Within managerial domains, the state organizes its resources
so as to achieve specified ends. The constitutional value of managerial domains is
that of instrumental rationality, a value that conceptualizes persons as means to an
end rather than as autonomous agents. Within managerial domains, therefore, ends
may be imposed upon persons.
Managerial domains are necessary so that a democratic state can actually
achieve objectives that have been democratically agreed upon. Yet managerial
domains are organized along lines that contradict the premises of democratic selfgovernance. For this reason, First Amendment doctrine within managerial
domains differs fundamentally from First Amendment doctrine within public
discourse. The state must be able to regulate speech within managerial domains so
as to achieve explicit governmental objectives. Thus the state can regulate speech
within public educational institutions so as to achieve the purposes of education; it
can regulate speech within the judicial system so as to attain the ends of justice; it
can regulate speech within the military so as to preserve the national defense; it
can regulate the speech of government employees so as to promote "the efficiency
of the public services [the government] performs through its employees"; and so
forth.
Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 164 (1996) (quoting Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983)) (footnotes omitted).
212. See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677-78 (1998);
Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678-79 (1992); United
States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990) (plurality opinion); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 807-13 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
213. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n, 523 U.S. at 678-83.
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even viewpoint regulation to ensure that its agents transmit the approved
message. 214
Questions of managerial prerogative also arise when the government
must manage speech that is undertaken as part of its own programmatic
objectives.
We have seen that public employment is one such
circumstance-a public employer must necessarily assess the quality of its
employees' speech at the workplace, whether evaluating a prosecutorial
recommendation or addressing a supervisor's alleged sexual harassment of
a subordinate.
Gareetti holds that this process of assessment is a
managerial prerogative not subject to First Amendment attack, but in this
Garcetti is not unique. 215 There are other circumstances in which the
government must of necessity evaluate the quality of speech, and these
cases implicate the concept of managerial prerogative no less than in
Garcetti. Thus, when deciding what books and other materials it will carry,
a public library must inevitably make judgments about the quality of the
materials that it chooses to offer to the public. 2 16 When deciding which art
projects merit public subsidy, an arts program must evaluate the quality of
the various applicants. 2 17 When deciding what content to offer to viewers,
a public broadcaster must make essentially editorial judgments about the
quality of broadcast material. 2 18 Moreover, as we have seen, when the
government makes managerial judgments about the quality of speech, the
imprecise than
government properly acts on the basis of standards far more
2 19
those required in general First Amendment jurisprudence.
Thus, the threshold inquiry in the emerging law of managerial
prerogative asks whether a public institution must manage or control the
214. The general rule is that the government may engage in speech, or hire individuals to
speak on its behalf, without violating the First Amendment as long as its speech is directed
toward a legitimate governmental objective. See Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-94 (1991). For

a sampling of the impressive body of literature examining the First Amendment issues raised
by speech of the government itself or those tasked to speak on its behalf, see, for example,
MARK G.

YUDOF, WHEN

GOVERNMENT

SPEAKS:

POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT

ExPRESSION IN AMERICA 158-207 (1983); Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The
Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1501-09 (2001); David Cole,
Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in GovernmentFunded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 702-47 (1992); David Fagundes, State Actors as
First Amendment Speakers, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 1637, 1659-83 (2006); Abner S. Greene,
Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1, 26-52 (2000); Post, supra note 211, at 16476; Martin H. Redish & Daryl I. Kessler, Government Subsidies and Free Expression, 80
MINN. L. REV. 543, 560-73 (1996); Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV.
565,605-22 (1980).

215. Perhaps the classic example of managerial prerogative is the military, where the
Court has long recognized that the special needs of military discipline require recognition of
a broad prerogative to manage speech. See, e.g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 353-58
(1980); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 757-61 (1974).
216. See United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 204-06 (2003) (plurality
opinion).
217. See NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 583-86 (1998).
218. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm 'n, 523 U.S. at 673-75.
219. See supra notes 189-92 and accompanying text; see also Finley, 524 U.S. at 588-90.
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content of speech in order to achieve an otherwise constitutionally
legitimate objective. If so, the general rule requiring strict scrutiny when
the government regulates the content of speech is deemed inapplicable, and
managerial prerogative will be recognized to ensure that the institution can
fairly be held politically accountable for the manner in which its public
duties are discharged. Locating the boundaries of managerial prerogative,
in turn, requires an inquiry into the character of the content discrimination
that is a proper incident to a public institution's mission.
2. The Propriety of Viewpoint Discrimination
As we have seen, the concept of managerial prerogative can justify both
content and viewpoint discrimination. Still, the rule against viewpoint
discrimination is not categorically inapplicable to public institutions. As we
have seen, the patronage cases hold that ideological discrimination is
forbidden in public employment except for positions in which ideological
220
loyalty is "appropriate."
The theory of political accountability at the root of the First Amendment
law of managerial prerogative explains the emerging doctrine when it
comes to viewpoint discrimination. Public institutions frequently will not
require ideological loyalty from their staff in order to complete their
missions-clerical employees expected to type and file need no ideological
qualifications; and a public institution's political accountability is not
compromised if it is permitted to inquire into only the clerical skills of its
clerical staff, which can usually be readily monitored. 22 1 Sometimes,
however, a public employee's ideology may well bear on and act as an
appropriate proxy for performance.
To return to the example of a
prosecutor's office considered in Part I above, at least a measure of
viewpoint discrimination is appropriate in that context; hiring prodefendant
prosecutors would hardly be consistent with the prerogative of a District
Attorney's office to take the most aggressive positions consistent with
applicable law, and senior management cannot practicably monitor
everything that line prosecutors do. Indeed, although the Supreme Court
has yet to consider the question, the weight of authority in the lower courts
is that the position of prosecutor is one for which ideological loyalty can be
required. 222 And, as we have seen, when the government employs persons
to speak for it, it may engage in viewpoint discrimination in order to ensure
220. See supra notes 50, 111 and accompanying text.
221. Cf Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 390-91 (1987) ("Where, as here, an

employee serves no confidential, policymaking, or public contact role, the danger to the
agency's successful functioning from that employee's private speech is minimal. We cannot
believe that every employee in Constable Rankin's office, whether computer operator,
electrician, or file clerk, is equally required, on pain of discharge, to avoid any statement
susceptible of being interpreted by the Constable as an indication that the employee may be
unworthy of employment in his law enforcement agency. At some point, such concerns are
so removed from the effective functioning of the public employer that they cannot prevail
over the free speech rights of the public employee." (footnotes omitted)).
222. See supra note 118.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

that the appropriate message is sent. 223 Davenport explains that when the
government is not imposing generally applicable regulations, the rationale
for a ban on viewpoint discrimination as an effort to ensure that disfavored
224
views are not driven from the marketplace of ideas will often be absent,
and Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n adds that managerial
prerogative should be assessed in light of the particular objectives of the
governmental organization at issue. 225
Thus, the emerging First
Amendment law of managerial prerogative requires an examination of the
objectives of the institution at issue to assess whether the type of content or
viewpoint discrimination at issue is a proper incident to institutional
objectives or threatens to drive disfavored viewpoints from the marketplace
of ideas.
3. Managerial Prerogative as a Shield Against External Interference
The First Amendment law of managerial prerogative, as we have seen,
endeavors to permit institutions to manage speech as necessary in order to
achieve otherwise constitutionally legitimate objectives. Intrusive judicial
oversight, as we have also seen, can subvert the proper functioning of the
marketplace of ideas by depriving public officials of managerial control and
hence political accountability for the operation of public institutions.
Judicial oversight, however, is not the only type of external interference
with managerial prerogative that can undermine the proper functioning of a
public institution within a broader marketplace of ideas.
When it comes to nongovernmental institutions that manage speech
within the marketplace of ideas, the Court has long recognized that
legislative interference with managerial prerogative offends the First
Amendment. The Court invalidated a prohibition on editorializing by
federally funded public broadcasters, for example, as distorting the proper
role of broadcasters in the marketplace of ideas. 226 The same rule governs
223. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.

224. See supra text accompanying notes 59-63.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 181-83.

226. See FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 381-401 (1984). The
conceptual underpinning of this line of cases can be traced to Miami HeraldPublishing Co.
v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), in which the Court invalidated a statute granting political
candidates a right to reply to editorials as an impermissible burden on editorializing, see id.
at 254-57, and because it impermissibly interfered with editorial discretion:
Even if a newspaper would face no additional costs to comply with a
compulsory access law and would not be forced to forgo publication of news or
opinion by the inclusion of a reply, the Florida statute fails to clear the barriers of
the First Amendment because of its intrusion into the function of editors. A
newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and
advertising. The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made
as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues

and public officials-whether fair or unfair-constitute the exercise of editorial
control and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation
of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment
guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time.
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public institutions that must necessarily regulate speech in order to achieve
an otherwise legitimate constitutional objective. As we have seen, the
Court invalidated a prohibition on federally funded legal services
organizations bringing litigation that challenged welfare laws on the ground
that this distorted the proper role that lawyers play in protecting their
clients' rights. 227 Thus, legislative interference with managerial prerogative
runs afoul of the same principles that caution against judicial oversight of
institutional management of speech.
4. Two Illustrations of the Emerging Doctrine
Governmental support for the arts illustrates the scope of First
Amendment managerial prerogative, as well as the analytic confusion that
results if the character of managerial prerogative is not clearly identified. In
Finley,228 the Court upheld a statutory requirement that the National
Endowment for the Arts consider "decency and respect for the diverse
beliefs and values of the American public" when awarding public funding
while doubting the permissibility of an interpretation of these criteria that
permitted viewpoint discrimination. 2 29 The Court's approach appears more
than a bit contradictory. On the one hand, it is surely difficult to deny that
the statutory criteria were a form of viewpoint discrimination-they plainly
would work against art that attacks mainstream sensibilities. 230 On the
other hand, it is far from clear that a rule against viewpoint discrimination is
appropriate in arts funding, any more than it would be appropriate when the
President picks his cabinet. At least in the view of many, it is difficult to
separate ideology from the aesthetic merit of art, and a constitutional
imperative that such programs ignore the sensibilities of most taxpayers and
voters will ultimately make these programs politically untenable. 2 31 For my
own part, I have a difficult time understanding how the First Amendment is
advanced by a constitutional rule governing arts funding that requires
public managers to follow a politically untenable course that must
ultimately lead to the abolition of such programs, at least absent an
empirical case, which the plaintiff in Finley did not attempt to make, that
public funding threatens to effectively silence dissenting artistic viewpoints.
But whether one agrees with Finley or not, there can be little doubt that
managerial prerogative permits a government agency to consider the
Id. at 258 (footnote omitted). For a more extended discussion of this doctrine and how it
relates to public broadcasters, see Jonathan M. Phillips, Comment, Freedom by Design:
Objective Analysis and the ConstitutionalStatus of Public Broadcasting,155 U. PA. L. REV.
991 (2007).
227. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 543-47 (2001).
228. NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 576 (1998).
229. See id. at 576, 583-87.
230. This point was at the heart of the argument in the dissenting opinion. See id. at 60411 (Souter, J., dissenting).
231. For a defense of Finley that focuses on the sensibilities of taxpayers, see Lackland H.
Bloom, Jr., NEA v. Finley: A Decision in Search of a Rationale,77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 34-50
(1999).
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content of speech, and permits even the consideration of viewpoint to the
extent that one agrees that viewpoint merges, at least on the margins, with
artistic merit. The extent to which public arts funding should be exempt
from the rule against viewpoint discrimination, in short, should turn on the
extent to which viewpoint discrimination is thought to be a proper incident
to the otherwise constitutionally legitimate objective of promoting
excellence in the arts.
Contrast government arts funding with the management of a public
library. At issue in United States v. American Library Ass 'n232 was the
Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA), legislation that required public
libraries receiving federal funds or federally authorized discounted rates for
Internet access to utilize filters that block pornographic material that are
inappropriate for minors. 233 Although the case produced no majority
opinion, there was general agreement on the appropriate doctrinal
Anticipating the conception of managerial prerogative
framework.
articulated in Garcetti, eight Justices agreed that content discrimination at
public libraries posed no particular problem because libraries properly make
judgments about quality when building their collections. 234 There was
similar agreement that the statute should be assessed to determine if it
undennined the traditional function of public libraries, and no member of
the Court was willing to characterize the function of libraries as promoting
the study of some viewpoints at the expense of others. 2 35 Instead, the Court
joined issue on the question of whether the statute distorted the proper
function of libraries, with the majority concluding that the CIPA imposed
such a modest burden on adult patrons: they needed only to request that the
filter be disabled to view whatever they wished-that it should be viewed
as a reasonable prophylactic effort to protect minors from inappropriate
material, 236 while the dissenters argued that237the statute improperly
constrained the managerial discretion of libraries.
Regardless of one's view on the correct result in American LibraryAss 'n,
however, the decision helpfully illustrates the centrality to the emerging
232. 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
233. See 20 U.S.C. § 9134() (2006); 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6) (2006).
234. See Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. at 204-06 (plurality opinion); id. at 216-20

(Breyer, J.,concurring in the judgment); id. at 226 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 235-36
(Souter, J., dissenting). The only member of the Court not to make this point in United
States v. American Library Ass'n was Justice Kennedy, and he subsequently authored
Garcetti.
235. Id. at 203-04, 207-08 (plurality opinion); id. at 214-15 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment); id. at 216-18 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 220-25 (Stevens,

J., dissenting); id. at 235-42 (Souter, J.,dissenting). This view of the library's function is
also reflected in the earlier conclusion of four members of the Court that a public school may
not remove books from school libraries for purely ideological reasons unrelated to sound
pedagogy. See Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853, 863-72 (1982) (plurality opinion).
236. See Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. at 208-09 (plurality opinion); id. at 214-15
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 218-20 (Breyer, J.,concurring in the

judgment).
237. See id. at 225-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 235-42 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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First Amendment law of managerial prerogative of an assessment of the
extent to which a challenged regulation distorts or advances legitimate
institutional objectives. 238 The decision reflects general agreement on the
Court on two critical propositions: laws consistent with an otherwise
legitimate institutional objective that necessarily requires the institution to
distinguish between high- and low-quality speech are not subject to the
rules against content or viewpoint discrimination; while laws that inhibit the
ability of an institution to make such distinctions, at least when they are
central to their own role in the marketplace of ideas, should be invalidated.
My purpose in reviewing the arts funding and library cases is not to
rehash old litigation, but to illustrate both the utility and growing
importance of managerial prerogative in First Amendment litigation. While
the concept of managerial prerogative was absent in Finley, resulting in an
opinion that lacked conceptual clarity, managerial prerogative importantly
informed the decision in the library case, illustrating the growing
importance of this concept in First Amendment doctrine. Yet, managerial
prerogative is of greatest value if it can untangle conceptual difficulties in
areas in which the law is not yet settled. That leads to the final institutional
context that this Article examines-the public university.
B. ManagerialPrerogativein Higher Education
Consider the management of public employee speech within the public
university, where managerial prerogative seemingly collides with academic
freedom.
1. Managerial Prerogative and Public Education
When it comes to primary and secondary education, there is plenty of
evidence of the influence of managerial prerogative in First Amendment
doctrine. Even as it recognized the right of junior and senior high school
students to engage in a nondisruptive antiwar protest in Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District,2 39 the Court cautioned that
schools can prevent protests under circumstances "which might reasonably
have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material
interference with school activities," 240 a standard significantly more
238. The Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA) presents an additional complication
because its filtering requirement was imposed as a condition on the receipt of federal
financial assistance. On the one hand, the plurality viewed this feature as bringing the CIPA
within the protection of the cases on subsidized speech, see id. at 212 (plurality opinion); on

the other hand, Justice Stevens argued that this feature meant that the plurality's reliance on
the managerial prerogative of libraries to make judgments about quality was mistaken given
that the statute functioned as a condition on funding rather than as a managerial decision, see
id. at 226-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
239. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
240. Id. at 514; see also id. at 513 ("If a regulation were adopted by school officials

forbidding discussion of the Vietnam conflict, or the expression by any student of opposition
to it anywhere on school property except as part of a prescribed classroom exercise, it would
be obvious that the regulation would violate the constitutional rights of students, at least if it
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generous than the usual rule that protects potentially disruptive speech
except when it is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and is likely to incite or produce such action. ' 24 1 Since Tinker, the Court
has held that "it is a highly appropriate function of public school education
'242
to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse,
and on that basis upheld discipline against a student for a speech at a school
assembly containing "pervasive sexual innuendo" that would have been
protected outside of the school context; 243 and upheld a high school
principal's excision from a school newspaper of articles about students'
pregnancy and the impact of divorce because the principal's decision to
prohibit publication was "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns." 244 These holdings surely demonstrate how the character of
institutional objectives have come to shape the application of First
Amendment rules that ordinarily view content discrimination as suspect.
Most recently, in Morse v. Frederick,245 the Court even tolerated a
measure of viewpoint discrimination, holding that a high school may forbid
speech at a school event that is reasonably construed to advocate use 2of
46
illegal drugs in light of the pedagogical interest in discouraging drug use.
Even the dissenting opinion in that case acknowledged that "[g]iven that the
relationship between schools and students 'is custodial and tutelary,
permitting a degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised
over free adults,' it might well be appropriate to tolerate some targeted
viewpoint discrimination in this unique setting." 247 This approach fits
comfortably within the doctrinal parameters for a managerial prerogative
could not be justified by a showing that the students' activities would materially and
substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school.").
241. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam); accord, e.g., Virginia
v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253
(2002); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, Co.,
458 U.S. 886, 927-28 (1982); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1973) (per curiam).
242. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
243. Id. at 682-86.
244. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). To be sure, at some
points, the opinion relied on the fact that the newspaper was sponsored by the school, see id.
at 271-73, and therefore this decision is influenced to some extent by the government speech
doctrine, see supra note 214 and accompanying text.
245. 127 S.Ct. 2618 (2007).
246. Id. at 2626-29. Even before Morse v. Frederick,courts had upheld restrictions on
student speech that appeared to be viewpoint-based when supported by what they regarded
as an adequate pedagogical justification. See, e.g., Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445
F.3d 1166, 1178-82 (9th Cir. 2006) (prohibition on displaying antigay message), vacated as
moot sub nom., 127 S.Ct. 1484 (2007); Scott v. Sch. Bd., 324 F.3d 1246, 1248-49 (11 th Cir.
2003) (per curiam) (prohibition on displays of confederate flag); West v. Derby Unified Sch.
Dist., 206 F.3d 1358, 1366 (10th Cir. 2000) (same).
247. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2646 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995)). Justice Stevens was willing to
protect the speech at issue-a sign proclaiming "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS"-only because of
its opacity, and seemingly embraced a norm of law-abidingness as a legitimate institutional
objective: "[I]t is one thing to restrict speech that advocates drug use. It is another thing
entirely to prohibit an obscure message with a drug theme that a third party subjectivelyand not very reasonably-thinks is tantamount to express advocacy." Id. at 2646.
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outlined above-the mission of the public schools is to teach; they can
therefore hardly be indifferent to advocacy that undermines their
pedagogical objectives. 248
This prerogative to select and pursue
pedagogical objectives reaches regulation of the speech of teachers no less
than students; the prerogative to insist on the chosen curriculum implies the
correlative power to discipline teachers who deviate from that
curriculum. 2 4 9

Garcetti confirms this conclusion by denying protection for

the speech of public employees made pursuant to their duties. 250 After all,
regulation of what teachers say to their classes (as well as much of what
students say and write in school) "simply reflects the exercise of
[managerial]1 control over what the [school] itself has commissioned or
25
created.1

248. For a more extended discussion of the inevitability of viewpoint discrimination as an
incident of the inculcation of values thought to be appropriate in primary and secondary
education that in some respects anticipates Morse, see R. George Wright, School-Sponsored
Speech and the Surprising Case for Viewpoint-Based Regulations, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 175,
206-13 (2007). In a similar vein, Emily Waldman argues that viewpoint discrimination is
permissible to the extent that it involves speech that is reasonably attributable to the school
because it occurs in a setting in which some measure of official endorsement or at least
acquiescence to the viewpoint expressed could be reasonably implied. See Emily Gold
Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood's Core: A New Approach to Restrictions on SchoolSponsored Speech, 60 FLA. L. REV. 63, 110-23 (2008). Prior to Morse, the more commonly
expressed view in the academy condemned viewpoint discrimination in the public schools
even while acknowledging, somewhat inconsistently, a legitimate role for values inculcation.
See, e.g., Susan H. Bitensky, A Contemporary Proposalfor Reconciling the Free Speech
Clause with Curricular Values Inculcation in the Public Schools, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
769, 824-42 (1995); Stanley Ingber, Socialization, Indoctrination, or the "Pall of
Orthodoxy": Values Trainingin the Public Schools, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 15, 64-71; Samuel
P. Jordan, Viewpoint Restrictions and School-Sponsored Student Speech: Avenues for
HeightenedProtection, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1555 (2003); Martin H. Redish & Kevin Finnerty,
What Did You Learn in School Today? Free Speech, Values Inculcation, and the
Democratic-EducationalParadox,88 CORNELL L. REV. 62, 94-109 (2002); Lisa Shaw Roy,
Inculcation, Bias, and Viewpoint Discrimination in Public Schools, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 647
(2005). For a defense of Morse as properly deferring to institutional imperatives, see Joseph
Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 870-77 (2008).
249. For surveys of pre-Garcetticase law reflecting this point, see W. Stuart Stuller, High
School Academic Freedom: The Evolution of a Fish Out of Water, 77 NEB. L. REV. 301,
329-42 (1998); Waldman, supra note 248, at 75-87; Merle H. Weiner, Dirty Words in the
Classroom: Teaching the Limits of the FirstAmendment, 66 TENN. L. REV. 597, 615-36
(1999).
250. The lower courts have read Garcetti in just this fashion. See, e.g., Lee v. York
County Sch. Dist., 484 F.3d 687, 694-700 (4th Cir. 2007); Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty.
Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 480 (7th Cir. 2007); Piggee v. Carl Sandburg Coll., 464 F.3d 667,
671-73 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Martha M. McCarthy & Suzanne E. Eckes, Silence in the
Hallways: The Impact of Garcetti v. Ceballos on Public School Educators, 17 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 209, 219-27 (2008) (summarizing decisions). For an elaboration on this aspect of
Garcetti,see Waldman, supra note 248, at 102-08.
251. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2006). In his concurring opinion in Morse,
Justice Alito cautioned that he joined the opinion of the Court
on the understanding that (a) it goes no further than to hold that a public school
may restrict speech that a reasonable observer would interpret as advocating illegal
drug use and (b) it provides no support for any restriction of speech that can
plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or social issue, including
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2. Managerial Prerogative and Academic Freedom
At first blush, higher education might seem like a poor candidate for
inclusion in the First Amendment law of managerial prerogative. We
generally think about higher education as a venue for uninhibited discussion
and debate rather than one in which management is entitled to monitor and
control the speech of institutional actors. First Amendment doctrine related
to public colleges and universities seems to reflect just this point.
In Healy v. James,2 for example, as it held that a public university had
unconstitutionally denied recognition to a chapter of Students for a
Democratic Society, the Court denied that "First Amendment protections
should apply with less force on college campuses than in the community at
large," adding that the "college classroom with its surrounding environs is
peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas,' and we break no new constitutional
ground in reaffirming this Nation's dedication to safeguarding academic
freedom." 253 The Court has since held that mandatory student activity
speech on issues such as "the wisdom of the war on drugs or of legalizing
marijuana for medicinal use."
127 S. Ct. at 2636 (Alito, J., concurring) (citation omitted). It is difficult to believe,
however, that the Court's holding can remain so confined. Speech advocating the use of
illegal drugs cannot plausibly be distinguished from speech advocating any other type of
illegal activity that is potentially dangerous to minors. Perhaps more important, it is hard to
believe that the cryptic prodrug message that can perhaps be teased out of Joseph Frederick's
sign poses a greater threat to a school's pedagogical objectives than speech that
straightforwardly urges students to neglect their studies. Indeed, as George Wright has
recently argued, student speech that merely has the potential to distract others from their
studies surely threatens legitimate pedagogical objectives. See R. George Wright, Tinker and
Student Free Speech Rights: A Functionalist Alternative, 41 IND. L. REV. 105, 127-35
(2008). Whatever else his sign meant, Frederick was surely engaging in a form of juvenile
clowning at a school event-and that alone might have triggered a legitimate managerial
prerogative to avoid pointless distraction without need to turn Frederick into Timothy Leary
(for the uninitiated, see Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851, 857 (5th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 395
U.S. 6 (1969)). Had the Court focused on the scope of managerial prerogative in the
secondary school setting, it might have produced a more principled and persuasive opinion,
while at the same time embracing Justice Alito's related statement that "the First
Amendment permits public school officials to censor any student speech that interferes with
a school's 'educational mission,"' at least if the mission were defined in a manner that
"g[a]ve public school authorities a license to suppress speech on political and social issues
based on disagreement with the viewpoint expressed." Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2637 (Alito, J.,
concurring). An objective of producing ideological conformity, or even avoiding ideological
distractions, when not anchored in broader pedagogical concerns, as we have seen, has
always been treated as illegitimate, and Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District applied that rule to the secondary school setting. Of course, one could also
support the result in Morse through a different model-that of parental rather than
managerial prerogative. On this view, schools would no more be bound to respect First
Amendment rights than parents. Indeed, Justice Thomas advocated such a model in Morse.
See 127 S. Ct. at 2634-36 (Thomas, J., concurring). The Court, however, has rejected this
approach since Tinker. See id. at 2637-38 (Alito, J., concurring).
252. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
253. Id. at 180 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court reiterated this point as it
subsequently held that a public university had unconstitutionally expelled a student for
distributing an allegedly indecent publication on campus. See Papish v. Bd. of Curators, 410
U.S. 667, 669-71 (1973) (per curiam).
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funds charged by public universities are subject to the First Amendment
25 4
prohibition on compelled support for political or other ideological causes
and that public universities are equally subject to the public forum
doctrine's rule against impermissible content discrimination, 255 confirming
the applicability of the First Amendment to the public university.
There is, moreover, a substantial body of precedent recognizing a
constitutional dimension to the concept of academic freedom, with the
invocation of this concept in Healy providing only one example. 256 Thus,
in Garcetti, the Court cautioned, "We need not, and for that reason do not,
decide whether the analysis we conduct today would apply in the same
25 7
manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship or teaching."
Indeed, there is reason to be skeptical about Garcetti's application to the
academy. Although scholarly speech and writing might seem within the
scope of managerial prerogative as it was described in Garcetti because
they are incidents of academic duties, as we have seen, Garcetti involved
speech made by public employees acting as agents of the government. 258
It is
far from clear that scholarly work can be described in a similar fashion.
The First Amendment concept of academic freedom, however, reflects
the influence of managerial prerogative. The Court has invoked academic
freedom when it has granted academics protection from forms of coerced
ideological conformity, but in this line of cases, the coercion was imposed
by external forces rather than by university leadership. 259 The Court has
254. See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229-35
(2000).
255. See Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828-37
(1995); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981).
256. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003); Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-13 (1978) (Powell, J.); Healy, 408 U.S. at 180; Keyishian
v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960);
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
257. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006). This qualification was offered in
response to Justice Souter's expression of concern about the implications of the Court's
holding for academic freedom. See id. at 438-39 (Souter, J., dissenting).
258. See, e.g., Kevin L. Cope, Defending the Ivory Tower: A Twenty-First Century
Approach to the Pickering-Connick Doctrine and the Public Higher Education Faculty After
Garcetti, 33 J.C. & U.L. 313, 350-59 (2007); R. George Wright, The Emergence of First
Amendment Academic Freedom, 85 NEB. L. REv. 793, 823-29 (2007). For a similar
argument for recognizing a broad swath of academic freedom prior to Garcetti,see Rebecca
Gose Lynch, Pawns of the State or Priests of Democracy? Analyzing Professors'Academic
Freedom Rights Within the State's Managerial Realm, 91 CAL. L. REv. 1061, 1090-99
(2003).
259. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (invalidating statutory
provisions barring "subversives" from university employment); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479 (1960) (invalidating statute requiring teachers to disclose organizational affiliations);
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (invalidating professor's conviction for
refusal to answer Attorney General's questions about his lectures and political affiliations).
In the context of primary and secondary education, the Court has similarly held that the First
Amendment prohibits externally imposed regulation aimed at producing ideological
conformity; for example, the Court has invalidated laws restricting the teaching of evolution.
See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585-89 (1987); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,
104-08 (1968).
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described this line of cases as "recognizing a constitutional dimension,
grounded in the First Amendment, of educational autonomy." 260 This
formulation, of course, leaves unclear whether the autonomy right is held
by the institution rather than individual scholars. In the classic judicial
explication of academic freedom as a First Amendment concept, Justice
Frankfurter's opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire26 1 speaks of academic
freedom as an institutional rather than individual prerogative: "'It is the
business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive
to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there
prevail "the four essential freedoms" of a university-to determine for itself
on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be
taught, and who may be admitted to study.' "262 Notably, this account offers
no rights to individual scholars or students to be free from institutional
2 63
regulation.
The influence of Justice Frankfurter's institutional approach to academic
freedom in Sweezy is perhaps clearest in Regents of the University of
Michigan v. Ewing.264 In that case, the Court held that academic decisions
are insulated from judicial review absent "such a substantial departure from
accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee
responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment, '265 and cited
the First Amendment's protection of academic freedom as supporting this
narrow scope of review. 266 Moreover, since the Court had already held that
260. Grutter,539 U.S. at 329; see also Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S.
214, 226 n.12 (1985) ("Academic freedom thrives not only on the independent and
uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and students, but also, and somewhat
inconsistently, on autonomous decisionmaking [sic] by the academy itself." (citations
omitted)).
261. 354 U.S. 234 (1957). This statement has since been invoked as seminal with some
frequency. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 23738 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring); Ewing, 474 U.S. at 226 n.12; Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263, 276 (1981); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (Powell, J.).
262. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting CONFERENCE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN AND THE UNIVERSITY OF THE
WITWATERSRAND, THE OPEN UNIVERSITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 12 (Albert van de Sandt

Centlivres et al. eds., 1957)).
263. This is not to say that the public university itself holds First Amendment rights, at
least against the government that has created it. There are a number of doctrinal objections
to such a view. See, e.g., Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, 473 F.3d 237,
247-48 (6th Cir. 2006). But cf Fagundes, supra note 214, at 1664-78 (developing a contrary
argument offering some protection for governmental entities as First Amendment speakers).
Instead, as noted above, the rule seems to be that individual academics have a right to be free
from external interference with their academic work, but no right to be free from academic
regulation by their institutional employer. This is, of course, the concept of managerial
prerogative sketched in Part III.A above.
264. 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
265. Id. at 225.
266. See id. at 225-26. This principle of autonomy, it should be added, argues only for
protection when there is some substantial interference with academic decision making. In
cases in which the Court could discern no meaningful interference, claims of academic
freedom have been rejected. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional
Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006) (upholding statute imposing duty of nondiscrimination on
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the First Amendment grants individual scholars no entitlement to participate
in university governance, 26 7 the upshot of Ewing is that the First
Amendment conception of academic freedom is an institutional right, as
opposed to some form of collective right of scholars that they exercise
through some sort of entitlement to control university policy. Indeed, since
Healy, the Court has retreated from its suggestion that the First Amendment
requires that the university be an unregulated marketplace of ideas,
suggesting considerable sway for the concept of managerial prerogative
advanced above by cautioning that "First Amendment rights must be
analyzed 'in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment.' ... A university's mission is education, and decisions of this
Court have never denied a university's authority to impose reasonable
regulations compatible with that mission ... ." 268 Thus, the academic
269
freedom line of cases reflects deference to managerial prerogatives.
universities with respect to military recruiters); Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990)
(enforcing subpoena for peer review materials in litigation alleging sex discrimination in
tenure review).
267. "[T]his Court has never recognized a constitutional right of faculty to participate in
policymaking in academic institutions .... Even assuming that speech rights guaranteed by
the First Amendment take on a special meaning in an academic setting ...there is no
constitutional right to participate in academic governance. . .. " Minn. State Bd. for Cmty.
Coils. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 287-88 (1984).
268. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268 n.5 (1981) (citation omitted) (quoting Tinker
v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)). Moreover, in Tennessee
Secondary School Athletic Ass "n v. Brentwood Academy, as it upheld the antirecruiting rule
at issue in that case, the Court observed that "Brentwood made a voluntary decision to join
TSSAA and to abide by its anti-recruiting rule," then noted, citing Connick and Pickering,
that "[j]ust as the government's interest in running an effective workplace can in some
circumstances outweigh employee speech rights, so too can an athletic league's interest in
enforcing its rules sometimes warrant curtailing the speech of its voluntary participants," and
from this concluded that "TSSAA can similarly impose only those conditions on such speech
that are necessary to managing an efficient and effective state-sponsored high school athletic
league." 127 S. Ct. 2489, 2495 (2007) (citations omitted). This approach, in addition to
linking public employee and public school First Amendment cases, has plain application to
the students and faculty at public universities, who voluntarily affiliate with their institutions
in a way that primary and secondary students, who are required to attend school, do not.
Indeed, even in Healy v. James, the Court cautioned that "[i]n the context of the 'special
characteristics of the school environment,' the power of the government to prohibit 'lawless
action' is not limited to acts of a criminal nature .... Associational activities need not be
tolerated where they infringe reasonable campus rules, interrupt classes, or substantially
interfere with the opportunity of other students to obtain an education." 408 U.S. 169, 189
(1972) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513); accord Papish v. Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of
Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 669-70 (1973) (per curiam). In any event, Healy and its progeny
concern the First Amendment rights of students, rather than those of teachers.
269. This view is consistent with that of most scholarly observers, who have
characterized the First Amendment doctrine of academic freedom in terms of institutional
autonomy. See, e.g., Blocher, supra note 248, at 877-82; William G. Buss, Academic
Freedom and Freedom of Speech: Communicating the Curriculum, 2 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 213, 230-62 (1999); J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the
FirstAmendment, " 99 YALE L.J. 251, 304-11, 323-27 (1989); Paul Horwitz, Grutter's First
Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REv. 461, 472-501 (2005); Walter P. Metzger, Profession and
Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic Freedom in America, 66 TEX. L. REv. 1265,
1310-22 (1988); Frederick Schauer, Is There a Right to Academic Freedom?, 77 U. COLO. L.
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Equally important, the public university fits comfortably within the ambit
of the emerging First Amendment law of managerial prerogative. Under
the doctrinal framework advanced above, the threshold inquiry is whether
the public institution at issue must necessarily engage in the management of
the writing and speech in order to achieve its legitimate societal objectives.
On that score, the public university falls well within the scope of First
Amendment managerial prerogative-institutions of higher education must
necessarily evaluate the content and quality of speech in order to perform
their function. Grading is the most obvious example, but the same is true
when public universities decide what to teach, whom to hire, and whom to
tenure. 270 The argument for management of speech, however, goes much
deeper than that. The function of the university involves more than staffing
decisions and the allocation of grades; the university is widely seen as an
institution central to both the search for truth and the promotion of highquality public discussion and debate through its cultivation of a faculty that
insists on the highest standards of intellectual rigor by its adherence to
scholarly norms. 2 71 Thus, when the government establishes a university, it
REV. 907, 919-26 (2006); William W. Van Alstyne, Academic Freedom and the First
Amendment in the Supreme Court of the United States: An UnhurriedHistoricalReview, 53
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1990, at 79, 135-43. Even commentators who advocate
an account of academic freedom that affords rights to the individual scholar acknowledge
that existing doctrine provides only limited if any protection of this type. See, e.g., Matthew
Finkin, On "Institutional"Academic Freedom, 61 TEX. L. REV. 817, 846-54 (1983); Lynch,
supra note 258, at 1090-99; Julie H. Margetta, Taking Academic Freedom Back to the
Future: Refining the "Special Concern of the FirstAmendment," 7 Loy. J. PUB. INT. L. 1,
30-34 (2005); David M. Rabban, A Functional Analysis of the "Individual" and
"Institutional" Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, 53 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1990, at 227, 280-300. The leading dissenter from this view argues that
courts have overread Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy v. New Hampshire opinion, and denies
that the Supreme Court has ever squarely held that the First Amendment protects
institutional academic freedom. See Richard H. Hiers, InstitutionalAcademic Freedom or
Autonomy Grounded Upon the FirstAmendment: A JurisprudentialMirage, 30 HAMLINE L.
REV. 1 (2007). This account, however, reads at least Regents of the University of Michigan
v. Ewing quite grudgingly, and does not dispute that Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Sweezy,
even if overread, has taken on quite a life of its own. Nevertheless, if it is right that the First
Amendment, properly understood, offers no special protection for academic freedom, then
this concept supplies no basis to limit the applicability of Garcettito higher education.
270. As Justice Stevens has written,
In performing their learning and teaching missions, the managers of a university
routinely make countless decisions based on the content of communicative
materials. They select books for inclusion in the library, they hire professors on
the basis of their academic philosophies, they select courses for inclusion in the
curriculum, and they reward scholars for what they have written.
Widmar, 454 U.S. at 278 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
271. For a more detailed argument along these lines, see Byrne, supra note 269, at 33340. The same point can be made in economic terms; the university can be seen as reducing
transaction costs in the marketplace of ideas by acting as a repository for particularly highquality writing and speech. See Blocher, supra note 248, at 857. In their accounts of the
function of higher education, university leaders have similarly stressed the role of higher
education in improving the quality of deliberative democracy. See, e.g., DEREK BOK, OUR
UNDERACHIEVING COLLEGES: A CANDID LOOK AT How MUCH STUDENTS LEARN AND WHY
THEY SHOULD BE LEARNING MORE
EDUCATION 50-52, 172-75 (1987).

185-93 (2006); Amy GUTMANN,
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is seeking to foster a very special type of writing and speech. The public
university accordingly presents a context entirely consistent with Garcetti's
view that public managers will sometimes enjoy a prerogative to control
speech that they have themselves created or commissioned.
3. The Scope of Managerial Prerogative in the Public University
As we have seen, the scope of managerial prerogative is ascertained by
identifying the forms of content or viewpoint discrimination that are
properly incident to the university's mission as a public institution. Many
forms of content discrimination-for example, evaluating the work of
students and faculty for its academic merit-are plainly central to the
mission of the university.
When faculty grade students or evaluate
candidates for tenure or promotion, an evaluation of the candidates'
writings and speech in order to assess their academic merit is inescapable.
Universities must also manage speech to ensure that it is consistent with
curricular objectives. Faculty must, for example, monitor students' written
work and in-class comments to ensure they are relevant to curricular
objectives, just as the university must monitor faculty to ensure that they
hew to the prescribed curriculum. Even before Garcetti, courts had
consistently upheld discipline against teachers for speech that would
otherwise be protected, but that was inconsistent with prescribed curricular
objectives or that lacked a pedagogical justification. 2 72 Garcetti confirms
the soundness of this approach. And, as we have also seen, while the First
Amendment may forbid external interference in a public university's

assessment of student and faculty speech, it equally insulates such academic
273
determinations against judicial review.
Thus, a measure of content discrimination is undoubtedly within the

scope of a public university's managerial prerogative.
But what of
viewpoint discrimination?
As we have seen, the emerging law of
272. See, e.g., Johnson-Kurek v. Abu-Absi, 423 F.3d 590, 594-95 (6th Cir. 2005)
(professor could be disciplined for refusing to provide students with additional information
about grading policies); Vega v. Miller, 273 F.3d 460, 466-68 (2d Cir. 2001) (termination of
professor for use of sexually explicit and vulgar language in classroom infringed no clearly
protected right and was therefore protected by qualified immunity); Brown v. Armenti, 247
F.3d 69, 74-75 (3d Cir. 2001) (professor's refusal to change a grade unprotected); Bonnell v.
Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 818-21 (6th Cir. 2001) (professor's use of vulgarities in classroom
unprotected); Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 491-92 (3d Cir. 1998) (professor's
choice of curriculum and materials unprotected); Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d
1177, 1191 (6th Cir. 1995) (coach's use of racial slur unprotected); Martin v. Parrish, 805
F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir. 1986) (professor's use of vulgarities in classroom unprotected);
Lovelace v. Se. Mass. Univ., 793 F.2d 419, 425-26 (1st Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (professor's
grading policy unprotected). Conversely, at least before Garcetti, use of vulgarities or other
speech normally deemed unprotected in the educational setting was held to be protected
when it occurred in a context in which a pedagogical justification was evident. See Hardy v.
Jefferson Cmty. Coll., 260 F.3d 671, 681-82 (6th Cir. 2001).
273. See supra notes 261-65 and accompanying text. Thus, as one court explicated the
case law, "[j]udicial interference with a university's selection and retention of its faculty
would be an interference with academic freedom." Weinstein v. Univ. of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091,
1097 n.4 (7th Cir. 1987).
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managerial prerogative will sometimes tolerate viewpoint discrimination
when it is unlikely to drive disfavored ideas from the general marketplace
of ideas, 274 but higher education might seem to be a poor candidate for
permitting viewpoint discrimination. After all, if disfavored viewpoints are
banned from the university, they may indeed disappear from the
marketplace of ideas altogether. 275 The opponents of university speech
codes, for example, point out that they are viewpoint-based regulations of
expression, 2 76 and add that the purpose of the relevant institution is properly
to facilitate rather than inhibit the development of diverse
understood 277
viewpoints.
Resolution of these questions, under the view of managerial prerogative
advanced above, requires an identification of the forms of content or
viewpoint discrimination that are properly part of a university's mission.
And while the conception of a university as a viewpoint-neutral
marketplace of ideas is perhaps attractive, it is far from clear that the First
Amendment compels public universities to hew to such a model-or even
that such a model is consistent with the character of scholarly speech that
the university seeks to foster. After all, among other things, the university
is a forum in which the search for truth and the quality of democratic
deliberation is enhanced through an insistence on the highest standards of
In such a forum, content regulation is
scholarship and argument.
appropriate, but a measure of viewpoint regulation is called for as well. A
simple effort to produce ideological conformity advances no generally
understood mission of the public university, and for that reason managerial
prerogative grants universities no exception from the general rule embraced
by the patronage cases. Nevertheless, while partisan political affiliation and
any number of other ideological screens could not be regarded as
appropriate criteria for decision making in a public university, any number

274. See supra Part I.B.3.

275. Cf Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834-37 (1995)
(public university's exclusion of religious organizations from receiving proceeds of student
activity fund amounted to impermissible viewpoint discrimination).
276. See, e.g., BERNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 59-72 (discussing constitutional
implications of university speech codes); Stephen Fleischer, Campus Speech Codes: The
Threat to Liberal Education, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 709, 712-28 (1994) (applying First
Amendment doctrine to speech codes); Robert A. Sedler, The Unconstitutionalityof Campus
Bans of "Racist Speech ": The View from Without and Within, 53 U. PITT. L. REv. 631, 646-

53 (1992) (discussing "the constitutionality of bans on racist speech on campus"); Jeanne M.
Craddock, Comment, Constitutional Law-"Words That Injure; Laws That Silence":
Campus Hate Speech Codes and the Threat to American Education, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.

1047, 1060-89 (1995) (arguing that the First Amendment does prohibit content-based
restrictions on speech in campus speech codes).
277. See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 276, at 739-47; Evan G.S. Siegel, Closing the
Campus Gates to Free Expression: The Regulation of Offensive Speech at Colleges and
Universities, 39 EMORY L.J. 1351, 1399-400 (1990). A closely related attack on speech

codes makes the point that in the university context, counterspeech should be the appropriate
response to the expression of noxious views. See Charles R. Calleros, Paternalism,
Counterspeech, and Campus Hate-Speech Codes: A Reply to Delgado and Yun, 27 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 1249, 1256-63 (1995).
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of viewpoints lack credibility under the norms of the relevant academic
discipline, and surely no one would expect the university to remain
indifferent to students or faculty who pursue them.
Consider, for example, the view of those who advocate Holocaust denial
in the face of voluminous historical evidence to the contrary. 2 78 Surely no
one could doubt the propriety of a public university's refusal to hire a
historian who pursued such dubious views, just as no university could be
expected to refrain from discriminating against an applicant for a sociology
department who proposed to use astrology as a means of studying social
trends. 279 One might deny that this is viewpoint discrimination, and claim
instead that such regulation is merely a form of content regulation-an
insistence that scholarly work be supported by appropriate evidence. Yet,
in the general marketplace of ideas, the government would surely be guilty
of viewpoint discrimination by insisting that only views with ample
evidentiary support enter the marketplace of ideas. Even in the context of
the public university, discrimination against those who base their views on
faith rather than evidence-religious adherents-has already been branded
by the Supreme Court as viewpoint rather than content discrimination. 2 80 I
see no basis for treating astrology-or Holocaust denial-any differently.
For that matter, a history department might well choose not to hire
adherents to the "great man" theory of history in an effort to enhance its
reputation with regard to other, more academically respected approaches to
history, yet this too involves discrimination against an identifiable
viewpoint. 28 1 Yet, while a refusal to hire astrologers as sociologists, or
Holocaust deniers, or "great man" advocates as historians, is properly
characterized as viewpoint discrimination under current doctrine, it is surely
a type of viewpoint discrimination that is a necessary part of the mission of
the university-ensuring that the positions taken by scholars are supported
by the type of evidence that is demanded by scholarly norms, so that
scholarly work is appropriately rigorous and disciplined, just as the work of
part of their studies is subject to intensive
students undertaken as
282
monitoring for quality.
To be sure, First Amendment jurisprudence generally insists on
counterspeech as the answer to meritless ideas, as the critics of speech
278. For a description of the small but significant advocacy within the academy of
Holocaust denial despite the contemporaneous efforts to document Nazi atrocities in the
wake of World War II, see Kenneth Lasson, Holocaust Denial and the First Amendment:
The Questfor Truth in a Free Society, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 35, 37-52 (1997).

279. For a more elaborate argument along these lines, from which I have borrowed the
astrology example, see Judith Jarvis Thomson, Ideology and Faculty Selection, 53 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1990, at 155, 158-63.
280. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-46.

281. For a discussion of changing views of the proper study of history, see, for example,
Peter Burke, Overture: The New History, Its Past and Future, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON
HISTORICAL WRITING 1, 1-23 (Peter Burke ed., 1991).

282. For a lengthier explication of the role that viewpoint discrimination properly plays in
the academy, see Mary Becker, Conservative Free Speech and the Uneasy Casefor Judicial
Review, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 975, 1033-44 (1993).
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codes note, 283 but surely it is not the function of the university to hire
scholars that it thinks incompetent and hope that someone else rebuts their
work; or to grant degrees to students that hew to discredited doctrines in the
hope that someone can eventually persuade them otherwise. 284 If the public
university is to elevate the caliber of scholarly, public discussion and
debate, it must have the power to regulate both the content and the
viewpoint of speech consistent with scholarly norms. As we have seen, in
the general marketplace of ideas, the government would surely be guilty of
viewpoint discrimination by insisting that only views with ample
evidentiary support enter the marketplace of ideas, but just as surely, the
academy properly insists on scholarly norms as a means of exposing "more
subjective, flabbier, and less coherent thinking." 28 5 Of course, when
regulation is not based on scholarly norms but some other objective, then
the argument for deference to the academy's effort to pursue its academic
mission disappears. 286 But, as we have seen, First Amendment doctrine
reflects this point by granting deference only when regulation is consistent
with scholarly norms and not the product of external political
2 87
interference.

283. See, e.g., Calleros, supra note 277, at 1256-63.
284. J.Peter Byrne has made the point eloquently:
In society at large, freedom of speech insulates from penalty expression that is
vulgar, pernicious, incomprehensible, and mad.... The justifications for this
regime are various but persuasive. First Amendment doctrine recognizes the
danger to a democratic political process if officials proscribe some subjects or
modes of expression....
Yet can it be said that these familiar themes exhaust the value to democratic
society of free expression? The First Amendment ought also to be aspirational.
Society ought to strive toward speech that is truthful, gracious, well-considered,
and generous to opponents. It ought not settle for ...speech that is ignorant, selfinterested, manipulative, hateful, or vapid....
Preeminent among the systems of discourse within our diverse society,
academic speech holds expression to high standards. For all the notorious faults of
jargon and circumlocution associated with scholarship, academic speech provides
our most important model of expression that is meaningful as well as free,
coherent yet diverse, critical, and inspirational.
Byrne, supra note 269, at 260-61 (footnotes omitted).
285. J. Peter Byrne, Racial Insults and Free Speech Within the University, 79 GEO. L.J.
399, 419 (1991).
286. Paul Horwitz has argued that the existence of distinct institutional norms should
ordinarily be seen as a prerequisite for special judicial deference to institutions under the
First Amendment. See Paul Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions: Some
Easy Answers and Hard Questions, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1497, 1510-15 (2007). Whatever the
merit of this view, however, it does not reflect the emerging law of First Amendment
prerogative, which affords deference to institutions that lack such a distinctive normative
structure, such as the public workplace, where managerial prerogative is justified as an
incident of political accountability without need of an elaborate normative structure that
governs institutional regulation of speech, as we have seen. Still, as the preceding discussion
demonstrates, the existence of distinctive institutional norms is of considerable aid in
identifying constitutionally legitimate institutional objectives as well as impermissible
external interference with managerial prerogative.
287. See supra notes 259-64 and accompanying text.
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Accordingly, the First Amendment law of managerial prerogative
tolerates regulation of speech within the university as long as that regulation
represents a bona fide professional judgment of academic merit consistent
with scholarly norms. It will now be helpful to apply what may seem like a
relatively abstract formulation to a concrete case.
4. Managerial Prerogative and Faculty Speech:
The Case of Ward Churchill
Although a managerial prerogative to assess the content and viewpoint of
speech consistent with scholarly norms may seem uncontroversial when it
comes to hiring and tenure decisions, what of other academic work?
Consider, for example, Ward L. Churchill, the University of Colorado
professor of ethnic studies who was fired after producing a notorious essay
that seemingly characterized the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 as
an understandable response to American foreign policy, although the
university claimed that his termination was based on unrelated academic
misconduct. 2 88 Presumably, the university's insistence that it had not
discharged Churchill for the essay reflects conventional pre-Garcetti
thinking that even poorly reasoned and inflammatory work, if addressing a
289
matter of public concern, is eligible for constitutional protection.
Considering the view of managerial prerogative advanced here, however,
things look quite different.
We have seen that at least when it comes to making hiring and
promotional decisions, the First Amendment permits a public university to
evaluate the content and even the viewpoint of scholarly writing and speech
consistent with scholarly norms. Had Churchill included his September 11
essay in an application for tenure, there is little doubt that the First
Amendment would have permitted a denial of tenure consistent with
prevailing scholarly norms. At least to my eye, the essay as a whole is little
more than a rant, and its most notorious passage, in which the civilian
victims of the attack on the World Trade Center were likened to "little
Eichmanns, ' 290 is a non sequitur. It may well be that many participants in
288. See Dan Frosch, Colorado Regents Vote to Fire a ControversialProfessor, N.Y.

July 25, 2007, at Al 1.
289. For the conventional view, see J. Michael McGuinness, Public Employee Expression

TIMES,

Law Under the Colorado and Federal Constitutions,COLO. LAW., Apr. 2005, at 77.

290. This characterization appeared in the context of an argument that the victims of the
attacks should not be considered "innocent" (to the extent that the argument made is
comprehensible):
There is simply no argument to be made that the Pentagon personnel killed on
September 11 fill that bill. The building and those inside comprised military
targets, pure and simple. As to those in the World Trade Center ...Well, really.
Let's get a grip here, shall we? True enough, they were civilians of a sort. But
innocent? Gimme a break. They formed a technocratic corps at the very heart of
America's global financial empire ? the "mighty engine of profit" to which the
military dimension of U.S. policy has always been enslaved ? and they did so both
willingly and knowingly. Recourse to "ignorance" ? a derivative, after all, of the
word "ignore" ? counts as less than an excuse among this relatively well-educated
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corporate America cast a blind eye toward what may well be American
depredations in the Third World, but this hardly merits the remotest
comparison with an architect of the Nazi genocide. 29 1 The statement is an
inflammatory, unthinking hyperbole; if there is an argument that those who
planned the extermination of millions are morally equivalent to those who
are insensitive to the impact of United States foreign and economic policies
in the Third World, it is not made in Churchill's essay.
But perhaps the original essay can be forgiven as written in the heat of
the moment. Yet, in a book that he later published, presumably after having
had ample time to reflect on the fairness of his comparison of those who
worked at the World Trade Center to those who directed the murder of
millions, Churchill refused to back down:
The storm of outraged exception taken by self-proclaimed progressives to
this simple observation has been instructive, to say the least. The
objections have been mostly transparent in their diversionary intent,
seeking as they have to focus attention exclusively on janitors, firemen
and food services workers rather than the much larger number of
corporate managers, stock brokers, bond traders, finance and systems
analysts, etc., among those killed.
A few have complained of the "cold bloodedness" and the
"insensitivity" embodied, not in the vocations pursued by the latter group,
but in describing their attitudes/conduct as having been in any way
analogous to Eichmann's. Left unstated, however, is the more accurate
term we should employ in characterizing a representative 30-year-old
foreign exchange trader who, in full knowledge that every cent of his
lavish commissions derived from the starving flesh of defenseless Others,
literally wallowed in self-indulgent excess, playing the big shot, priding
himself on being a "sharp dresser" and the fact that "money spilled from
his pockets.., flowed like crazy... [spent] on the black BMW and those
clothes-forgetting to pack ski clothes for a Lake Tahoe trip. Dropping
$1,000.00 on new stuff," and so on. As a "cool guy" with a "warm
heart"? A "good family man"? Just an "ordinary," "average" or

elite. To the extent that any of them were unaware of the costs and consequences
to others of what they were involved in ? and in many cases excelling at ? it was
because of their absolute refusal to see. More likely, it was because they were too
busy braying, incessantly and self-importantly, into their cell phones, arranging
power lunches and stock transactions, each of which translated, conveniently out
of sight, mind and smelling distance, into the starved and rotting flesh of infants.
If there was a better, more effective, or in fact any other way of visiting some
penalty befitting their participation upon the little Eichmanns inhabiting the sterile
sanctuary of the twin towers, I'd really be interested in hearing about it.
Ward Churchill, "Some People Push Back" On the Justice of Roosting Chickens,
http://www.politicalgateway.com/news/read.html?id=2739 (last visited Aug. 14, 2008).

291. For an account of Adolf Eichmann's role in the genocide, see DAVID CESARANI,
EICHMANN: His LIFE AND CRIMES 36-199 (2004).
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"normal" fellow who "happened
to strike it rich?" How then are we to
292
describe Eichmann himself?
One hardly knows where to begin. The fact that the foreign exchange
trader considered himself unextraordinary surely does not merit any
comparison with Adolf Eichmann-unless pretty much the entire world's
population merits similar comparison. As for Churchill's claim that the
trader acted "in full knowledge that every cent of his lavish commissions
derived from the starving flesh of defenseless Others," Churchill's
supporting footnote cites only an obituary in the New York Times,293 which
itself says nothing of the trader's supposed awareness of the lamentable
source of his income; it does not even identify the nature of the trader's
work. 2 9 4 If there is an argument that foreign exchange trading inevitably
produces starvation, it is not made by Churchill; and he surely makes no
effort to explain why he is unable to discern any moral distinction between
a foreign currency exchange trader who may be indifferent to the suffering
that his profession supposedly creates and those who plan genocide.
Although I profess no particular expertise in the field of ethnic studies, one
certainly hopes that such work is not consistent with scholarly norms in the
field.
To be sure, ordinary First Amendment doctrine tolerates a good deal of
rhetorical hyperbole, 295 and protects statements that cannot reasonably be
construed as factual assertions as opposed to opinions. 296 But these
principles are found in cases considering generally applicable laws-they
do not answer the question whether a university must disregard what it
finds to be shoddy scholarship by one who seeks a scholarly position. It is
hard to understand how the marketplace of ideas is harmed if academic
institutions insist that those who seek admittance to institutions that adhere
to uniquely high standards comply with norms of scholarship rather than
indulge an appetite for vituperation. If bad scholarship were somehow
protected from critical evaluation in the hiring and tenure process, public
universities plainly could not fulfill their legitimate functions. 297 The

292. WARD CHURCHILL, ON THE JUSTICE OF ROOSTING CHICKENS: REFLECTIONS ON THE
CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. IMPERIAL ARROGANCE AND CRIMINALITY 19-20 (2003) (footnotes
omitted) (ellipses and brackets in original).

293. Id. at 33 n.128.
294. See B. Drummond Ayres, Jr. et al., An Old-Fashioned Man, A Pair of Loving
Brothers, and a Jolly Snowboarder,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2001, § 1B, at 8.
295. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50-56 (1988); NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982); Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin,
418 U.S. 264, 284-86 (1974).
296. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal, Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18-22 (1990). Nevertheless,
given Ward Churchill's apparently baseless but seemingly factual claim that some of the
World Trade Center victims knew that "every cent of [their] lavish commissions [was]
derived from the starving flesh of defenseless Others," supra note 292, it may well be that he
is not entitled to the First Amendment protection afforded statements of opinion even
without reference to managerial prerogative.
297. As Professor Byrne wrote, long before Garcetti,
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authority to repudiate bad scholarship and those who create it is plainly
within the scope of First Amendment managerial prerogative. The absence
of any reasoned defense of Churchill's incendiary reference to Eichmann
puts his essay in the realm of inflammatory cant, incapable of persuading,
rather than measured and incisive advocacy of an unpopular position.
Of course, the Churchill essays were not part of an application for
One could argue that
scholarly employment, promotion, or tenure.
Churchill wrote them as a citizen addressing a matter of public concern and
therefore should receive First Amendment protection. 298 One could also
argue, however, that university faculty are paid, among other things, to
produce work of intellectual value for both the academy and the public at
large, and, as a consequence, the university's enforcement of scholarly
norms even with respect to post-tenure writings intended for a nonscholarly
audience "simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the
employer itself has commissioned or created. '299 To resolve this debate
under the conception of employer prerogative advanced above, one must
return to the role of content discrimination in defining the mission of a
public university.
It is surely difficult to understand why the role of the university must be
limited to promoting high-quality scholarship only in work that is included
in a promotion or tenure application, with the university otherwise
indifferent to the quality of the work that its scholars produce. The point of
the promotion and tenure process becomes elusive if it is understood to
permit scholars to abandon the standards to which they have been trained to
adhere upon receiving tenure and instead produce work as debased,
demagogic, and unreasoned as the worst of popular culture. After all, there
seems little reason to inculcate norms of quality in the hiring, promotion,
and tenure processes that academics are free to ignore once they have
In particular, a university could
surmounted these processes. 30 0
[T]he free exchange of ideas, the support of which is the central tenet of the First
Amendment, is a more attractive ideal when it results in insight and elucidation
rather than in manipulative persuasion of vituperative ranting. The development of
a field of knowledge through reasoned debate and the progress of a student to a
critical perspective are among the most appealing and fruitful forms of expressive
activities. These goals are often missing in political or commercial speech. This
may be the sense behind Justice Brennan's highly figurative declaration that the
"classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas."'
Byrne, supra note 269, at 337 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603

(1967)). For a statement along similar lines, see Larry Alexander, Academic Freedom, 77 U.
COLO. L. REv. 883 (2006).

298. Some pre-Garcetti cases seem to take this view of the nonscholarly work of
academics. See, e.g., Levin v. Harleston, 966 F.2d 85, 87-89 (2d Cir. 1992).

299. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2006). This is the reason that the
extracurricular speech of students is likely subject to less extensive regulation than faculty
speech. The mission of the university is not generally understood to include supervision of
student speech not undertaken as part of the curriculum, although a full exploration of this
issue lies beyond the scope of this Article.

300. To be sure, academics sometimes produce nonscholarly work wholly unrelated to
their academic interests that can therefore be characterized as irrelevant to the university's
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legitimately expect that its ethnic studies scholars will make some
contribution toward elevating debate over America's interaction with the
Third World, rather than resorting to the most inflammatory and misleading
kind of rhetoric.
That said, I have stressed that academic freedom protects scholars against
political interference and insists that academic decisions be consistent with
scholarly norms. Churchill's essays appear to have been intended for a
popular audience, and therefore very likely should not be held to the same
standards as work intended for an academic audience. Still, even the
canonical accounts of academic freedom have never asserted that it includes
protection for shoddy reasoning or unsupported accusations in a faculty
member's nonscholarly writings. 30 1 For example, the 1915 American
Association of University Professors statement on academic freedom, the
foundational document of its type in the United States, 30 2 acknowledged
that "in their extramural utterances, it is obvious that academic teachers are
under a peculiar obligation to avoid hasty or unverified or exaggerated
statements, and to refrain from intemperate or exaggerated modes of
expression." 30 3 It also acknowledged the academy's obligation "to purge
its ranks of the incompetent and the unworthy, [and] to prevent the freedom
which it claims in the name of science from being used as a shelter for
inefficiency, for superficiality, or for uncritical and intemperate
partisanship." 304 These norms have remained widely accepted in the
academy. 305 Thus, although work directed at a general audience is properly
judged by different standards than scholarly output, those who indulge in
advocacy of crackpot ideas compromise the quality of public discussion in
debate in a manner inconsistent with the norms of the academy. While the
First Amendment forbids enforced ideological conformity, it offers no
protection to those whose work is inconsistent with scholarly norms, as we
managerial prerogative to control work that it has effectively commissioned. It may be that
writing or speech bearing little relation to a scholar's academic pursuits, and which has no
likelihood to undermine the scholar's effectiveness as a teacher, does not implicate
legitimate managerial interests. For an argument along these lines, see Thomson, supra note
279, at 165-72. As we will see, however, this distinction is not reflected in authoritative
statements embodying generally accepted scholarly norms.
301. See, e.g., Finkin, supra note 269, at 822-29; Stanley Fish, Holocaust Denial and
Academic Freedom, 35 VAL. U. L. REV. 499, 514-24 (2001); Horwitz, supra note 269, at
477-79.
302. See, e.g., RICHARD HOFSTADTER & WALTER P. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES 468-506 (1955); Byrne, supra note 269, at 27679; Risa L. Lieberwitz, Faculty in the Corporate University: ProfessionalIdentity, Law, and
Collective Action, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 263, 268-74 (2007); Metzger, supra note

269, at 1267-85.
303. AM. Ass'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, THE 1915 DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES (1915),

reprintedin AM. Ass'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE 172 (Louis
Joughin ed. 1967).
304. Id. at 170.
305. For a discussion of the development of professional norms with respect to scholars'
speech outside of their academic roles since the 1915 statement, see Neil W. Hamilton,
Academic Traditionand the Principlesof Professional Conduct, 27 J.C. & U.L. 609, 627-29,

634-37, 647-49 (2001).
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have seen. And, if Churchill's work is consistent with scholarly norms,
even for work directed at a popular audience, then we are all in trouble.
Although I suspect that few serious scholars have any sympathy with
Churchill's essays, one could legitimately fear that the termination of those
who voice unpopular views will have a chilling effect even on responsible
scholars. As a doctrinal matter, however, the Court has never found this
possibility in itself sufficient to impose on public universities a system of
tenure protection as a matter of constitutional imperative.3 0 6 There is,
moreover, reason to doubt the likelihood of this sort of chill. Tenure offers
a variety of valuable protections to scholars. 30 7 A university that
capriciously erodes these protections will accordingly find itself at a
significant disadvantage in the market for scholarly talent. Moreover,
evidence of political interference with academic decision making may add
up to a compelling case for pretext, depriving a university of the
institutional academic freedom defense to which it would otherwise be
entitled. 30 8 Indeed, the conception of managerial prerogative advanced here
could well ward off political interference with academic decision making
precisely because such interference would provide the basis for judicial
intervention.
The possibility of pretext, however, supplies no justification for granting
scholars lifetime protection for any and all shoddy work. Surely a
constitutional guarantee of protection for the incompetent is as real a threat
to the mission of the university as any other. The concept of managerial
prerogative, in turn, grants universities the control over speech that
compromises legitimate institutional missions, such as a university's desire
to elevate the level of public discussion and debate. After all, the threat to
academic freedom comes from political pressure, not scholarly norms. The
fact that bad scholarship may also reflect an unpopular political
viewpoint-as in the Churchill essays-is surely no reason to insulate bad
scholarship from the operation of scholarly norms.
CONCLUSION

As the adverse scholarly reaction to Garcetti demonstrates, the
emergence of managerial prerogative in First Amendment law strikes many
306. To the contrary, the Court has been quite clear on this point: "[T]he interest in
holding a teaching job at a state university, simpliciter, is not itself a free speech interest."
Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 575 n.14 (1972).
307. For an account of the benefits afforded faculty by tenure, see Mark L. Adams, The
Quest for Tenure: Job Security and Academic Freedom, 56 CATH. U. L. REv. 67, 69-81

(2006).
308. To be fair, there is some evidence of political interference in Professor Churchill's
case. See Cope, supra note 258, at 342-44. On the view advanced here that external
interference with academic decision making does not fall within the scope of First
Amendment managerial prerogative, a finding that political interference was a substantial
motivating factor for Churchill's dismissal would require the university to bear the burden of
proving that it would have dismissed Churchill even absent political pressure. See Mt.
Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284-87 (1977).
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as alarming, since it seems to reduce the scope of First Amendment
protections that those who work in public institutions enjoy. 309 Yet
managerial prerogative also advances critical First Amendment objectives.
Public institutions are properly assigned important societal objectives, and
are properly held politically accountable when they fail to achieve those
objectives. The First Amendment's protection for speech and the press is
thought to grant the public the information it needs to enforce political
accountability, but political accountability is undermined if the mission of
public institutions could be subverted by prodefense prosecutors,
efficiency-sapping workplace harassers, or inept scholars, who could use
the costs and risks of litigation as a means to blunt the ability of politically
accountable public officials to bring them to heel.
When it comes to the regulation of speech outside of public institutions,
we all compete in the marketplace of ideas, and First Amendment doctrine
endeavors to keep the competition fair. But when it comes to the
performance of public institutions, it is the marketplace of ideas that
evaluates them.
Permitting public institutions to act on their own
assessments of the quality of speech within those institutions does not
insulate institutional management from the marketplace of ideas-the next
election holds them accountable for the manner in which they have
managed the public institutions within their care.
Those who fire
prodefense prosecutors, or who discharge whistleblowers who have
exposed serious misconduct, will necessarily confront the ordinary
processes of political accountability that are themselves protected by the
First Amendment. The last say on the exercise of managerial prerogative is
had by the voters.
For those who aspire to a fully effective and accountable government, the
emerging law of managerial prerogative, by insisting on both managerial
control and managerial accountability, has considerable virtues. After all,
the First Amendment law of managerial prerogative acts in a representationreinforcing manner. It recognizes managerial authority in order to facilitate
the process by which public institutions are held politically accountable for
the manner in which they discharge their responsibilities-a process that
would be undermined by intrusive judicial oversight that would diffuse
accountability. Yet, as we have seen, it also circumscribes managerial
authority when public employee speech is most likely to enhance
accountability-as in the case of the true whistleblower who brings
concealed governmental misconduct into public view, or in the case of the
officeholder who seeks to coerce ideological loyalty from his employeevoters. For this reason, the emerging First Amendment law of managerial
prerogative bears more than a little resemblance to representationreinforcing theories of judicial review, such as the one famously

309. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
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championed by John Hart Ely. 3 10 In this sense, Professor Ely's work
continues to shape constitutional law. Worse things could happen.

310. See ELY, supra note 44, at 73-104.

